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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Institutions form the incentive structure of a society and the political and economic 
institutions, in consequence, are the underlying determinant of economic performance”1. 
-Fogel  and North (1993) 
 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to contribute to the discipline of labour law and economics 
through conducting an empirical analysis of the functioning of labour laws in India. It 
examines how changes in labour laws and legal institutions, which operate within and outside 
the legal purview, affect the functioning of the labour markets. The study also sheds light on 
the functioning of law and lawlessness, which might be of general interest for understanding 
the labour markets in many other developing countries. 
 
1.1. Background: 
The relevance of law in the economic development of a country is widely acknowledged 
in academia and policy making.  Legal and social institutions govern both the society and 
economic processes by providing a framework for interaction between individuals. Thus, law 
matters. However, the ways in which it matters, are heavily contested. In recent years, an area 
which has seen an intense debate surrounding the efficacy of the law is the relationship 
between the inflexible labour market institutions and various labour market outcomes. The 
laws, practices, policies, and norms that fall under the umbrella of labour market institutions 
determine inter alia what kinds of employment relationships are permissible in the labour 
markets. These institutions set boundaries for wages and benefits; determine working hours, 
and conditions; define the rules for collective representation and bargaining; proscribe certain 
employment practices, and provide social protection for workers.  Almost every country based 
upon its prevailing economic conditions, designs an industrial relation system and labour laws 
to protect workers and act as a redistribution mechanism to ensure a minimum amount of 
income for all working age population.  
After the end of Second World War, the industrial relation system was devised with the 
aim of regulating the industrial climate and to promote a harmonious relationship between the 
                                                          
1.  Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1993. 
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employer and employees. With the emergence of economic liberalization, the system of 
industrial relations and labour laws, which was once believed to ensure the smooth 
functioning of labour markets, however, began to appear as an institutional constraint that was 
likely to slow down job creation and labour turnover. Moreover it also started creating well 
protected insiders and almost unprotected outsiders. 
At present, the existing empirical literature which assesses the direct impact of labour laws 
or labour market institutions has been shaped by neoclassical labour economics which 
consider that labour law rules operate as an exogenous interference with the operation of 
market forces (Stigler 1946). This idea later set the tone for much of the economic discussion 
on the analysis of labour laws and industrial regulations (Posner 1984). In the neoclassical 
model, wages and employment are set by the interaction of supply and demand for labour. The 
market operates as an implicit regulator of decisions to trade that generate incentives for firms 
who bear the risk of losing workers to their competitors and for workers who bear the risk of 
exclusion from employment as firms could substitute capital for labour or perhaps even finish 
trading (Deakins 2009). Moreover, labour laws and their institutions are seen as an external 
source of inefficiency which reflects the rent-seeking behaviour of collective groups who 
control the labour market process. As a result, the rent-seeking, as it is aimed at redistribution 
rather than value creation, imposes a deadweight loss on the economy and hence, it constitutes 
a major source of inefficiency (ibid).  These sources of inefficiencies resulting from 
distortions in the operation of labour markets were primarily driven by legal interferences 
(Kaufman 2009). This view later became a driving force to design the labour market flexibility 
– a strategy proposed by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) for selected industrialised countries which were responsible for facilitating the 
creation of jobs and reducing the negative impact of labour regulations. The World 
Development Report (2005), for instance, argued that the deregulation of the labour market 
would improve the investment climate. Subsequently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has taken this position in various discussions for policy coherence among international 
organizations that labour market flexibility is a key instrument for the employment creation 
and economic development. 
Given this background, two compelling views have emerged and have dominated the 
debate on the labour markets in the developing countries. According to neoclassical 
economics, labour markets are perfect and competitive, and wages as well as employment 
levels are set by the demand for and supply of labour (Kaufman 2009). This view advocates 
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minimum state intervention to reduce inefficiency in the labour markets. On the contrary, the 
view from institutional economics argues that the labour markets are inherently imperfect and 
structurally unbalanced; wages, and employment conditions determined by market forces tend 
to have a significant element of inefficiency (Deakin 2009 and Freeman  2005). Therefore, 
this view postulates that the role of labour market institutions needs to be strengthened to 
promote allocative efficiency in the distribution of work and worker’s welfare. In both views, 
the debate over the relationship between the labour market and labour market institutions has 
intensified as globalisation and technological change have exposed both the developed and 
developing countries to greater competition and raised the stakes for finding the optimum 
institutional framework to govern the labour market. Voluminous qualitative and quantitative 
approaches have been used to analyse the economic impacts of labour market institutions and 
to investigate the effect of a specific labour law or policy that may have a significant impact 
on labour market outcomes. Research in the 1990s, mostly from OECD countries, typically 
found that the labour market institutions that were introduced with good intentions had 
unintended negative consequences on the functioning of labour markets. However, since then 
considerable progress has been made to study the impact of labour market institutions in a 
single country framework. Such a framework fostered their scepticism about the economic 
impact of labour market institutions.  
The functioning of the labour market is not only affected by the labour market institutions 
and labour laws but also by other non-labour market institutions which have an indirect impact 
through a changing division of labour within the family. The “Family” as a socio-economic 
unit in a given society greatly influences the division of labour, and resource allocation within 
and outside the family (Becker 1981). It also determines consumption and saving patterns and 
acts as a decisive factor in labour market participation. Earlier analyses treated the family as a 
homogenous entity with regard to consumption and production. It further assumed that all 
household resources and incomes are pooled, and this pooled resource represents the 
household’s tastes and preferences, whose utility the family seeks to maximise. However, with 
the changes in laws, many studies have noted its impact on the changes in the value of existing 
social relationships and bargaining power within households. For instance, in the United 
States of America (USA), the impact of changes in the divorce law on the female labour 
supply and educational attainments has generated considerable empirical research. These 
changes also reduced investment in marriage specific capital, while increasing the labour force 
participation of both married and unmarried women.  As a result, laws that affect the family 
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and alter the bargaining power within the household by providing incentives for participation 
in the labour market, have also emerged as a key instrument for active labour market 
intervention and a strategy for inclusive development(World Bank 2013). 
 
1.2. Aim of the study: 
 
This study contributes to the discipline of labour law and economics through conducting 
an empirical analysis. Unlike previous attempts which consider the legal institutions as a 
simple coded index drawn from the black letter laws of legal statutes, it is proposed to allow a 
more nuanced understanding of labour market institutions that takes into account the dynamics 
of local contexts, examines how it helps shape the economic behaviours and provide the 
systematic empirical evaluation of changes in labour laws on the macro indicators of labour 
markets. While so doing, the aim is to advance understanding about how the labour market 
and non-labour market institutions function and influence the functioning of labour markets in 
the single country framework of India. It however, will allow capture of the widely different 
institutional environments given the federal character of India with 29 member states and 7 
Union Territories having an equal number of partly different labour laws. 
Specifically, India as a representative country from the pool of many developing 
economies has been selected to study how the observed outcomes in the labour markets are 
influenced by the labour market and non- labour market institutions in India.  The context of 
the Indian economy also appears to be an interesting place for the empirical investigation, 
since it is the world’s largest federal democratic country, whereby labour laws and inheritance 
laws differ between the member states of the Union of India. The federal structure between the 
central government and its member states assumes a joint responsibility for law making and 
enforcement as enshrined in the Constitution of India- Directive Principles of the State Policy.  
This setting provides the diversity and statistical variance, which makes the statistical analysis 
particularly interesting. Due to its notable democratic institutions derived from colonial 
history, such a study would not be possible for any centralist state like France, China, Turkey 
or even many Sub-Sahara African Countries.  
Following the reforms in the 1990s, the Indian economy has achieved a remarkable 
progress in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which has attracted the world’s attention. The 
average annual growth rate of the Indian economy hovered around 6.3 to 6.5 percent for the 
period between 2000 and 2014. This period was also marked as a period of the demographic 
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dividend that India is banking on to provide the country’s 63.4 percent active working age 
populations (15-64 years) to the global economy. During the same time, this growth trajectory 
was largely criticised for yielding the jobless economic growth with the persistence increase in 
unemployment among youths by several prominent scholars. Rigid labour market institutions 
and an inflexible business environment were mooted as the principal factors impeding the 
labour market performance. Hence, in order to reduce the negative impact on the labour 
market, the state unleashed a slew of labour laws reforms aimed at promoting a business 
friendly economic environment and to improve its ranking in the World Bank’s Index on Ease 
of Doing Business. This dissertation analyses the impact of three of India’s legal reforms on 
the labour market outcomes and investigates the impact of those reforms on the observed 
labour market outcomes.   
1.3. Research Questions: 
Can labour market institutions be blamed for the poor economic performance in 
developing countries? The prevalent view is that they can be. This is based on a simplistic 
theory of the workings of labour markets, with the intersection of demand and supply curves 
for labour determining the “market-clearing” levels of wages and employment. In this view, 
the labour market institutions – however well-intended – are the primary sources of labour 
market rigidities. To promote flexibility in the labour market, many developing countries have 
started the institutional reform to compete in the global market. However, these reform 
measures were taken as a response to macro shocks in the labour market which were 
considered as institutional barriers. These reform measures were strongly guided by the  
insights of New Classical Economies which aims to accelerate the pace of economic growth 
and productivity so that benefit of higher economic growths will be trickle down to the least 
productive sectors. For instance, Brazil in the 1990s and Chile in the 2000’s started massive 
labour market reform programmes to deregulate the labour market in response to the exchange 
rate crisis and to the increasing rate of unemployment respectively (World Bank 2006). Unlike 
the developed countries, the labour markets in developing countries are characterised by a 
large informal sector and lack of compliance with labour regulations. Therefore, the 
developing countries’ labour markets appear to be a special case to assess whether the labour 
and non-labour market institutions have had any significant impact on the functioning of 
labour markets.  
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This dissertation will address the following three specific research questions.  
The first research question is: What is the impact of strict employment protection 
legislation (EPL) and the law enforcement on the rise in the proportion of temporary contract 
workers, who are not protected by these labour laws? And to what extent do firms located in a 
stricter EPL regime hire differentially more temporary contract workers in response to 
variable enforcement intensity? Answering this question is important because, across the 
world, employment arrangements have been witnessing a dramatic shift from a decrease in the 
share of regular employment towards an increase in the share of temporary contract workers 
with little or no protection from labour laws. The existing body of literature argues that 
restrictive EPL, in particular strict dismissal laws, increase the adjustment costs of regular 
workers through raising the costs of firing, and discourage firms from adjusting their 
workforce. Hence, there has been an extensive reliance on the temporary contract workers to 
increase labour market flexibility - an employment adjustment technique to manage the labour 
demand flexibly. The results drawn from these studies are based on the developed countries’ 
labour markets, which give little consideration to the developing countries that have a low 
level of compliance with labour laws and have a huge informal sector which escapes the 
labour law, regulatory law and tax law almost altogether. This peculiarity of labour markets in 
developing countries especially in the case as discussed above will allow an estimate of the 
interactive effect of EPL (de jure)  and Enforcement Intensity (de facto)  on the incidence of 
temporary contract workers by exploiting the variations across space and time in the extent of 
EPL and enforcement intensity.  
The second research question is: What is the impact of mandatory and non-mandatory 
conciliation mechanisms on the negotiated settlements and on the dispute resolution time? Are 
they effective instruments to avoid strikes and lockouts, and thus contribute to improved 
industrial relations? Is the mandatory reconciliation mechanism superior to the non 
mandatory mechanism in this respect or vice versa? This chapter will analyse the impact of an 
amendment to section 2(a) of Industrial Dispute Act of 1947 which provides a multi tier 
dispute resolution mechanism. According to the new amendment to the Industrial Dispute Act 
in 2010 , the disputing parties seeking to redress their dispute in a consultative process can 
have direct access to the labour courts, irrespective of the conciliation proceedings or the 
negotiated outcome of a conciliation conference. This amendment allows the disputing parties 
to resolve their case in a labour court. In the wake of the growing popularity of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR), this question allows an exploration into the effectiveness of state 
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mediated dispute resolution mechanisms when they are binding and when they are not. In this 
chapter, the relevance of conciliation methods in the resolution of labour disputes will be 
studied. Furthermore, it will also undertake an empirical assessment of the impact of 
mandatory and non-mandatory conciliation processes on the negotiated settlement and on the 
dispute resolution time. This chapter uses a newly obtained micro dataset on labour disputes 
from two Central Government Cum Industrial Tribunals (CGIT’s) in India namely, the 
Mumbai CGIT and New Delhi CGIT for the period between 2008 and 2011. The empirical 
strategy applied in this chapter allow the separation of the impact of the mandatory 
conciliation process on the negotiated settlement and disposition time when compared to the 
non-mandatory conciliation process using the three main variables namely– a) total case 
disposition time, b) differences in outcomes achieved by workers, and finally, c) the final 
payments received by workers.  
The third research question is: Do the changes in equal inheritance property rights in 
favour of women improve their educational attainments and the labour force participation? 
Answering this question involves the analysis of non-labour market institutions and their 
impact on the bargaining power within a household. This study is an example of how legal 
changes regulating a subsection of the society (the family) can have far reaching consequences 
on another subsection of society (the labour market). In 2005, India witnessed a major 
constitutional amendment to the very old Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (hereafter HSA), 
giving women a legal claim to inherit their parents ancestral bequest, dwellings and 
agricultural land on a par with men. This law applies to the ancestral property of a Hindu 
undivided family, and does not apply to the other property acquired by the parents. This law 
governs the inheritance rights of four religious communities namely- Hindus, Buddhists, Jains 
and Sikhs; it does not extend to other religious communities such as Muslims, Christians, 
Parsis and Jews. Prior to the 2005 amendment, five states of India had amended this Act to 
eliminate the gender inequality in inheritance and make it in a favour of women. The first 
attempts to amend this law came from the state of Kerala in 1976, followed by Andhra 
Pradesh in 1986, the state of Tamil Nadu in 1989, and finally by the state of Maharashtra and 
Karnataka in 1994 respectively. This change has larger implications in the Indian context for 
raising the socio-economic status of women, and particularly improving their bargaining 
positions relative to men, within the household. This study used the exogenous variations 
created by a legislative change in India’s inheritance laws in favour of women and  examined 
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the effects of equal inheritance property rights of women on their labour supply and education 
levels by comparing the observed outcome between the reform and non-reform states.  
From the foregoing discussion, it follows that the present study aims to explore the impact of 
labour and non –labour market institutions on the observed labour market outcomes by using 
insights from labour law and economics and development economics. It does not therefore, 
endeavour to articulate definite conclusions about the potential impact of specific legal rules, 
but rather it strives to generalise the conclusion drawn from the Indian labour market to other 
developing countries, which are markedly different than the developed countries.  
1.4. Methodology: 
To address the aforesaid research questions, the study adopts a multifaceted empirical 
approach largely drawn from the discipline of empirical legal studies and based on the positive 
analysis (analytical approach) as commonly used in labour economics. This study is carried 
out in the context of India to analyse the impact of labour and non-labour market institutions 
on the labour market outcomes. This study has three specific research questions. The legal 
provisions concerning labour markets are discussed and the different empirical approaches 
have been used to study them. Existing studies that have assessed the impact of institutions on 
the labour market tend to overlook the role of the specificity of legal provisions which trigger 
the conclusion. To overcome this limitation, the legal context for each research question is 
discussed in great detail and an attempt has been made to identify an appropriate empirical 
identification strategy for further investigation. The study uses a theoretical premise, mostly 
drawn from the discipline of labour law and economics and formulates its research hypothesis 
for the empirical test.    
To analyse the first research question, the study uses the EPL measure which corresponds 
with the Labour Regulation Index constructed in a study by Besley and Burgess (2004). It is 
based on the state-level amendments to the Industrial Dispute Act of 1947 for the period 
between 1958 and1992 and later. It was in the process of being updated until 2008. This index 
captures the inter-state variations in labour regulation over time. The index on labour 
regulation along with the index on enforcement intensity measured in terms of the number of 
labour inspectors per one thousand workers will be used to explore the variation in EPL and 
enforcement intensity across thirty one Indian states for the period 2000-2007. The study 
applied the Panel Data Methods (Fixed Effects Model) to estimate the impact of EPL and the 
enforcement intensity and their differential impacts on the incidence of temporary contract 
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workers. Empirical methods generally witnessed the problem of endogeneity, which in this 
chapter has been addressed using the instrumental variable approach 
To study the second research question, the study undertook a special effort to collect the 
dataset on labour conflicts using the Right to Information Act, 2005 from the Central 
Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT’s). This study formulated the 
research hypothesis based on the theory of alternative dispute resolution from law and 
economics. Further, the database was obtained from the two CGIT’s namely, Mumbai and 
New Delhi to test the proposed hypothesis. Using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method, 
this chapter examines the impact of mandatory and non-mandatory conciliation mechanisms 
on the negotiated settlement and dispute resolution time.  
To address the third research question, the study uses the intra-household bargaining 
model that considers whatever improvement in inheritance laws in favour of women would be 
likely to bring out a drastic change in the value of existing social relationships, and thus 
potentially would change the relative bargaining power within the household. Using the 
restrictive sample population, the study employs the Difference-in-Difference (DID) 
estimation strategy to measure the impact of inheritance property law reforms on human 
capital accumulation (measured in terms of the average years of schooling), and the female 
labour supply (measured in the months for the previous employment) for the reformed and 
non-reformed Indian states.  
Although there are interconnections between the chapters, they can be read independently, 
each addressing the specific issues. Broadly speaking, the contents of this dissertation are best 
viewed as an empirical exercise exploring how India’s specific labour laws and personal laws 
such as inheritance property rights, interact with the Indian labour market. In addition it 
examines how such interactions are receptive to advance our scholarship to understand the 
relationship between the labour market and labour market institutions in the present context. 
The study takes into account the development of literature in law, labour economics, 
development economics, and law and economics scholarships, until the 31st of March, 2016. 
Any significant development after this period is not taken into consideration.  
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1.5. Relevance of the study: 
This study provides a fresh perspective on how particular labour laws and their imperfect 
enforcements vary across the different types of workers and within the different sectors.  
Another topic which will be discussed in the following chapter is the role of the state mediated 
labour dispute resolution mechanism. Generally, the state mediated dispute resolution 
mechanism in many developing counties including India, is a preferred way to resolve 
problems, rather than to settle them in private negotiations due to the lower bargaining power 
of trade unions as compared to employers. This study will assess the effectiveness of the 
conciliation mechanism and will provide the empirical evidence on the impact of mandatory 
and non-mandatory conciliation mechanisms.  This analysis supports the arguments to 
strengthen the alternative dispute resolution mechanism relative to the traditional adjudication 
method to resolve labour disputes in the developing countries. As mentioned above, any direct 
legal intervention in labour markets is generally perceived to be bad for economic 
performance. In the final analysis, the study will present a case where legal intervention 
through the positive changes in inheritance rights for women will significantly improve their 
bargaining power and the labour force participation rates. These findings highlight that to 
bring in the important changes the market might require legal changes of laws which at the 
surface have no connection with the market.  The learning drawn from this dissertation is of 
importance for a societal perspective as it enables the assessment of legal institutions in the 
developing countries’ labour markets that single out the strengths of lessons learnt from 
theoretical and empirical models of developed countries. The study will be beneficial to a host 
of law and economics scholars, labour lawyers and development economists. Moreover, this 
will enhance the quality of a discussion like this, on the functioning of labour markets in 
developing countries and indicate the lines along with which the labour law reforms could be 
envisaged in the long run.  
From a scientific viewpoint, the study employs contemporary empirical methods to 
address the research questions with respect to the functioning of legal institutions in the labour 
markets. The literature related to law and economics is enriched by providing the robust 
empirical assessments.  Furthermore, it opens up the possibility of using insights from 
development economics and labour economics to enrich the current understanding of the 
impact of labour laws and regulations in the context of developing countries in general, and 
India in particular. 
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1.6. Thesis Outline:  
Chapter One starts with questions that are raised in the context of developed countries 
and identifies the needs to address them in the context of the Indian labour market. Next, it 
identifies the types of labour and non-labour market institutions which have been studied in 
the larger context. It then discusses their relevance in our context. In line with the main 
objective of the thesis, this chapter discusses the role of labour market institutions such as 
Employment Protection Law and Dispute Resolution Mechanism and their plausible effects 
on the labour market outcomes. Secondly, it discusses the changes in property rights laws and 
analyses how these changes have had a direct impact on the labour market through its 
influence on the female labour supply. Thus, this chapter raises three research questions in 
the context of the Indian labour market, which has witnessed a significant change in labour 
laws and policy to promote a business friendly economic environment. Subsequently, it will 
provide an overview of the Indian legal contexts and will review the arguments and evidence 
surrounding the impact of labour market institutions. Finally, this chapter outlines the 
methodological approaches and scientific relevance of the present thesis.  
Chapter Two will investigate the impact of EPL and its variable enforcement intensity on 
the growth in the number of temporary contract workers in the organised manufacturing 
sector. The analysis begins by studying the global trend in the rise in the number of temporary 
contract workers as compared to regular workers. It then reviews and examines the arguments 
surrounding the role of strict EPL and its variable enforcement intensities on the labour market 
outcomes. The chapter aims to study whether the impact of strict EPL varies with different 
enforcement intensities in the organised manufacturing sector of Indian states. This chapter 
hypothesizes that the firing and compliance costs as mandated by the strict EPL, factor into 
forward-looking employment decisions of the firm. If the strict EPL, that protects the rights of 
regular workers and enforcement of those legal rights, is perfectly complied with, then it is 
possible for firms to circumvent those laws. They would do so by reducing the demand for 
regular workers and by increasing the demand for temporary contract workers since the latter 
category of workers are exempted from the legal compliance. In this context, we expect that 
firms located in strict EPL states and faced with high enforcement intensity, are likely to 
experience a higher incidence of temporary contract workers compared to the firms located in 
less strict EPL states and facing low enforcement intensity.  
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In Chapter Three, another notable labour market institution- Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism will be examined in detail. This chapter aims to study the relevance of the 
conciliation method in the resolution of labour disputes and to empirically assess the impact of 
mandatory and non-mandatory conciliation processes on the negotiated settlement and the 
dispute resolution time. Traditionally, the labour conflicts are resolved in a multi-tier dispute 
resolution mechanism. This mechanism begins with a consultative process wherein, disputing 
parties with assistance from a third neutral person bargain to settle their claims. However, if 
the bargaining process does not converge into the desired settlement outcome as a last resort, 
disputing parties may proceed to litigation in the labour court. A former mechanism is also 
referred to as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and consists of mediation, conciliation 
and an arbitration procedure, that is, the process does not involve going to the labour court and 
is less expensive compared to other methods; whereas the latter involves a formal adjudication 
in a labour court or a tribunal with excessive costs as compared to conciliatory and mediation 
methods. In the context of developing countries like India, this chapter provides strong 
empirical evidence to strengthen the policy measures for conciliation mechanisms to resolve 
labour conflicts and discusses its social welfare benefits.   
Chapter Four examines the economic impact of non-labour market institutions, namely, 
the equal inheritance property law reforms in India, on the female labour force participation 
and their educational attainments. As is well known, in numerous countries across the 
developing world, women rarely hold secure rights to property, which can provide them with 
physical safety, psychological security as well as incentives to participate in paid economic 
activities. The denial of women’s rights to property takes the form of a systemic gender bias in 
inheritance laws and laws restricting women’s mobility, which are nonetheless the only two 
sources women can have at their disposal to improve their economic security. It is widely 
acknowledged that inheritance laws are the principal legal instrument that grant women access 
to family wealth and are an important determinant of an individual’s incentives for wealth 
creation, social mobility and access to labour market opportunities. Legal reforms that are 
aimed to reduce accumulative gender discrimination coexist with the convoluted interaction of 
customary norms and statutory laws. Hence, the effectiveness of these reforms has been 
widely disputed, and the vast literature including qualitative studies documents the 
discriminatory practices against women. Against this backdrop, the study will look at the 
economic effects of a constitutional amendment to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 giving 
women a legal claim to inherit their parents’ ancestral bequest, dwellings and agricultural land 
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on their labour force participation rate and education attainments. This chapter argues that, 
changes in inheritance property rights for women are likely to change their bargaining power 
and improve their autonomy within the household. Here, the assumption is that the equal 
inheritance property rights alter women’s bargaining power, and allow them to steer 
allocations in their preferred channels i.e., their decision to participate in the market and their 
education outcomes. To evaluate the potential effect of changes in inheritance rights, the 
identification strategy relies on a D-I-D to estimate the impact of reform. The causal 
inferences are drawn from the empirical analysis by comparing the mean educational 
attainment, and the female labour force participation between the reform and non-reform 
states, as well as between younger and older women. Treatment was assigned to younger 
cohorts in the reform states, and the observed outcomes were compared with the older cohorts 
in the reform and non-reform states. The chapter concludes that women in states where the 
reforms were implemented experienced positive effects on their employment and educational 
attainments. These positive effects have also been observed in their daughters’ educational 
attainments. 
Finally, Chapter Five summarizes the findings, provides some concluding remarks and 
indentifies avenues for future research.  
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Chapter Two 
Labour Law, Enforcement and the Rise of Temporary Contract Workers:  
Empirical Evidence from India’s Organised Manufacturing Sector2 
2.1. Introduction: 
The effect of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) on the growth in the number of 
temporary contract workers in developing countries is widely debated in the recent labour 
economics literature. For the past two decades, the share of temporary contract workers 
compared to regular workers has increased rapidly (ILO 2012). A segment of temporary 
contract workers mainly consists of those who are recruited by firms through third party 
contractors or temporary work agencies, and who lack the security of definite tenure as well as 
the basic employment protection. Temporary contract workers not only constitute a significant 
share of the labour market in the developing countries, but their share has also seen a 
substantial rise in many developed countries3. 
At a micro level, this growth has been closely associated with an attempt to increase 
labour market flexibility, in other words an employment adjustment technique for the 
management of demand of labour flexibly (OECD 2014). In the absence of this flexibility, 
labour markets in many developing economies are likely to experience high levels of 
unemployment. Firms in the developing countries tend to depend excessively on temporary 
contract workers as it enables them to adapt to the fluctuations in the business cycles. Thus, 
this growth has generally been perceived as a positive development in the labour market. On 
the other hand, this positive development has its own drawbacks. A growth in their share is 
coupled with poor working conditions, low productivity and lack of social cohesion with 
                                                          
2.  Note-This chapter was published as a journal article in the European Journal of Law and 
Economics with the same title, “Labour law, enforcement and the rise of temporary contract 
workers: empirical evidence from India’s organised manufacturing sector”, online on 14th 
September, 2015 (doi: 10.1007/s10657-015-9514-z).  
3.  The share of temporary and short term contractual workers has been increasing in many OECD 
countries over the past few decades. According to the OECD Employment Outlook report 
(2010), it has increased four times in the Scandinavian countries and has almost doubled in 
other European countries. This segment, however, employed 6.8 percent point of the European 
Union working population in 2006. In the United States and the Japanese labour markets, the 
same segment covers 6.2 and 4.9 percent point of the total workforce respectively (Heinrich et 
al. 2008). 
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regular workers (World Bank 2012). This suggests that the demand for temporary contract 
workers to adjust firms’ workforce is actually making them a more vulnerable workforce, if 
they are not covered under the employment protection laws. And therefore, it is likely that the 
supply and demand factors could have influenced the growth of temporary contract workers.  
Earlier studies argue that the growth in number of temporary contract workers is triggered 
by the stringent EPL, in particular, strict dismissal laws that increase the adjustment costs of 
regular workers and discourages firms from adjusting their workforce in the presence of 
adverse economic conditions (Boeri and Jimeno 2005; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002; Booth et 
al. 2002). According to these studies, a higher level of firing costs of regular workers also 
increases the compliance costs of overall labour regulation and offers less flexibility to firms 
to balance the workforce in response to product market competition. As a result, when faced 
with strict EPL, firms are likely to avoid the burden of adjustment costs and overall 
compliance costs of labour regulations through employing temporary contract workers.  
This large body of literature has two main features. First, it mostly focuses on the 
developed countries where labour regulations are more efficiently enforced (Botero et al. 
2004; Schneider and Enste 2000). Second, most of these studies have overlooked the role of 
the imperfect nature of enforcement while analyzing the effects of EPL (Almeida and Poole 
2013; Deakin et al. 2007). Much of the empirical literature has been extended to analyse both-
the impact of strict EPL on the firm’s demand for temporary contract workers where strict 
compliance with labour regulation was implicitly assumed (Pierre and Scarpetta 2013; Cuesta 
and Martin 2009; Autor 2003), and the impact of enforcement intensity on compliance with 
labour regulation that constrains the demand for temporary contract workers (Almeida and 
Carneiro 2012; Ronconi 2010; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005). However, none of the studies 
have looked at a case of labour markets in developing countries where there is weak 
compliance with labour laws, and the de facto level of regulation is lower than the de jure 
level (Feldmann 2009; Djankov and Ramalho 2009).  
Given this context, this chapter aims to estimate the joint effects of EPL and variable 
enforcement intensity on the growth in the number of temporary contract workers in the 
organised (formal) Indian labour market. In particular, it examines whether firms located in a 
stricter EPL regime hire differentially more temporary contract workers in response to 
variable enforcement intensity. India provides an ideal setting to study the growth in the 
number of temporary contract workers in the organised labour market. India has highly 
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restrictive employment protection laws but its enforcement is very poor. In India, the share of 
temporary contract workers has increased from a 10 percent point to a 27 percent point; the 
share of regular workers has decreased from 68 percent point to 54 percent point for the period 
1995–2010 respectively (Fig. 2.1). The Industrial Dispute Act of 1947 (hereafter IDA, 1947) 
sets out the regulations governing employer-worker relations and covers various aspects such 
as the resolution of labour disputes, hiring and firing workers, closure of establishments, 
retrenchment, strikes and lockouts. This act covers regular workers who are directly employed 
in the formal sector, through long-term contracts, and are largely represented by the trade 
unions. However, temporary contract workers are exempted from the application of severance 
payment, mandatory notice or retrenchment authorisation from the state (Rajeev 2010; 
Deshpande et al. 2004). Such exceptions from the legal compliance incentivise employers to 
hire an increasing number of contract workers due to the flexibility in the formal labour 
market (see Fig. 2.2).  
Figure 2.1: Ratio of regular and temporary contract workers 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, various years. 
The theoretical premise for an empirical analysis is derived from a simple model of 
dynamic labour demand developed by Adhvaryu et al. (2013) and Bertola (1990). According 
to the theoretical model, firing and compliance costs as mandated by the strict EPL, factor into 
forward-looking employment decisions of the firm. If EPL that protects the rights of regular 
workers and the enforcement of those legal rights is strictly complied with, it is possible for 
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firms to circumvent those laws. They would do so by reducing the demand for regular workers 
and increasing the demand for temporary contract workers since the latter are exempted from 
legal compliance. In this context, it is expected that firms located in strict EPL states and faced 
with high enforcement intensity are likely to experience higher incidence of temporary 
contract workers compared to firms located in less strict EPL states and facing low 
enforcement intensity.  
For an empirical analysis, this chapter uses the dataset of the Annual Survey of 
Industries to compute the share of temporary contract workers. Next, it explores variations in 
EPL and enforcement intensity measures across thirty-one Indian states for the period 2000–
2007. The results suggest that the average effect of strict EPL and high enforcement intensity 
on the growth in size of temporary contract workers is positive and statistically significant 
across Indian states. The average effect is stronger for enforcement intensity than EPL. This 
implies that strongly enforced legal rights for regular workers increase the demand for 
temporary contract workers relative to strict EPL. Second, compared to firms in more flexible 
labour regimes, those in an increasingly restrictive labour regime hire differentially a higher 
number of temporary contract workers in response to variable enforcement intensities. And 
finally, the study reports that the demand for temporary contract workers is rising in almost all 
labour intensive industries but the magnitude of the growth is slightly higher in inflexible 
states compared to flexible states. 
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Figure 2.2: Share of temporary contract workers across different labour regimes 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, various years. 
The topic discussed here is important for two reasons: first, it adds to the growing 
literature on labour laws and economics and provides empirical evidence on how labour 
regulation, as stipulated in the national legislation and its variable enforcements, generates 
incentives to use temporary contract workers. Second, in the context of India, labour 
regulation is criticised for being restrictive, since its strict enforcement may create obstacles to 
economic activity. Due to variations in EPL and enforcement intensity across Indian states, 
some firms may be more affected than others; thus, the present study provides a better 
understanding of this complex interplay of institutions which is crucial for allocative 
efficiency in the labour market.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a snapshot of previous studies; 
Section 2.3 provides an overview of labour regulation and enforcement climate; Section 2.4 
describes the dataset and variables; Section 2.5 looks at identification strategy and summary 
statistics; Section 2.6 reports empirical results and robustness checks and finally, Section 2.7 
provides the conclusion. 
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2.2.  Review of Previous studies:  
The evolution and persistence of temporary contract workers and the effects on the formal 
labour markets has already been a subject of immense policy debate in countries with different 
regulatory frameworks and labour market conditions. The introductory section provides an 
overview of some studies that have used different labour regulatory frameworks to study the 
factors responsible for the rise in the share of temporary contract workers. The regulatory 
framework implicitly assumed that the labour regulation is perfectly complied with. However, 
it may be correct in the context of developed countries but may not be true in the case of a 
developing country like India.  
This section provides an overview of some landmark studies that have analysed the impact 
of different regulatory frameworks and labour market conditions on the rise in the use of 
temporary contract workers. The US (United States) labour market is widely recognised as 
one of the most flexible in the world. According to Autor (2003), the rise in a number of 
temporary contract workers in the US is causally related to the adoption of one class of 
exception by the US courts (i.e., an exception clause to legal doctrine of employment-at-
will)—the implied contract right to ongoing employment by forty-six member states. On the 
contrary, Kalleberg (2011) considers macro factors such as declining labour market regulation 
and oversight; diminished union power and global capital in part responsible for the growth of 
temporary workers in the US economy. In the British labour market, the same growth is 
attributed to the European Commission (EC) directive that is being promulgated to prevent 
discrimination against temporary workers and extension of employment protection to protect 
the legal rights of temporary contract workers (Forde and Slater 2005). In the context of 
Germany, Antoni and Jahn (2009) examine the impact of the amendment reforming the 
Labour Placement Act of Germany in the period of liberalisation that has significantly 
increased the average employment duration of temporary workers. In response to persistent 
high unemployment faced since the early 1980s, many European countries have adopted 
widely varying labour policies concerning employment protection. Among them, the national 
policy instrument was directed towards the possibility of hiring temporary workers on flexible, 
fixed-duration contracts, aimed at encouraging job creation (see Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 
2002; Booth et al. 2002).  
In the Indian case, to begin with, the most influential study by Besley and Burgess (2004) 
examined the economic effects of two Central government level amendments (1976 and 1984) 
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to the chapter VB of IDA, 1947 on the employment outcome. The labour regulation index 
constructed by Besley and Burgess (2004) (henceforth the BB index) has further been used by 
Aghion et al. (2008) to assess the effect of the entry regulation (The Licence Raj); by Hasan et 
al. (2007) to analyse the effect of trade reforms on labour demand elasticity; by Adhvaryu et 
al. (2013) to examine the sensitivity of industrial employment to local demand shocks; and 
finally by Sanyal and Menon (2005) to analyse the impact of labour regulation on firms’ 
decision on the plant location and investment. Dougherty (2009) using the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) index on labour regulation argues that 
states with flexible labour laws, and plants in labour-intensive industries, experienced a 
fourteen percent improvement in total factor productivity compared to their counterparts.  
Using the same index, Golder and Aggarwal (2012) examined the determinants of 
informalisation of organised workforce by focusing on import competition and labour market 
rigidities. They report that in the post-liberalisation period, import competition was 
responsible for creating an increasing number of casual jobs, temporary contract jobs 
compared to regular jobs, for workers with above primary level education. Ahsan and Page 
(2009) depart from the earlier analyses of labour regulation indices, which capture specific 
provisions on hiring and firing restrictions. In the paper, they assess the effects of two cost 
components that could lead to labour market rigidities: first, the hiring and firing costs 
incurred by the employer while responding to global competition; second, the cost of 
resolving labour disputes that could otherwise have an effect on the employer’s size. The 
study suggests that states with inflexible labour laws and costly dispute resolution mechanisms 
experienced lower levels of output and employment growth than states with flexible labour 
laws and less costly dispute resolution mechanisms.  
Fagernaes (2010) provides a new direction to the present debate. Her paper analyses the 
effect of labour dispute legislation, and dispute settlement process (as a proxy index for the 
enforcement mechanism), on the formal–informal employment divide in India. The study 
concludes that the relationship between judicial efficiency (as captured by constructing an 
indicator of Court efficiency), and formal employment is weak. Recently, Soundararajan 
(2013) examines the impact of minimum wage legislation and enforcement intensities in the 
Central government sphere (a similar measure used in this study) on wages and employment 
among low wage construction workers in India. An extensive survey of literature, on the 
Indian labour market, confirms that the labour regulation climate indeed has a significant 
negative impact on the economic growth and employment level. One aspect which has been 
21 
 
overlooked in these studies (except two -Fagernas (2010) and Soundararajan (2013)), but has 
relevant policy implications, is the variations in labour regulation and enforcement intensity 
and their joint effects on the growth in the number of temporary contract workers in the Indian 
manufacturing sector. 
2.3. Labour regulation and enforcement climate:  
2.3.1. Labour regulation in India:  
Under Article 246 of the Constitution of India, labour is a subject in the Concurrent 
List. India is a federal democracy wherein the Central (Union) and State governments are 
competent to enact legislations. Due to joint jurisdictions, a large number of labour laws have 
been enacted to cater to different aspects of labour regulation. The central and state 
governments have powers to formulate rules to facilitate the implementation of these laws. 
The industrial relation system is mainly governed by the Trade Union Act, 19264, the 
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 19465 and 
finally, the Contract Labour Act, 19706. These laws are mostly applicable to firms in the 
formal sector, and the execution of labour laws varies greatly across Indian states. Among 
several legislations, the IDA deserves special attention in this paper. The main objective of the 
Act is to govern industrial dispute resolution procedures, and provide employment protection 
in case of unjust retrenchment, layoffs and lockouts. The IDA applies to a variety of 
                                                          
4.  The Trade Union Act of 1926 deals with the formation, and registration of trade unions by employers 
for the purpose of collective bargaining. Under this Act, trade union organizations are legally sanctioned 
and collective bargaining (at least nominally), strikes, and lockouts are regulated.
 
5.  The Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 provides rules and regulations governing the 
general terms and conditions of employment between the employee and the employer. Under this Act, 
the employer and the employee must agree on a set of rules and regulations governing the contractual 
employer/employee relationship. This Act provides income and job security to workers and safeguards 
the interest of both parties in case of a breach of the employment contract. 
 
6.  The Contract Labour Act, 1970 was brought into effect to regulate the employment of contract labourers 
in certain establishments, and to provide for its abolition in certain circumstances. A contract labourer is 
defined in the Act as ‘‘one who is hired in connection with the work of an establishment by a principal 
employer (the firm) or through a contractor’’. The Act makes certain provisions for the welfare of 
contract workers as a whole including payment of minimum wages, certain health and sanitation 
facilities on the work premises, provident fund benefits and so on. However, it has been observed in 
many field studies that this Act is completely overlooked by principal firms and contractors, and the 
legal rights of contract workers are poorly enforced. Due to the lack of collective bargaining and legal 
protection from labour laws, contract workers continue to face vulnerable work conditions and poor 
welfare (Shyam Sunder 2011). 
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establishments and industries in India. The terms ‘industrial establishment’ or ‘industries’ are 
used in the widest possible sense. It brings together almost all economic activities within the 
ambit of the Act, and is most widely applied in the Indian organised sector. It also establishes 
a three-tier dispute resolution mechanism comprising conciliation, arbitration, and compulsory 
adjudication of labour disputes. In the IDA, the regular workers’ layoffs and retrenchments are 
covered under Sections V-A and V-B respectively. Section V-A lays down regulations for 
establishments with 50 or more workers. For example, a retrenched worker is entitled to 
compensation equal to 15 days’ average pay for each year of service and for layoffs; every 
worker is paid fifty percent of basic wages and a cost allowance for each day that they are laid 
off (maximum of 45 days). Regulations in Section V-B cover all establishments with 100 or 
more workers. This section is more stringent and requires firms to obtain government 
permission to layoff or retrench a single worker. The closing down of establishments requires 
60 days (Section V-A) or ninety days (Section V-B) of prior notification to the government. 
Thus, both these sections of the IDA increase the costs of firing and compliance with the 
labour regulations. According to the IDA, contract workers are exempted from the application 
of severance payment, mandatory notice, or retrenchment authorisation. This creates an 
incentive for the employer to hire temporary contract workers differentially relative to the 
regular workers. Firms are free to hire and fire contract workers as market conditions change, 
without being subjected to the provisions of the IDA. (Rajeev 2010; Deshpande et al. 2004) 
observed that in many Indian states, a large number of temporary contract workers are being 
employed in work of a perennial nature, and it is mostly being done by regular workers. 
Moreover, they are being paid almost 45 percent lower wages than the regular workers 
(Bhandari and Heshmati 2008). Therefore, excessive reliance on temporary contract workers 
has become a prominent feature of the Indian organised sector. 
2.3.2. Enforcement Mechanism: 
India’s employment protection legislation dovetails job, income security, and 
collective bargaining to regular workers in the organised sector. However, their effectiveness 
relies on how well the legislations is enforced. The present industrial relations system allows 
each state to amend and execute all labour regulations prescribed by the central government. 
There are forty-five central government labour regulations (on which states can make further 
amendments), and in addition, hundreds of state level laws (Debroy 1997). This leads to a 
profusion of labour legislations, especially across states, and makes enforcement increasingly 
burdensome. Enforcement of labour regulations is decentralised at the level of states. At the 
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state level, the enforcement capacity is low due to poor human resource capability and lack of 
financial resources in the state labour departments. The industrial relations system is designed 
in a way that every Labour Inspector, Commissioner and Zone-officer, working under state 
jurisdiction, is responsible for enforcing multiple laws. Consequently, there is a gap between 
the number of labour inspectors available for inspection and their demand in enforcing these 
myriad acts. Since the 1990s, there has been an overall decline in the total number of labour 
inspectors as well as factory inspections at the state level. In this paper, the enforcement 
intensity measured in terms of human capacity is the number of labour inspectors per one 
thousand workers. The mean number of labour inspectors is 0.23 for one thousand workers 
across states. In the year 2000, the average number of labour inspectors was 0.25. This further 
declined to 0.19 in 2007 (Figs. 2.3 and 2.4). In the central sphere for minimum wage 
legislation, the mean number of labour inspectors declined from 6.51 in 2000 to 4.17 in 2010 
for ten thousand workers in the scheduled industries (Soundararajan 2013). 
Figure 2.3: Average number of labour inspectors (state sphere) 
 
Source: Pocket book of Labour Statistics, various years 
This decline is partially associated with a paucity of government spending on the labour 
department personnel (Shyam Sunder 2007), and partly due to the growing incidence of collusive 
agreements (e.g. a bribe) between employers and inspectors, the latter turning a blind eye to the 
noncompliance of laws (Basu et al. 2010; Rajeev 2010). Other institutional changes were adopted 
(adoption of ‘New Industrial Policy’) to curtail the power of the labour inspection system to attract 
Foreign Direct Investment and promote a business friendly environment. This change, however, 
exempts certain types of firms from inspections (such as firms located in Special Economic Zones 
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(SEZs)), small and medium size industries, and firms registered under the shops and establishment 
acts) and they are also allowed to self-certify compliance. As a result, heterogeneity in enforcement 
intensity at state level is primarily driven by the state’s economic policy, changes in institutional 
configurations, and their pursuit for Foreign Direct Investment (Soundararajan 2013) 
Figure2 4: Incidence of contract workers by enforcement intensities 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
2.4.  Data description: 
This chapter combines different data-sources: (1) Data on contract workers, value added 
and industry characteristics, (2) Data on labour regulation, (3) Data on Enforcement intensity, 
and (4) Data on state level indicators. The primary data source for this study is obtained from 
the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation of the Government of India. It is a state-industry level aggregate cross-
sectional dataset on total output, value added, profit, employment (both regular and contract 
workers), capital stock, wages and so on, at the three-digit National Industrial Classification 
(NIC) industry level, and at the state level for the period 2000–2007. The ASI extends to the 
entire country. It covers all factories registered under Sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the 
Factories Act, 1948, i.e., those factories that employ ten or more workers and use power; and 
those that employ twenty or more workers, without using power respectively. Our state-
industry panel dataset contains data on twenty-five states and six union territories (UT’s) for 
almost sixty-four three digit industries. Data on the labour regulation index is drawn from the 
study by Besley and Burgess (2004). It is based on state-level amendments to the IDA for the 
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period 1958–1992. This index captures the inter-state variation in labour regulation over time. 
The index on labour regulation takes values as follows: if there is no amendment, it scores ‘0’; 
if the amendment is pro-worker, it takes the value of ‘1’; and finally, if the amendment is pro-
employer then the score is ‘-1’. A pro-worker (pro-employer) amendment was one that 
decreased (increased) a firm’s flexibility in hiring and firing of workers while a neutral 
amendment left it unchanged. The BB index codes a direction of change if there are multiple 
amendments in a given year for each state. The cumulated sum of these scores in all previous 
years would determine the state’s labour regime in a particular year. The BB index on the 
composite labour regulation ends in 1992. This chapter reviewed the IDA, 1947 in a recent 
edition of Malik (2009) and collected almost nine state amendments that were enacted after 
1992—these are included in the appendix section of this paper. The BB index and its coding 
procedure was heavily criticised (Bhattacharjea 2006). However, in two later studies, such 
criticism has been used to correct the index (Ahsan and Page´s 2009; Gupta et al. 2009). 
Following Besley and Burgess (2004), and Gupta et al. (2009), this paper follows the method 
of cumulating the BB scores to categorise the states in three categories: pro-worker, pro-
employer and neutral for each year. Based upon a revised measure, six states are classified as 
pro-employer (flexible states) viz. Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. Another fourteen states are classified as pro-worker states (inflexible 
states): Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Delhi (UT), Goa, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Kerala and West Bengal. The remaining 
eleven states are classified as neutral states: Chandigarh (UT), Dadara Nagar Haveli (UT), 
Jammu & Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Pondicherry (UT), Tripura, Daman and 
Diu (UT), Uttaranchal, and Andaman and Nicobar (UT) (see Appendix A). 
In this chapter, the enforcement intensity is measured in terms of human capacity: number 
of labour inspectors per one thousand workers. The data on the enforcement intensity 
corresponding to Annual Survey of Industry years are obtained from the appendix sections of 
Pocket book of Labour Statistics published by the Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour and 
Employment of Government of India. To analyse the responsiveness of strict EPL, with 
variable enforcement intensity, we have categorised the enforcement intensity measure in two 
sub-indexes: high enforcement intensity, and low enforcement intensity at a state level (see 
Appendix-I). If the mean number of labour inspectors for a given state is higher than the 
overall mean value (0.23) of labour inspectors in the sample, then the state is referred to as 
having high enforcement intensity. For instance, the state of West Bengal has on an average 
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0.45 labour inspectors for one thousand workers making it a case of a state with a high 
enforcement intensity. In a similar vein, if the mean number of labour inspectors is lower than 
the overall sample mean of labour inspectors, then that particular state has been classified as 
low enforcement intensity. For instance, the state of Karnataka has on an average 0.19 labour 
inspectors, much less than the sample mean on enforcement intensity. Finally, the data on 
control variables comes from the statistical abstracts of Indian states, various reports on 
Economic Survey, and the Annual Survey of Industries. The following control variables at the 
state level are used: per capita state domestic product, per capita road lengths, per capita 
electricity consumption, and per capita state development expenditure. 
2.5. Identification strategy and summary statistics 
In this section, the study discusses the empirical methodology that examines whether firms 
located in stricter EPL states hire differentially more temporary contract workers in response 
to variable enforcement intensity. The identification strategy is closely related to Adhvaryu et 
al. (2013) who use state-industry and district level data to find that total employment in 
states/districts with more flexible labour regimes is more responsive to demand shocks. 
Exploiting variation in EPL and enforcement intensity, we first measure the impact of EPL 
and enforcement intensity on our dependent variable: the log ratio of contract workers to total 
workers at the state-industry level for the period 2000–2007.  
At the aggregate level, the base regression specification is thus: 
Yi,s,t= Įi+Įs+ Įt+ȕ1(EPLs,t)+ ȕ2(ENFORCEs,t)+ȕ3(EPLs,t*ENFORCEs,t)+įs,t+İs,t…..(1) 
(Yi,s,t )represents the log ratio of contract workers to total workers for industry (i), state(s) at 
time (t).  The base regression equation (1) controls for macro shocks with industry fixed 
effects (Įi), state fixed effects (Įs) and for time-invariant state-industry variation with year 
fixed effects(Įt). Industry specific fixed effects take into account the macro shocks resulting 
from the product market competition.  The state-specific fixed effects capture factors such as 
demography, culture and natural endowments. The year-specific fixed effects capture year-
specific factors such as common shocks of industrial unrest, and amendments in the workfare 
programme etc. The coefficient of interests (ȕ1) and (ȕ2) estimate the average effect of EPL 
and enforcement intensity on state-industry level outcomes (Yi,s,t). As mentioned in the 
previous section, the measure on EPL is computed as a cumulative sum of state-level 
amendments to the IDA. Enforcement intensity is measured in terms of total number of labour 
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inspectors for one thousand workers for each state over years.  In addition, the study also adds 
another coefficient of interest (ȕ3) to the baseline specification that estimates the interactive 
effect of EPL and enforcement on the share of contract workers. (įs,t)is the time varying and 
state-specific vector of control variables. (İs,t)  represents the idiosyncratic error term. The 
specification clusters standard errors at the level of state to deal with concerns of serial 
correlation (Bertrand et al. 2004).  
At a disaggregate level, the study estimates how firms’ demand for  temporary contract 
workers varies across states with different labour regulations as well as with different levels of 
enforcement intensities by adding interaction dummies.   
Yi,s,t= Įi+Įs+ Įt+ȕ1(EPLs,t)+ ȕ2(ENFORCEs,t)+ȕ3(INFLEX-EPLs,t *HIGH-ENFORCEs,t)+ 
ȕ4(FLEX-EPLs,t*LOW-ENFORCEs,t)+įs,t+İs,t…..............................................(2) 
In equation (2), the index on EPL is classified as either pro-worker (+1), pro-employer (-1) 
and neutral (0), depending on the cumulative score of IDA for each state. Enforcement 
intensity is classified as high (+1) and low (-1) enforcement intensity, depending on the mean 
number of labour inspectors across states. Hence, (ȕ3) and (ȕ4) measure the differential effects 
of inflexible EPL (pro-workers regime) with high enforcement, and flexible EPL (pro-
employers regime) with low enforcement on two dependent variables respectively. Sample 
states with neutral EPL (with ‘0’code) and average enforcement intensity (with ‘0.23’ mean) 
are being treated as an omitted category. When faced with high firing costs, firms located in 
inflexible states would have strong incentives to hire more temporary workers than those firms 
already located in flexible states. Thus, the magnitude of coefficient (ȕ3) is expected to be 
positive and larger than (ȕ4) i.e. ((ȕ3)  (ȕ4)).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Firms’ decisions to use capital intensive technology or a labour intensive mode of 
production are also influenced by the labour regulation climate. Most of the industries in India 
are labour intensive, so the negative of strict EPL is likely to affect the workforce composition 
of the firm. In this respect, the study tests in specification (3) whether labour intensive firms 
recruit contract workers differently across states with flexible and inflexible labour regimes.  
 
Yi,s,t=Įi+Įs+Įt+ȕ1(EPLs,t)+ȕ2(ENFORCEs,t)+ȕ3(INFLEX-EPLs,t*HIGH-                                  
ENFORCEs,t*LABINTENSi,s,t)+  ȕ4(FLEX-EPLs,t*LOW-
ENFORCEs,t*LABINTENSi,s,t)+įs,t+İs,t………………………………(3) 
 
To estimate the impact, the study adds an additional variable - labour-intensity dummy that 
takes the value ‘1’ if the industry belongs to the category labour-intensive industry and zero 
otherwise to (ȕ3) and(ȕ4) respectively. 
2.5.1. Summary Statistics: 
Before we proceed to formal analysis, Table 2.1 presents a descriptive statistic of all 
relevant variables used in this study. The average size of the contract workforce in a given 
industry-state pair is 1341 with the standard deviation of 7687. The maximum value of 
contract workers (i.e.,2,74,266), with the value of the standard deviation, and their relative 
difference indicates that the growth of the contract workers workforce is heterogeneous across 
the industry-state pair. On the contrary, the relative difference between the maximum number 
of regular workers (i.e., 2,45,973) and a standard deviation (i.e. 12,815) indicates that the 
average number of regular workers is relatively less dispersed than those of contract workers. 
Notably, the difference between the maximum numbers of both types of workers is low. This 
explains that the variation in different EPL states causes firms to use either or both type of 
workers at a maximum level. There are on an average, 105 factories in each industry-state 
pair. The mean cumulative score of EPL is (0.31) across all states, which is more close to the 
value of EPL index (0.39), constructed by Deakins et al. (2007). The variation in enforcement 
intensity across states appears to be low due to an overall decline in the total number of labour 
inspectors. Other state level variables, such as per capita state domestic product, per capita 
road lengths, per capita electricity consumption, and per capita state development expenditure 
exhibit remarkable heterogeneity in state level resource endowments and development 
indicators. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std.Dev Min. Max. 
      
State-Industry Level Outcomes 
 
 
Contract Workers 9586 1341.31 7687.44 0 274266 
 
Regular Workers 9586 4105.05 12815.41 0 245973 
 
Total Workers  9586 7048.15 19571.75 0 348062 
 
Value Added by Contract 
Workers 
9586 1250.02 2381.01 -578.5 151421.4 
      
Total Factory 9586 105.82 246.29 0 4301 
 
Total Output (in ‘000 INR) 9586 51472.38 195363.72 -79257 4493838 
      
State Level 
Institutions  
 
Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) 
9586 0.31 1.27 -2 4 
 
Enforcement Intensity 
(ENFORCE) 
9586 0.23 0.26 0.05 0.48 
 
 
State-Industry Level Control Variables 
 
Value Added (in ‘000 INR) 9586 68433.93 256603 -12197 8959593 
 
Net State Domestic Product 
(Per Capita in INR) 
9586 252.74 139.94 57.86 847 
Development Expenditure ( 
Per Capita in INR)) 
9586 14824.82 10612.96 224 47695 
 
Electricity Consumption (Per 
Capita in INR)) 
9586 1283.00 1870.14 75.06 14761.84 
 
Road Lengths (Per Capita)  9586 112334.9 88606.91 223 336982 
Notes: The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all 8 years and 
includes an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period 2000–2007. 
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2.6. Empirical results:  
2.6.1. Effects on the incidence of contract workers by EPL strictness and enforcement 
intensity: 
It is evident from the previous sections that firms’ decisions to hire contract workers 
are highly influenced by various institutional factors specific to the particular country. In the 
context of India, this chapter identifies variations in EPL and enforcement intensity in Indian 
states over several years as a major source of heterogeneous growth in the proportion of 
contract workers in the manufacturing sector. First the test of the premise: whether firms 
located in stricter EPL states hire differentially more temporary contract workers in response 
to variable enforcement intensity. Table 2 presents the estimated results for Eq. (1)—whether 
strict EPL and high enforcement intensity induce demand for contract workers at the aggregate 
level. Col. (1) of Table 2.2 shows that the overall impact of EPL and enforcement intensity is 
positive and significantly associated with the share of contract workers. The average estimated 
effect is larger for the coefficient on enforcement intensity than EPL. Next, is the control for 
differential industry-state-year specific effects. The inclusion of these effects allows a control 
for unobserved, time-varying, industry-state shocks that are potentially correlated with the 
variables of interest (thus, exploiting changes within states over time). In addition to fixed 
effects, there is a control for state specific covariates to analyse the robustness of the baseline 
specification. Inclusion of these control variables allows identification of the effects of labour 
regulation, and enforcement that vary along the some dimension. It further mitigates concerns 
that economic development and growth are endogenous to industrial development; while 
controlling for these potentially important determinants of industrial performance (Aghion et 
al. 2008). Col (2) reports that the magnitude of coefficients becomes larger for both 
independent variables after controlling for fixed effects and state level covariates. The results 
indicate that strongly enforced legal rights for regular workers actually increase the demand 
for contract workers more than strict EPL. Both the estimated coefficients are positive and 
significant but the magnitude of enforcement intensity is higher than EPL. High enforcement 
intensity that actually increases the overall compliance costs with labour regulation is likely to 
increase the demand for contract workers. The point estimate suggests that one unit increase in 
enforcement intensity leads to a 1.05 percent point basic increase in the proportion of contract 
workers within an industry.  
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Results obtained from Col. (1) and (2) shows that firms located in strict EPL and a 
high enforcement regime are likely to hire more contract workers. However, a firm perceives a 
higher level of enforcement intensity as a stronger factor that influences their choice for 
contract workers than strict EPL. The effectiveness of flexible or inflexible labour laws 
depends on how well they are being enforced in a particular context. As mentioned in the 
introduction, labour markets in developed countries generally comply, but this is not true for 
the labour markets of developing countries. Although India appears to be strict in terms of 
EPL on paper, in practice the legislations are poorly enforced (Nagaraj 2004). Next, the study 
tests the joint impact of EPL and enforcement intensity on the share of contract workers. 
Columns (3) and (4) re-estimate the baseline specification by adding an interactive term i.e. 
(EPL*ENFORCE), to analyse the average impact of strict EPL when it is correctly enforced 
on the firms’ demand for contract workers.  
 Using controls and fixed effects, the estimated impact of the interaction term is large, 
positive and significantly different than zero for contract workers. The point estimate indicates 
that a unit increase in strictness of both EPL and Enforcement are likely to yield a positive 
impact on contract workers in the state-industry pair by 0.31 percent point. This implies that 
both firing costs as well as compliance costs (i.e. through effective enforcement), as mandated 
through strict EPL, act as pivotal factors in the employment decision. Thus, when faced with 
strict legal regimes, firms would probably circumvent those laws by reducing the demand for 
regular workers and increase the demand for temporary contract workers since the latter 
category of workers are exempted from legal compliance. 
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Table 2.2: Effects of EPL and Enforcement Intensity on the Share of Contract Workers 
(Aggregate) 
State-Industry Panel 
 (1) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
(2) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
(3) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
(4) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
    
EPL 0.0199*
*   
(0.0101) 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
0.083*** 
(0.031) 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
ENFORCE 0.354**
*   
(0.128) 
1.054*** 
(0.155) 
0.100**   
(0.046) 
1.087***  
(0.158) 
EPL*ENFORCE   0.321***  
(0.092) 
0.312***   
(0.027) 
Controls      
Log NSDP  -0.423***   
(0.040) 
 0.113*** 
(0.017) 
Log DEV EXP  - 
0.228***  
(0.025) 
 -0.224 ***   
(0.025) 
Log Electricity  0.317*** 
(0.026) 
 0.312***   
(0.027) 
Log Road  0.115*** 
(0.017) 
 0.041*** 
(0.040) 
Fixed Effects 
(Industry+Year+State) 
No YES NO YES 
Constants  2.555**
*   
(0.032) 
3.279***  
(0.085) 
2.524***  
(0.033) 
1.068***    
(0.243) 
Adj R2 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.20 
No. of observations 9586 9367 9586 9367 
 Note: The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all eight years 
and includes an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period 2000–
2007. Robust standard error is reported in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states. * Significant at 
10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %. 
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2.6.2. Effects on the incidence of contract workers by variable EPL strictness and 
enforcement intensity: 
 In this section, there is discussion of the results on the differential responses of firms 
towards contract workers that vary across states with different labour regulations as well as 
with a diverse level of enforcement intensities as formulated in the Eq. (2). It is expected that 
due to a restrictive legal environment, firms located in inflexible states would have a strong 
incentive to hire more temporary workers than those firms who are already located in a 
flexible environment. Thus, the estimated effects would be larger in inflexible states as 
compared to flexible states. Col. (1) and (2) in Table 2.3 report that the differential response to 
contract workers is higher in a strict EPL regime with high enforcement intensity; the response 
is quite low in states with low EPL and low enforcement intensity. In the same column, the 
coefficients on EPL and enforcement intensity reports the analogous results as presented in the 
previous section. In col. (3), there was control for fixed effects and it included additional 
control variables to check the robustness of results obtained from col. (1) and (2). The re-
estimated results are fully consistent with those obtained above. States that have strict EPL 
with a high enforcement intensity are likely to witness a greater increase in the number of 
contract workers than those states which have had a flexible labour regulation regime. The 
results obtained from Table 2.2 also provide a strong case for differential response of contract 
workers, through rejecting the hypothesis that the response to contract workers is equal across 
EPL and enforcement regimes. The point estimate suggests that highly inflexible states, with 
strict enforcement intensities, experience 0.23 percent point higher incidence of contract 
workers relative to flexible states with lenient enforcement. This result is indicated in the Fig. 
(2.4) that capture the macro level trend. 
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Table 2.3: Effects on the Share of Contract Workers by variable EPL and Enforcement 
Intensities (Disaggregated) 
State-Industry Panel 
 (1) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
(2) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
(3) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
   
EPL 0.101** 
(0.046) 
0.025** 
(0.013) 
0.044 *** 
(0.013) 
ENFORCE 0.124 
*** 
(0.008) 
1.014*** 
(0.155) 
1.593*** 
(0.167) 
HIGH_EPL*HIGH_ENFORCE (ȕ3) 0.448 
*** 
(0.041) 
0.501*** 
(0.040) 
0.617*** 
(0.081) 
LOW_EPL*LOW_ENFORCE (ȕ4) 0.287**
* 
(0.049) 
0.381*** 
(0.048) 
0.592*** 
(0.060) 
Controls    
Log NSDP   -0.373*** 
(0.040) 
Log DEV EXP   -0.200  
*** 
(0.025) 
Log Electricity   0.325 *** 
(0.027) 
Log Road   0.189*** 
(0.019) 
Fixed Effects 
(Industry+Year+State) 
NO YES YES 
Ho: (ȕ3) -(ȕ4)=0   0.283*** 
(0.004) 
Constants 2.728**
* 
(0.035) 
2.732*** 
(0.038) 
1.238*** 
(0.251) 
Adj R2 0.16 0.20 0.22 
No. of observations 9586 9367 9586 
Note: The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all eight years 
and includes an average of sixty-four three digit industries in the thirty-one Indian states over the period 2000–
2007. We report robust standard error in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states. * Significant at 
10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %. 
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2.6.3. Effects on the incidence of contract workers across labour intensive industries 
caused by variable EPL strictness and enforcement intensity: 
 In India, almost all industries rely on labour intensive technology. The selection of 
technology for the production activities is susceptible to the local regulatory environment. In 
the previous two sections, it was seen that the variation in strictness in EPL and enforcement 
intensities across states leads to differential responses to the demand for contract workers. In 
this section, the response of these variations in flexible, inflexible and neutral labour regimes 
is exploited and tested for whether they vary across the labour intensive industries. There is an 
estimate of the regression Eq. (3), analogous to the previous Eqs. (1) and (2). In this 
specification, our main independent variables interact with the dummy variable for labour 
intensive industries . Col. (1)–(3) in Table 2.4 report the average effect of the interaction term 
that allows examination of the differential effects for labour intensive industries across states. 
Controlling for macro trends and fixed effects, the average effect on the incidence of contract 
workers, in labour intensive industries, by variable EPL, and enforcement intensities, in the 
inflexible states, is somewhat higher compared to the flexible states. The null hypothesis: the 
response to temporary contract workers in labour intensive industries is equal across different 
EPL and enforcement regimes. The point estimates indicate that firms located in pro-worker 
labour states with a high enforcement intensity demand 0.13 percent point basis more contract 
workers than firms located in pro-employer states with low enforcement intensity. 
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Table  2. 4:  Effects on the Share of Contract Workers across Labour Intensive 
Industries by variable EPL and Enforcement Intensities (Disaggregated) 
State-Industry Panel 
 (1) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
(2) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
(3) 
Log 
contract 
workers 
   
EPL 0.019* 
(0.011) 
0.034 ***  
(0.010) 
0.034***   
(0.010) 
ENFORCE 0.508 
***  
(0.141) 
0.445***   
(0.134) 
0.985***   
(0.157) 
HIGH_EPL*HIGH_ENFORCE*LABINTENS (ȕ3) 0.025** 
(0.012) 
0.033**   
(0.0124) 
0.041***   
(0.015) 
LOW_EPL*LOW_ENFORCE*LABINTENS (ȕ4) 0.032 ** 
(0.015) 
0.033**  
(0.015) 
0.042***   
(0.0125) 
Controls    
Log NSDP   -0.437***   
(0.040) 
Log DEV EXP   -0.238***   
(0.0255) 
Log Electricity   0.338***   
(0.0275) 
Log Road   0.125***   
(0.0177) 
Fixed Effects 
(Industry+Year+State) 
NO YES YES 
Ho: (ȕ3) -(ȕ4)=0   0.1363***   
(0.0178) 
Constants 2.545*** 
(0.032) 
2.568***   
(0.035) 
2.443***   
(0.0165) 
Adj R2 0.16 0.19 0.21 
No. of observations 9586 9586 9586 
Notes: The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all  eight years 
and includes an average of sixty four three digit industries in the thirty one  Indian states over the period 2000-
2007. Robust standard errors are reported  in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states. *significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
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2.6.4. Endogeneity concern and robustness checks: 
 Throughout this chapter, the effect of EPL and enforcement intensity on the share of 
contract workers has been considered, but it cannot be denied that these effects could be 
driven by a reverse causality. A change in labour regulations does not occur randomly. In this 
case, it is also possible that changes in labour regulation may result from an inconsistency in 
economic and political outcomes that would influence the costs and benefits of passing 
individual amendments to the IDA.  
 In such a case, our estimates of these effects would be too high. Using exogenous 
sources of variations in the IDA, and the labour regulation measure as an instrumental variable 
will help address this concern. Besley and Burgess (2004) found that most changes in labour 
regulation took place after 1977, following the declaration of a state of Emergency. This 
caused a shock to the incumbent sovereign status in the subsequent elections. The Congress 
party lost political power in sixteen out of the thirty-one sample states. The newly formed non-
Congress government in these states introduced new ideas for the development of industrial 
relations. Thus, early changes in the IDA can be associated with this political shock. Besley 
and Burgess (2004) suggest two measures for capturing the initial conditions that trigger 
political development in each state and their influence on labour regulation for the period post 
1977 when political competition intensified: (1) the pre-1977 unionisation, and (2) the 
historical pattern of land tenure captured by the proportion of districts in each state, which had 
non-landlord-based revenue collection systems. These two variables explain significant 
transitions in industrial relations due to changes in political power from the Congress party to 
non-Congress regional parties. States where regional parties have a majority witnessed a more 
protective attitude towards labour regulation and welfare, than the Congress-ruled states. Two 
variables as instruments are explored for regulation measures restricted to amendments that 
took place after 1977.  
 Col. (1) of Table 2.5 indicates the ordinary least square estimate of labour regulation 
measures from two instrumental variables for a sample of thirty-one states. Both instruments 
are strongly correlated with labour regulation (F statistics = 5.15). The union variable is 
positively correlated with labour regulation, while the variable based on the proportion of 
districts with non-landlord based revenue collection systems is negatively correlated with 
labour regulation.  Cols. (3) to (5) report instrumental variable estimates of the effects of 
instrumented labour regulation on the proportion of contract workers. The results are robust to 
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instrument variables7. It also implies that the effects of labour regulation as an instrumemental 
variable on the growth of contract workers in Indian industries, indeed has a slightly larger 
impact than those reported by the OLS. The standard errors for the IV estimates are also larger 
than the OLS standard errors. During the Emergency, a major transition in political control of 
states was accompanied by the revival of judicial activism in India. Raparelia (2013) observes 
that the Supreme Court of India in the late 1970s, emerged as a resuscitate judicial authority, 
and protected the Court’s independence following its capitulation during the Indira Gandhi 
imposed Emergency (1975–1977). The study argues that the emergence of judicial activism in 
India was largely influenced by the swelling of diverse social movements that emerged in the 
mid1970s. During the period, Indian courts began to deliver various socio-economic 
entitlements in the Constitution, justiciable through its substantive re-interpretations, and 
implicitly strengthening enforcement mechanisms (Chatterjee 1998). Higher judicial activism 
had a spill over effect on labour jurisprudence and industrial relations (Raparelia 2013). The 
study assumes that changes in the political climate during the Emergency would have 
influenced the enforcement of pro-worker labour regulation (inflexible). Two instruments 
were used to see whether variation in the enforcement intensities is primarily due to changes 
in the Court’s stance, and not from the industrial development to enforcement of labour 
regulation. In col. (6), the OLS estimates of two instrumental variables on the enforcement 
index is positive and significant (F statistics = 7.56). This implies that the wave of changes in 
political climate was also associated with changes in the enforcement of labour regulation. 
The instrumental variable estimate of the effects of instrumented enforcement intensity on 
contract workers is positive and significant. This indicates that the changes in the attitude of 
enforcement authorities towards labour regulation would have been influenced by the changes 
brought by the Emergency. This attitude which still persists can be seen in the manner in 
which the enforcement authorities differentially enforce labour laws. As a robustness check, 
this study presents two estimates of alternative specifications in order to check the sensitivity 
of the findings. First, the measures on EPL and enforcement intensity with alternative indexes 
proposed by Goswami et al. (2002), and Montag (2013)8  and Fagerna¨s (2010)9, are replaced. 
                                                          
7. The F-statistic in the first stage regression is 7.26 (this is a state-year regression with standard error 
cluster at the state level), indicating that the instruments have some power in explaining the direction of labour 
regulation. 
8. The index on labour regulation constructed by Goswami et al. (2002) is based on a survey of 
entrepreneurs and managers in 11,000 manufacturing companies in India. Montag (2013) uses both indices 
proposed by Besley and Burgess (2004) and Goswami et al. (2002) to construct a combined index of labour 
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The re-estimated result in Table 2.6 confirms that the effects of EPL and enforcement intensity 
are positive and significant on the growth of contract workers in the Indian manufacturing 
sector. Second, In Table 2.7, another robustness check is presented using the generalised 
method of moments (GMM) technique (see Arnellano and Bond 1991). Valid instruments in 
each time period for the first difference equation are specified. Col (1) in Table 2.7 controls 
for year and industry fixed effects by including dummy variables, controls for states fixed 
effects by first differencing the data, and then controls for the panel bias instrumenting the 
differenced lagged dependent variable with the lagged level of dependent variables dated t-2 
and earlier. The coefficient on EPL and ENFORCE is still positive and significant. Next in 
col. (2),is included the more general specification of lags of the dependent and independent 
variables. The estimated effect of both EPL and ENFORCE is still positive and comfortably 
significant. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
regulation. The index takes a value of 1 if both indices do not show any changes and -1 if either index contradicts 
the other.      
 
9. Based on state level amendments to the IDA, Fagerna’s (2010) constructs a proxy index on 
‘‘enforcement act’’ that would allow for individual workers or employers to apply directly to the Labour Court 
for adjudication, or an amendment that raises the punishment for non-implementation of the award. 
 40
 
 T
ab
le
 2
.5
: E
nd
og
en
ei
ty
 c
on
ce
rn
s 
 
EP
L 
EP
L 
L
og
 c
on
tr
ac
t 
w
or
ke
rs
 
L
og
 c
on
tr
ac
t 
w
or
ke
rs
 
L
og
 c
on
tr
ac
t 
w
or
ke
rs
 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t 
In
te
ns
ity
 
 
L
og
 c
on
tr
ac
t 
w
or
ke
rs
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
LS
 
O
LS
 
IV
 
IV
 
IV
 
O
LS
 
IV
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
M
ea
n 
pr
e-
19
77
 
un
io
ni
sa
tio
n 
0.
14
9*
**
 
(0
.5
72
) 
0.
16
6*
**
 
(0
.5
35
) 
 
 
 
0.
00
2*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
M
ea
n 
no
n-
la
nd
lo
rd
 
te
nu
re
 
-1
.9
01
**
 
(0
.9
57
) 
-2
.0
30
**
 
(0
.9
75
) 
 
 
 
0.
01
02
**
* 
(0
.0
02
1)
 
 
 
In
st
ru
m
en
tin
g 
La
bo
ur
 R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
 
 
0.
04
4*
**
 
(0
.0
04
) 
0.
15
7*
**
 
(0
.4
17
) 
0.
10
3*
**
 
(0
.0
25
5)
 
 
 
In
st
ru
m
en
tin
g 
E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.
05
0*
* 
(0
.0
21
) 
 
St
at
e 
Ef
fe
ct
s 
N
o 
Y
es
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
Y
ea
r 
Ef
fe
ct
s 
N
o 
Y
es
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
C
on
tr
ol
s 
 
N
o 
N
o 
N
o 
N
o 
Y
es
 
N
o 
Y
es
 
F-
te
st
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
 
5.
15
 
6.
59
 
 
 
 
7.
56
 
 
Pr
ob
>F
 
0.
01
98
 
0.
00
89
 
 
 
 
0.
00
5 
 
A
dj
 R
2  
0.
47
 
0.
49
 
0.
12
 
0.
12
 
0.
11
 
0.
05
 
0.
08
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
24
8 
95
86
 
93
67
 
93
67
 
93
67
 
24
8 
95
86
 
N
ot
es
: T
he
 d
at
ab
as
e 
is 
a 
ba
la
nc
ed
 p
an
el
 o
f t
hr
ee
 d
ig
it 
sta
te
 in
du
st
rie
s t
ha
t i
s p
re
se
nt
 in
 th
e 
da
ta
 in
 a
ll 
ei
gh
t y
ea
rs
 a
nd
 in
cl
ud
es
 a
n 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 si
xt
y 
fo
ur
 th
re
e 
di
gi
t i
nd
us
tri
es
 in
 th
e 
th
irt
y 
on
e 
 In
di
an
 st
at
es
 o
ve
r t
he
 p
er
io
d 
20
00
-2
00
7.
 R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
  a
re
 re
po
rte
d 
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 a
nd
 th
ey
 a
re
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 a
t t
he
 le
ve
l o
f s
ta
te
s. 
*s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
, *
* 
sig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 5
%
, *
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 1
%
.
 41 
Table 2.6: Robustness Check-I 
 Log contract workers Log contract workers 
1 2 
EPL 0.047** 
(0.023) 
 
ENFORCEMENT ACTS 
 
 0.064*** 
(0.024) 
Controls  
Fixed Effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
(Industry+Year+State)   
Constants  2.467*** 
(0.014) 
2.587*** 
(0.033) 
Adj R2 0.12 0.16 
Observations 9586 9586 
Notes: The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all eight years 
and includes an average of sixty four three digit industries in the thirty one  Indian states over the period 2000-
2007. We report robust standard error in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states. *significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
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Table 2.7 Robustness Check-II 
 Log contract workers Log contract workers 
1 2 
Log contract workers t-1 0.041 *** 
(0.012) 
0.043*** 
(0.012) 
EPL 0.040*** 
(0.010) 
 
EPL t-1  0.099*** 
(0.008) 
ENFORCE 0.303** 
(0.142) 
 
ENFORCE t-1  0.023*** 
(0.010) 
Fixed Effects 
(Industry+Year+State) 
YES YES 
Adj R2 0.18 0.20 
Observations 8161 8161 
Notes: The database is a balanced panel of three digit state industries that is present in the data in all eight years 
and includes an average of sixty four three digit industries in the thirty one  Indian states over the period 2000-
2007. We report robust standard error in parentheses and they are clustered at the level of states. *significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
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2.7. Conclusion:  
 This chapter estimates the joint effects of EPL and enforcement intensity on the 
incidence of temporary contract workers, by exploiting variations across the space and time to 
the extent of EPL and enforcement intensity in India. In particular, the study examines 
whether firms located in a stricter EPL regime hire differentially a greater number of 
temporary contract workers in response to variable enforcement intensity. The results indicate 
that the average effect of a strict EPL and enforcement intensity on the incidence of temporary 
contract workers is positive and statistically significant across all Indian states. This result 
corroborates the theoretical prediction and argues that the overall strictness of EPL that 
protects the rights of regular workers and ensures their strong enforcement causes firms to hire 
a greater number of temporary contract workers relative to regular workers. We report that 
firms in the inflexible labour regimes and those in the flexible labour regimes hire 
differentially more temporary contract workers in response to variable enforcement intensities. 
Finally, the findings reveal that the labour intensive industries located in the inflexible states, 
witness a higher incidence of contract workers than those located in the flexible states. 
Therefore, the conjecture emerges that firms hire differentially more temporary contract 
workers in response to variable enforcement intensity to circumvent firing and overall 
mandated compliance costs which further gives them more flexibility to adjust the workforce. 
This paper adds to the growing perception of the difference between the labour regulation and 
its actual enforcement, in developing countries, has not generated enough incentives for 
compliance with labour regulation. And therefore, firms prefer to use a greater number of 
contract workers to reduce labour costs, thus enabling them to adapt to the fluctuations in the 
product market competition. This paper does not claim that the strict EPL and enforcement 
intensities are the only factors responsible for the rise of contract workers in the Indian 
economy. There are other factors such as the state specific business environment, nature of the 
capital market, and foreign direct investment that could be responsible for shaping the 
industrial climate in India. Due to a lack of data at the state level, the study did not include the 
factors but hopes that such issues will be addressed through future research. 
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Chapter Three 
To Conciliate or not to Conciliate: 
Empirical Evidence from Labour Disputes in India10 
3.1. Introduction: 
 Grievances and conflicts are an inevitable part of the employment relationship; 
establishing effective dispute prevention and resolution processes is a key to facilitating the 
smooth functioning labour markets.  Among policy makers, the dispute prevention and 
resolution is attracting more and more attention, as the effective prevention and resolution of 
labour disputes is critical for sound and productive employment relations worldwide (ILO 
2015 and Love 2015). However, in the absence of this mechanism, the labour market is likely 
to experience the strains of labour strikes and industry lockouts that would lead to an increase 
in number of workday stoppages and decrease in the production of goods and services 
respectively (ILO 2008).  
  
At present, the industrial relation system, in almost all countries, provides a multi-tier dispute 
resolution mechanism to resolve an individual as well as collective labour disputes. Every 
country has developed a range of alternatives for resolving the labour disputes. This 
mechanism begins with a consultative process wherein, the disputing parties, with assistance 
from a third neutral person, bargain to settle their claims. Nevertheless, if the bargaining 
process does not converge into the desired settlement outcome then, as a last resort, the 
disputing parties may proceed to litigation in the labour court. A former mechanism is also 
referred as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and consists of mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration procedures (Brown and Iyres 1994).  This mechanism does not involve going to the 
labour court and is less expensive as compared to other methods; whereas the latter involves a 
formal adjudication in a labour court or tribunal with excessive costs as compared to the 
                                                          
10. Note- This chapter was presented on 14th March, 2015 at the first International Conference on Law and 
Economics, jointly organised by Gujarat National Law University (India), Indian Institute of Management 
Ahmadabad (India) and Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur (India). This chapter was selected for publication 
in the conference proceedings of an edited book entitled, “Breaking New Ground: Dispatches on Law & 
Economics from India”. The editors of the book are Prof. Ranita Nagar and Dr. Hitesh Thakker of Gujarat 
National Law University (India) and it is being published by Eastern Book Company, India. The book is 
scheduled for release in the second week of June, 2016 at Gujarat National Law University. The submitted copy 
of this manuscript is available from the EDLE secretariat.     
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conciliatory and mediation methods. Among many ADR programmes, the conciliation and 
mediation methods provide a loosely structured process in which a third neutral party assists 
in the negotiation process through promoting a voluntary interpersonal communication and 
sharing the private information (Reif 1990). Unlike an arbitrator, a third neutral party, both in 
a conciliation and mediation process does not render a decision.  
  
In many legal conflicts, the demand for ADR is gradually gaining momentum, and many 
countries are using this as an effective method for the resolution. Even in labour conflicts, the 
application of ADR mechanism for the individual and collective disputes is advocated on 
economic efficiency grounds, as it reduces the total cost of dispute resolution and assures the 
maximisation of social welfare through mutual negotiation among both parties. In the context 
of developing countries, as part of World Bank Investment Climate Program, governments 
have been advised to use ADR in almost all branches of legal conflicts since the procedural 
law in the traditional dispute resolution system has turned out to be more cumbersome and 
inefficient, hurting the sentiments of the private sector (World Bank 2008). Hence, the 
obvious question arises- are the dispute resolution mechanisms embroiled in the broader 
package of ADR really efficient?  
 
Notable studies in law and economics have also pointed out the welfare maximising effects of 
an ADR programme that seeks to reduce the case disposition time and promote settlement 
(Heise 2010 and Shavell 1995). In those studies, theoretical models of ADR have gone much 
ahead relative to the empirical studies to support this claim (Heise 2010 and Stiponwich 
2004). Most empirical assessments of ADR programme efficiency have revealed mixed results 
(Heise 2010). However, the validity of their argument is limited to assess the efficiency of 
arbitration as one distinct form of ADR mechanism compare to other forms such as mediation 
and conciliation (Doornik 2014).  Hence, the present study broadly focuses on the relevance of 
conciliation as a method in labour dispute resolution and specifically, it aims to analyse the 
impact of mandatory and non-mandatory conciliatory systems on the negotiated settlement 
and dispute resolution time. Under the mandatory conciliation system, both parties resolve 
their dispute with assistance from a neutral conciliation officer and agree to accept the 
negotiated award; while in the non-mandatory conciliation system, both parties can freely 
accept the negotiated award or prefer to bring the case for resolution in the labour court.  
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The primary motivation to use the Indian case stems from a recent amendment to Section 2(a) 
of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 (hereafter IDA) which provides a multi-tier dispute 
resolution mechanism11. Prior to amendment, both disputing parties were mandated to bring 
the dispute to the conciliation officer who provides an amicable environment for the 
settlement in a stipulated time frame (i.e. not more than 6 months). This was the regime of 
mandatory conciliation process.  However, in the amended Industrial Disputes (Amendment) 
Act 201012 , the parties seeking to redress their disputes in a consultative process can have 
direct access to labour courts, irrespective of the conciliation proceedings or the negotiated 
outcome in the conciliation conference. This amendment allows disputing parties to resolve 
their case in a labour court and it is often called the non-mandatory conciliation regime. This 
amendment to the Act gives us a unique opportunity to shed some light on the role of 
conciliation mechanism in resolving labour conflicts under the shadow of court litigation and 
second, whether the outcome achieved in the mandatory conciliation system is better than that 
achieved in the non-mandatory conciliation system.    
 
 In a broader context, this change, however, implies that this amendment to the Act seeks to 
minimise the role of a conciliator in handling labour disputes, as it aims to build up un-
disposed cases before the labour judiciary. On the one hand, an amendment to the Act has 
been appreciated by many employers’ associations, labour lawyers and civil society 
organisations (ISF 2010), while on the other hand, a set of groups had expressed their 
concerns for the potential negative impact of this amendment. The latter group argues that it 
would minimise the role of the conciliation method of resolving labour conflicts, which is a 
less expensive way to settle the claim than to adjudicate in the labour court and give them 
enough flexibility to negotiate their settlements (CITU 2015). However, those who support the 
amendment believe that it would liberate them from the adverse bargaining process as well as 
from the complex process of securing permissions from the appropriate authority to take 
necessary business decisions at the time of business uncertainties (ILO 2008). At present, a 
comprehensive empirical study is starkly missing to support either of their claims. 
 
In this chapter, a unique dataset is used, comprising the samples of labour disputes filed 
between the period 2008 and 2011 from two Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
                                                          
11.  Section 2(A), Industrial Disputes Act §§ 1-52 (1947).  
12. Section 2(A), Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act §§ 1-38 (2010). 
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Labour Courts (known as CGITs),namely, New Delhi and Mumbai. These micro datasets were 
obtained by using the Right to Information Act (RTI), 2005. This micro data set allows us to 
disentangle the effectiveness of conciliation process as one form of ADR in settling the labour 
conflicts as compared to trials in the labour court. First, the datasets were combined across 
time periods and labour tribunals, and a simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
model was exploited to estimate the effects of various case-related variables on the outcome of 
the conciliation process. Secondly, the study investigates the impact of amendment to the IDA 
of 1947 on the basis of the outcomes observed in the conciliation and trial processes. This 
empirical exercise will complement the first analysis, by exploiting a dummy variable 
regression model comparing the outcomes achieved in the post-reform period (non-mandatory 
regime) with the pre-reform period (mandatory regime) for the conciliated and litigated 
disputes. 
Results obtained from this study indicate that at aggregate level, labour disputes settled in the 
conciliation process takes less time than those appealed in the labour courts. Furthermore, the 
study also confirms that the overall conciliation process succeeded in reducing the differences 
between the initial claim and final payments received by workers and in improving their 
settlement rates through mutual bargaining.  In addition, it also takes into account a recent 
amendment to the IDA of 1947, which allows direct access to labour courts- undermining the 
role of the conciliation process in resolving labour conflicts. Results obtained at the 
disaggregate level; suggest that the disputes settled in the pre-reform period (mandatory 
conciliation) experienced a reduction in the total disposition time. This result is consistent 
with the theoretical prediction of ADR theory and it also corroborates the results obtained at 
the aggregate level. Moreover, the study observes that the labour disputes resolved in the 
mandatory conciliation process were settled more quickly compared to disputes which were 
part of a non-mandatory conciliation process. Finally, the study argues that a mandatory 
conciliation process provides an efficient way to reduce the differences in the final payments 
received by workers, as it provides a time-bound negotiation space to disputing parties relative 
to the trial. In the context of developing countries such as India, the analysis provides strong 
empirical evidence to support policy measures for the application of conciliation mechanisms 
to resolve labour conflicts.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides the background of previous studies 
and proposes testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the institutional underpinning of 
labour dispute resolution mechanism of India. Section 3.4 presents the Data, Research Design 
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and Descriptive Statistics. Section 3.5 presents the main results. Finally, Section 3.6 presents 
the conclusion.  
 
3.2. Review of Previous Studies: 
3.2.1. Theoretical Studies: 
 This chapter is broadly related to the literature on settlement bargaining and dispute 
resolution, and more specifically to the work on alternative dispute resolution. A significant 
portion of literature has focused on explaining why settlement negotiations fail in legal 
disputes, and on assessing the effects of case selection in trial courts. In this framework, the 
standard economic models assume that the adjudication is costly; parties involved in disputes 
hold private information and are mandated to behave according to the rational decision theory. 
Such assumptions allow them to take a rational account of the expected costs of adjudication 
and therefore, all disputes conclude in private settlement.  
 There are two views in the existing literature on the subject that explain why 
settlement negations fall apart. According to the first view, disputing parties’ divergent 
expectations about the likely outcome of the trials drive them to excessive optimism, and 
incentivise them to move from the settlement option to a formal suit in trial courts (Priest and 
Klein 1984; Shavell 1982; Landes 1971). A second view explains the role of disputing parties’ 
strategic behaviour and the incomplete information that affects the settlement bargaining 
(Nalebuff 1987; Bebchuk 1984; P’ng 1983; Cooter et.al. 1982). In these models, the defendant 
will accept the offer in cases where the plaintiff is likely to prevail at the trial and will reject 
the offer in cases where the plaintiff is relatively weak in the trial. Both the information 
structure and divergent expectations systematically explain the plausible difference between 
the average underlying merit of disputes that are settled out of court and disputes that proceed 
to adjudication.  
 When the aggrieved parties fail to negotiate their settlement outcome, then the role of 
the third party becomes inevitable in providing an amenable environment for the settlement of 
legal disputes. A host of studies on ADR give immense importance to the role of the third 
neutral party in resolving legal disputes that promises reduction in the costs and case 
disposition time as compared to formal litigation. Among many types of ADR, the arbitration 
method is widely believed to be more popular than other methods of ADR. Many hybrid 
models of arbitration have been evolved, studied and extensively applied in many branches of 
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legal disputes. The arbitration method is applied with an aim to promote settlement 
negotiation under the shadow of adjudication. The arbitrator- a neutral agent, acts like a 
potential judge who holds the powers to replicate the court decision. The economic model of 
ADR assumes that parties take a rational account of the effects of ADR on the likely 
disposition of their disputes (Shavell 1995). The model holds two scenarios- first, where both 
parties hold a probabilistic belief about the outcome of ADR and second, where both parties 
have an expected judgement about how the ADR influences the outcome of the trial. The 
study concludes that the tendency to bring suit is not affected by the voluntary ADR, but this 
tendency reduces significantly when both parties are mandated  to submit their disposition 
with the court annexed ADR (ibid). Second, whether the ADR is binding or not, its 
effectiveness and application is significantly determined by the outcome predictive capacity of 
ADR (Shavell 1995). Therefore, the parties’ decision to participate in ADR is presumably 
determined by how closely the ADR predicts the likely outcome of litigation and how each 
party’s divergent belief about expected outcomes converge into a desired settlement. Even 
though the settlement under ADR might be less costly and may take lesser time than litigation, 
the parties’ motives vary across cases.  
In many instances, the ADR participation might appear to be effective. Some litigants, perhaps 
those wary of ‘second-class justice’ either avoid ADR altogether or after participating in ADR 
take legal disputes to trial (Priest and Klein 1984) or sense some reasonable level of 
uncertainty (both factual and legal) about their case outcome so that they could bear the cost 
of litigation (Ibid). Similarly, parties engaging in the mandatory ADR programme were 
reported to have felt more satisfied than that those who went to trial (Rosenberg and Folberg 
1994). In terms of effectiveness, the mandatory ADR programme improves information 
sharing between parties, reduces the potential cost of trial and reduces case disposition time. 
However, in the unilateral arbitration, the size and content of the arbitrated outcome cannot on 
its own explain the frequency and recourse to arbitrations (Manzini and Mariotti 2001). Other 
factors that are outside the bilateral negotiation play an important role in influencing the 
parties’ behaviour to engage with the arbitration. In contrast, consent arbitration sometimes 
increases the strategic complexity of the game to the point where there are inefficient 
outcomes with delays in agreements. In both situations, it is assumed that the parties enjoy the 
rights to alter offers in repeated rounds of meetings and the threat to call in an arbitrator would 
prevail if and only if, either party gets a lower offer than expected from the bargaining. The 
asymmetric information bargaining model examines both the costs and benefits with 
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increasing rate of settlements. They conclude that the settlement can have benefits of reducing 
litigation costs and delay, but it can also reduce deterrence and the accuracy of the legal 
system (Friedman and Wickelgren 2008). 
A settlement of a legal claim is a deliberate act and disputing parties participate in the process 
of settlement of their respective claims only if such an outcome is consistent with the interests 
of both the parties. Some of the significant studies elaborated above explain the main drivers 
of settlement in legal disputes, and provide us with the advantages of ADR in promoting 
settlements. Although most theoretical studies on ADR agree that participation in ADR has 
positive incentives for disputing parties, empirical research on the efficacy of ADR is scant.  
3.2.2. Empirical Studies:  
In a recent review of empirical studies of 27 general civil litigation court-connected ADR 
programmes, Wissler (2004) found that out of 27 studies, approximately one-half found no 
difference in settlement rates between ADR and non-ADR cases. The other half found that 
ADR cases tended to have a somewhat higher rate of settlement or a somewhat lower rate of 
trial judgement on a dispositive motive. Heise (2010) using data from 46 large countries 
consisting of 8038 trials with 166 appeals participating in ADR programmes, finds a mixed 
support for ADR programmes. Specifically, the study indicates that participation in an ADR 
programme correlates with an increased likelihood of settlement but not with reduced 
disposition time and ADR programme mixed efficacy diminishes its appeal to litigants.  
In a similar vein, the study by Kaplan et.al.(2008), exploits a newly assembled dataset on 
procedures filed in Mexican labour tribunals to analyse the determinants of final awards to 
workers. The study indicates that on an average, workers receive less than 30 percent of their 
claims in trial judgement as compared to settlements. Multiple claimants against a single firm 
are less likely to settle, which partly explains why workers involved in these procedures 
receive lower percentages of their claims. Regardless of the motives and advantages of ADR, 
case settlements obtained in ADR create private and public benefits. In addition to such 
benefits flowing from timely and less costly resolution of disputes, it allows the judiciary to 
devote more time and care to other important branches of legal systems (Heise 2010).  
There are many factors that limit the comparison between the present study and many other 
important empirical studies discussed above. The studies discussed so far, focus on the 
participation in court annexed ADR in the pre-trial stage and arbitration as one form of ADR 
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that promotes settlements of legal claims. However, there is a notable absence of work in the 
area of conciliation that is a more flexible way to resolve disputes than those discussed above. 
In this paper, the detailed information is collected on the amount of settlement, initial offer 
and the court award, which otherwise is unavailable in many studies discussed so far. Lack of 
important data on the amount of the initial claim implies that the present study cannot compare 
the percentage of recovery achieved by the plaintiff, as in many empirical studies. Information 
on settlements is usually unavailable, so empirical work in the area of ADR has focused on the 
probability of settlement or on failed settlement offers.  
Clearly due to plausible differences across the datasets, legal areas and the time period studied 
in the literature; the present study attempts to provide a fresh perspective on the role of a 
conciliation mechanism in resolving labour conflicts by using the framework of ADR. More 
specifically, the study analyses the impact of the mandatory and non-mandatory conciliation 
mechanisms on the negotiated settlement and dispute resolution time. 
3.2.3. Research Hypotheses: 
Based on the previous section, this study proposes the following three hypotheses.  
3.2.3.1.Hypothesis I-Standard ADR theory as elaborated in the previous section assumes that 
ADR mechanism is a less costly and more flexible way to resolve disputes than the court trial 
(Heise 2010). Therefore, the study hypothesises that settlement rates are higher in disputes 
participating in mandatory conciliation process as compared to disputes participating in a non-
mandatory conciliation process that allows both parties to proceed in a labour court.  
3.2.3.2.Hypothesis II- In the mandatory conciliation process, a conciliation officer stimulates 
mutual communication between parties about the private information that generates better 
incentives for the parties, as accuracy in determining the final outcome in mutual negociation 
often improves on what would have been litigated in the labour court (Doornik 2014). 
Therefore, the study hypothesizes that the difference between the initial claim and final 
settlement negotiated in the mandatory conciliation would be less than those disputes 
concluded in the non-mandatory conciliation mechanism.  
3.2.3.3.Hypothesis III-The conciliation method of dispute resolution provides a time-bound 
negotiation space to disputing parties relative to trial (Brown and Iyres 1994). Hence, the 
present study proposes that the total disposition time for dispute resolution in the mandatory 
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conciliation process is lower than those disputes resolved in the non-mandatory conciliation 
process.  
3.3. Institutional Background: Labour Dispute Resolution Mechanism in India 
The IDA of 1947 in India deserves special attention in this chapter. The main objective of the 
Act is to govern the industrial dispute resolution procedures. This Act, along with other labour 
laws, has continued since the pre-independence period in the country; hence, it promulgates 
the British Legacy and British wartime legislation that were aimed to regulate industrial 
conflicts and peacefully sustain the production activities (Bhattacherjee 2003). The Act 
applies to a variety of establishments and industries in India. The term “industrial 
establishment” or “industries” is used in the widest possible sense, bringing almost all 
economic activities within the ambit of the Act. The Act applies to all “workmen” employed 
in these industries as defined above but does not apply to the person who is engaged in the 
industry in a supervisory/managerial capacity or drawing more that Rs. 1600 (Indian Rupees) 
as a monthly salary. In spite of that, the broad coverage of the Act makes it one of the most 
widely applied acts in India. The main objective of the Act is to govern the industrial dispute 
resolution mechanism and provide a multi-tier dispute resolution setup for resolving labour 
conflicts.  
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Figure 3.1: Industrial (Labour) Dispute Resolution System 
 
Source: Source: Industrial Dispute Act of 1947.  
Figure 3.1 explains the stages of the industrial disputes resolution system in which collective 
as well as individual disputes are resolved at various levels. These stages can be better 
explained by the following example. Suppose a worker receives a notice from his/her 
employer that his/her employment at the firm has been terminated, and if she/he thinks that it 
is unjust according to the law then she/he can raise this issue in a stage 1 before the work 
committee or else in front of the Conciliation Officer (CO) ( stage 2). A similar procedure is 
applied to a collective bargaining dispute as well (Saini 1993). These two stages are also 
known as a conciliation stage, where aggrieved parties may resolve the dispute through mutual 
negotiation. The CO is supposed to conclude the conciliation meeting in 6 months.  If an 
employee feels that the negotiation is not fair or for any reason the negotiation fails, the CO 
can refer this issue to the appropriate government where, with the help of the Board of 
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Conciliation (an independent body constituted by the appropriate government) the 
negotiations may proceed in a fair manner. 
However, it has been noted that such an institutional body does not really exist (ibid). So, the 
CO after hearing the bargaining deals prepares a confidential report about the failure of 
negotiations. The report then proceeds to the Directorate of Labour or Chief Labour 
Commissioner of the respective state. Depending upon the matter and its legal standing, the 
appropriate government may, further in stage 4, constitute a court of inquiry for investigating 
the matter about the dispute, and its main determinants of the failure of negotiations. 
Therefore, from stages 1 to 4, the parties may have a chance to arrive at a solution through the 
state mediated bargaining mechanism (i.e., a mechanism for conciliation). If the conciliation 
mechanism fails, (i.e., from stage 1 to 4) then the parties may approach through voluntary 
reference to arbitrators for the settlement of the industrial dispute (stage 5) under section 10-A 
of the IDA, 194713. However, the final decision of the arbitrator in the dispute is binding upon 
all parties of the dispute. Though, it has many advantages over other mechanisms of dispute 
resolution (such as no litigation cost, expediency in delivering awards etc.), this method is not 
yet commonly used. Moreover, the efficacy of arbitration is largely buttressed by reliance on 
state intervention (Rao 2001; Mathur 1998). As a consequence of this, the dispute that had 
been moved from stage 1 (from conciliation to arbitration) enters into stage 6 with a proper 
reference from the appropriate government. This stage, as mentioned above, is a compulsory 
adjudication stage wherein every dispute is resolved in the Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunal 
and National Tribunal under section 7, 7A(1) and 7B(1) respectively14. 
In Indian industrial relations, the role of a conciliator is pivotal to the dispute resolution 
process and he/she has the authority to inquire into the dispute and suggest possible solutions 
to bring the parties into an agreement (Basu 2012). The Conciliation officer is the first point of 
reference for dispute resolution, when the bilateral negotiation fails. As per Section 11 of the 
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, all the disputes are routed through the jurisdiction of a 
conciliator officer to various stages of resolution (i.e., an arbitration and adjudication in the 
labour tribunal).The modus operandi of dispute resolution is to raise a dispute before the 
Conciliation Officer who must endeavour to resolve the raised dispute within 14 days from the 
date of raising the dispute. However, the process of conciliation is invariably less time- 
                                                          
13. Section 10(A), Industrial Disputes Act §§ 1-52 (1947). 
14. Section 7, 7A (1) and 7B (1), Industrial Disputes Act §§ 1-52 (1947). 
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consuming than the adjudication since it has to be concluded in the first six months ( Rao, 
2001 and Malhotra, 1994). The Conciliation Officer in most cases, calls for a meeting with the 
parties, and if he does not succeed, he may decide to call another meeting at a later date. On 
most occasions, conciliation meetings last a whole day when the subject matter of the dispute 
involves much discussion. The strategy is to try to ascertain each party’s bargaining and 
current positions and to suggest suitable compromises in order to settle the dispute. If the 
conciliation efforts are not successful, the Conciliation Officer may decide to call for a 
meeting at a later date, or may submit a failure report of the meeting with his 
recommendations to the appropriate government. The appropriate government may make a 
decision to refer the dispute to a labour court or national tribunal for adjudication.  
3.4. Data, Research Design and Descriptive Statistics: 
This chapter uses a collected dataset comprising of samples of labour disputes filed between 
the years 2008 and 2011 in two Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Courts 
(known as CGITs) namely, New Delhi and Mumbai. These micro datasets were obtained by 
using the Right to Information Act of 2005. Initial requests for the data were made under the 
Right to Information Act to collect the detailed information on labour disputes, terms of 
settlements, labour court award, the nature of disputes, parties to dispute etc. from 13 major 
CGIT-cum-LCs in India. However, due to the sensitivity of the data and the confidentiality 
clause of the dispute resolution procedure of the Conciliation Officer’s report, the respective 
authorities of the Ministry of Labour and Employment of Government of India and Registrar 
of the CGIT-cum-LCs have officially responded to the request by providing a dataset from 
two CGIT-cum-LCs.  There are 26 industries that fall under the purview of a central sphere in 
which the Central Government of India is an appropriate authority, and it is a principal owner 
of companies operating in those industries15. Both tribunals cover firms listed in the central 
sphere industries and those firms registered under the Factories Act of 1948.  The micro 
dataset contains information of 234 labour disputes from Mumbai CGIT-cum-LC and 203 
                                                          
15. The main central sphere industries includes- 1) Transport Services 2) Agro Based Industries, 3) Medium 
& Light Engineering 4) Consumer Goods 5) Tourist Services 6) Financial Services 7) Contract & 
Construction Services 8) Transportation Equipment 9) Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals 10) Heavy 
Engineering 11) Coal & Lignite 12) Petroleum (refinery & Marketing 13)  Other Minerals & Metals, 14) 
Telecommunication Services 15) Textiles, 16) Industrial Development & Technical Consultancy 
Services 17)  Consumer Goods 18) Trading & Marketing 19) Steel 20) Fertilizers 21) Power Generation 
22) Banking 23) Crude Oil 24) Insurance 25)  Crop Insurance 26) Contraceptives, Pharmaceutical  and 
Medical Devices. 
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labour disputes from Delhi CGIT-cum-LC for the period 2008-2011. The main causes of 
disputes are retrenchments, dismissals, bonus, wage and other allowances, others (including 
worker’s injuries, discrimination, accidents), and firm closures.  
As mentioned in the previous section, labour disputes were brought into the Indian dispute 
resolution mechanism either through a conciliation process or with a new amendment directly 
referring to the labour courts. In the conciliation process, there is only one statement of facts 
made jointly by the employer and employee in the presence of the Conciliation Officer and the 
resolution of the procedure is always a negotiation that results in settlement. A legal claim that 
is brought into a labour court contains the worker’s claim, the employer’s counter-claim or 
reply, the terms of negotiations that failed in a conciliation process, and finally the terms of 
the court ruling if the case is not settled.  
In this section, the chapter describes the main variables relating to the legal claim, the 
disputing parties’ information and resolution of conflicts. For all procedures filed in the 
sample disputes, the study observes the principal cause of dispute16, the date of filing, the 
geographic location of disputes, initial claims of the workers, a case disposition time (in days), 
tenure of workers, award of labour courts, settlement amount in the conciliation process, the 
number of Conciliation Officers and tribunal judges, and finally, whether the procedure is a 
settlement or a legal suit. The information obtained from the respective government officers 
can also be verified with various annual reports published by the Gazette of India.  
To examine the first question, this chapter pooled the datasets across time periods and labour 
tribunals, and exploited a simple least square regression model to estimate the effects of 
various case-related variables on the outcome of the conciliation process. The same variables 
were regressed on the outcome of cases litigated in the labour courts. The three main variables 
of interest are:  a) total case disposition time, b) differences in the outcomes achieved by 
workers (both in mandatory and non-mandatory conciliation processes), and finally, c) the 
final payments received by the workers. There are many factors that affect the outcomes 
achieved in the resolution process. However, due to limitations of the datasets obtained from 
the government sources, the study used workers’ initial claims, their total length of tenure in 
the employment, participation in the dispute resolution via conciliation or directly approaching 
the labour court, and the size of the labour judiciary as pivotal independent variables that are 
                                                          
16. It is the main cause of dispute listed in the Industrial Dispute Act of 1947. 
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likely to have an impact on the dependent variables. These variables were observed separately 
for each conciliation type in both CGITs. The first exercise of pooling the dataset allowed an 
analysis of the statistical association between the case related independent variables with the 
dependent variable.  
In a second exercise, the chapter investigates the impact of an amendment to the Industrial 
Dispute Act of 1947 on the outcome achieved in the mandatory and non-mandatory 
conciliation processes. This empirical exercise complements the first exercise, but instead of 
pooling the dataset, the study exploits a dummy variable regression model for comparing the 
outcomes achieved in the post reform period with the pre-reform period. In this approach, a 
dummy variable is assigned to the dispute which concluded in the post-reform period and then 
compares the outcomes with the pre-reform period.  
In addition to two empirical approaches, this study also adds two fixed effects to the empirical 
models. The CGIT-specific fixed effects were employed to control for CGIT-specific factors 
such as total size of workforce, workload, approximate distance from the Supreme Court of 
India and the location of the industrial zones. The year-specific fixed effects were also 
employed to capture factors such as common shocks of industrial unrest and reforms in the 
workfare programme such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MNREGA).  
Table 3.1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of labour conflicts concluded in the mandatory 
conciliation process and appealed in the labour court for two CGITs respectively.  In the 
Mumbai tribunal sample, 234 disputes were entered into the industrial dispute resolution 
system during the period 2008-2011. Out of those, approximately 64 percent of disputes (i.e., 
149 disputes) concluded in settlements with a Conciliation Officer of the respective state 
government and 36 percent (85 disputes) of disputes proceeded to and concluded in the labour 
tribunal. The mean values of workers’ initial claims, settlement obtained in the conciliation 
and labour court award are INR 685627, INR 607335 and INR 650361 respectively. It is 
interesting to note that the average value of difference between the workers’ initial claims and 
the settlement outcomes was less than the difference between the initial claims and the awards 
received in the labour court. This also implies that due to procedural flexibilities, the 
settlements obtained in the mandatory conciliation process reduced the expectation gaps 
between the parties’ claims relative to the awards concluded in the labour courts.  
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There were 203 labour disputes registered with New Delhi CGIT. Out of those, 69 percent 
(142 disputes) of the disputes were successfully concluded in the conciliation process and 31 
percent (65 disputes) were tried in the labour court.  
In the New Delhi CGIT, the difference between workers’ initial claims and the settlement 
amount is higher than those differences in disputes that ended in the labour court. In both 
CGITs, on an average, the disputes concluded in the conciliation process tended to take less 
time than the disputes litigated in the labour court.  
Table 3.2 provides the descriptive statistics of all disputes entered in both CGITs. Labour 
conflicts related to outstanding bonus payments and annual increments in wages and other 
allowances are frequent causes of disputes that are observed in samples drawn from both 
CGITs for the causes of disputes which are raised under the Payment of Bonus Act of 1965 
and Payment of Wages Act of 1936. Under the conciliation process, both types of disputes 
take less time to settle the claims as compared to disputes litigated in the labour tribunals. 
Labour disputes raised to recover the arrears in bonus payments are settled quickly in the 
conciliation process. The differences in the final bonus payments received by workers are 
lower than differences in payments that the workers would receive in the labour courts.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Mumbai and New Delhi- (cause-wise) 
 Mumbai New Delhi 
Obs Mean Std.Dev Obs. Mean Std.De
v 
 
Bonus 
 
Initial claim* 111 680922 307542 100 683179 312586 
Settlement in conciliation* 68 607011 267033 71 587005 270038 
Case Disposition Time# 
(Conciliation) 
111 139 70.64 100 134 70.73 
Award in labour court * 43 638028 298939 30 719803 307341 
Case Disposition Time# ( 
Tribunal) 
43 468 130.65 30 497 139.96 
Difference in Settlement*  68 59379 30006 71 57317 28330 
Difference in Award * 43 65874 32458 30 61525 45766 
  
Closure 
 
Initial claim* 12 755073 275176 14 586633 334286 
Settlement in conciliation* 8 661235 246439 12 458414 284876 
Case Disposition Time# 
(Conciliation) 
12 129 50.94 14 167 82.67 
Award in labour court * 4 727526 281827 3 694318 299829 
Case Disposition Time# ( 
Tribunal) 
4 452 112.95 3 395 32.25 
Difference in Settlement*  8 67027 27841 12 115613 251036 
Difference in Award * 4 81169 35695 3 68116 22527 
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Retrenchment 
 
Initial claim* 20 663286 325751 17 528588 270820 
Settlement in conciliation* 13 465489 237595 12 510820 269155 
Case Disposition Time# 
(Conciliation) 
20 104 67.47 17 153 76.05 
Award in labour court * 7 870421 203725 5 405225 182748 
Case Disposition Time# ( 
Tribunal) 
7 366 110.13 5 484 130.87 
Difference in Settlement*  13 40537 20188 12 52612 27170 
Difference in Award * 7 84918 25198 5 39740 20413 
  
Wages and Allowances 
 
Initial claim* 80 718767 297234 53 696272 363319 
Settlement in conciliation* 51 671140 263444 32 587721 312705 
Case Disposition Time# 
(Conciliation) 
80 108 67.78 53 123 59.88 
Award in labour court * 29 619382 280853 21 708218 355350 
Case Disposition Time# ( 
Tribunal) 
29 448 131.27 21 449 139.35 
Difference in Settlement*  51 68182 29749 32 60546 32814 
Difference in Award * 29 63246 30592 21 61207 42889 
  
Others 
 
Initial claim* 11 456939 332559 15 699354 300731 
Settlement in conciliation* 9 405200 316920 11 718296 224540 
Case Disposition Time# 11 169 79.59 15 162 80.44 
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(Conciliation) 
Award in labour court * 2 440183 255804 5 503215 338854 
Case Disposition Time# ( 
Tribunal) 
2 317 116.67 5 411 139.32 
Difference in Settlement*  9 45290 40581 11 75163 24683 
Difference in Award * 2 45778 32851 5 42368 32628 
Notes: *- in Indian Rupees (INR), #- in days, @- in logs Source: Author’s own calculation based on 
collected data.  
 
It is important to note that the disputes pertaining to wages and allowances do not show 
positive effects of disputes settled in the conciliation process relative to those concluded 
in the labour courts. This is possibly due to wages and allowances being prone to 
variations across states and is subject to prevailing real wages, costs of living, inflation 
and the level of economic activity in each state. However, such variations could not be 
possible with the disputes of payment of bonus, since it is a discretionary payment that 
workers would receive subject to the firm’s financial position.  Disputes pertaining to the 
firm’s closure, unjust retrenchment and others (including discrimination, sexual 
harassment, workplace accidents etc.) are less frequent types of disputes that entered in to 
sample disputes.  Therefore, the summary statistics of labour conflicts confirms the main 
prediction of the ADR theory that disputes settled in the conciliation process take less 
disposition time than cases concluded in the labour courts. Nonetheless, the descriptive 
statistics show mixed results for the settlement rates, final payments received by workers 
and differences of payments obtained in the conciliation vis-à-vis in the labour courts.   
Figures 3.2 to 3.7 provide the kernel density estimates for disposition time, differences in 
final payments and final amounts received by workers in both CGITs. The figures are 
presented to capture the distribution of outcome variables that are concluded in 
conciliation and litigated in labour courts. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show that despite the more 
spread out distribution processing which is  observed, on balance the dependent variable, 
disposition time, is expressed by the square root of the raw numbers of days for 
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conciliation and trial courts. In Figure 3.2., there are two modes which indicate that on an 
average, the disputes that are similar in nature are resolved in the same time frame. In 
Figure 3.3, the observed time disposition variable is skewed towards the right with a long 
tail. This implies that the actual time taken to resolve the disputes in labour courts is 
higher than those approximated by the normal density distribution. Figure 3.4 shows the 
density estimate of differences in the amount received by workers in the conciliation 
process. The observed densities of disputes are actually approximate to the normal 
density estimate. However, one can observe in Figure 3.5 that the same approximation 
with a normal density estimate cannot be ascertained for disputes litigated in the labour 
courts.  
The actual differences of claims realised in the courts are much higher and skewed 
towards the right than anticipated by the normal density estimate. As we can see in 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7, the final amounts obtained are tilting towards the right, even though 
they approximate to the normal density estimate. From both the figures, it can be inferred 
that the actual receipt of final payments has the same magnitude in both systems and does 
not show any systematic deviation. 
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Figure 3.2 Disposition of time in conciliation  
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Figure 3.3 Disposition of time in labour court 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 65 
 
Figure 3.4 Difference in Final Settled Amount 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Figure 3.5 Differences in Court Award 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
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Figure 3.6 Final amount in Settlement 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Figure 3.7 Final Award in Labour Court  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 67 
 
 
In Figures 3.8 to 3.10, the study presents a slightly different perspective on the outcome 
variables than those presented in Figures 3.2 to 3.7. Similar to the previous graphical 
exercise, instead of looking at the spread of outcome variables, the researcher here looks 
at the box plot of each variable of interests. In Figure 3.8, a subtle difference can be seen 
in the dispute disposition time. Overall, the median (a single bold line in the middle of the 
box) disposition time for disputes settled in conciliation is lower than the median 
disposition time for disputes concluded in labour courts. The two sub-groups are almost 
similar in terms of the spread between the 25th and 75th percentiles. In Figure 3.9, it can 
be seen that the median differences in final amounts to workers are almost similar in both 
methods and they have an equal spread at the bottom and top percentiles. The same 
equivalence is also revealed in figure 3.10, where the spread of box plots is almost 
similar in all dimensions. However, the median final amounts received in the labour 
courts are higher compared to the settled disputes.  
Taken together, the graphic exercise from Figures 3.2 to 3.10 and the preliminary results 
of summary statistics indicate that the average settled appeal took less time to conclude 
the case than the average appeal pursued to a court decision. What these figures and the 
table largely mask, however, is critical within group variations. Moreover, this analysis 
also presents a mixed picture for the plausible positive effects of differences in claims 
settled and the final payment received by workers. To address the statistical relationship 
between dependent variables and independent variables as the main observable 
determinants of legal claims in the next section, this chapter exploits the empirical 
strategy as explained in the previous section to test the proposed hypothesises.   
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Figure : 3.8 Dispute Disposition Time in Conciliation and Trial 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Figure:3.9 Differences In Final Amount Received In Both Conciliation And Trial  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
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Figure 3.10 Final Amounts Received  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
3.5. Main results:  
With the growing popularity of ADR programs and relatively little emerging literature on 
assessing the efficiency of ADR programs in several branches of legal disciplines, this 
chapter adds to the existing literature by investigating the efficiency of the conciliation 
method of resolving conflicts as against the traditional adjudication method. Table 3.3 
reports the results of a simple ordinary least square model, estimating the relationship 
between independent variables and the dispute disposition time. The dependent variable 
is the total dispute disposition time in square days for both the mechanisms employed in 
Indian industrial relations to resolve labour conflicts. The key independent variables are 
the participation dummy that takes the value of 1, if cases are settled in conciliation and 0 
in all other cases for the conciliation process, and the same dummy variable is assigned to 
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disputes proceeded and concluded in labour courts. The study also includes three other 
key independent variables that are relevant for the empirical analysis. Among them, the 
first variable is the worker’s initial claim. The starting point for any legal battle is 
unsatisfactory conflict resolution mechanisms that are expected to be in place. In the 
matter of labour conflicts, if a worker’s initial claims are not heard by his/her employers 
then it becomes the primary reason for the burgeoning tension between the employer and 
employee. Due to labour laws and national legislations that insulate workers’ welfare, the 
workers’ lobby enjoys the legal rights to raise their concerns with respective government 
authorities. It is a subject of debate whether the size of initial claims matters for the 
selection of a disputes resolution mechanism in labour conflicts or perhaps they randomly 
select particular mechanisms to redress their conflicts. Therefore, instead of addressing 
other aspects of initial claims as a potential cause of conflict, this chapter treats this 
variable as the main independent variable. The second important variable is the size of 
workforce that is employed in India’s industrial disputes resolution systems. It includes 
the total number of judges posted in various labour courts and the total number of 
Conciliation Officers who are responsible for mediating the conflict resolution and 
refereeing them to the appropriate authorities (such as the government, labour courts and 
an independent arbitrator)  for further reference.  
 
The third independent variable is workers’ actual tenure of employment in their 
respective firms. This variable is measured in log days. For any disputes to be raised 
under the Industrial Dispute Act of 1947, the total service tenure has to be more than 260 
days in a year without any interruption in the employment contract. Uninterrupted service 
tenure strengthens the workers’ position of being recognised as a regular worker or 
temporary worker.  
To test the proposed hypothesis, Table 3.3 estimates the effects of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable. Column (a) in Table 3.3 shows that workers who 
participated in the conciliation process with their due claims tended to settle earlier than 
those whose claims proceeded in labour courts. The coefficient on participation dummy 
 71 
 
is negative and significant at 1 percent. This implies that on an average, workers who 
participated in the conciliation process tended to settle their claims more promptly. 
However, disputes litigated in the labour courts also take less time compared to the 
conciliation process. The coefficient on participation dummy is negative but insignificant, 
thus the study rules out the possibility of disputes concluded in courts taking less time 
relative to the conciliation mechanism. Therefore, the results obtained from Table 3.3 
support the proposed hypothesis and confirm that ADR participation reduces case 
disposition time.  
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Effects on Dispute Disposition Time (Dependent variable- Disposition 
Time in Sqrt-days)  
 Conciliation 
(Mandatory) 
Appeal(Non-Mandatory 
Conciliation) 
 
 
Participation Dummya 
 
 
(A) (B) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.331) 
-1.224 
(1.316) 
Worker’s Initial Claim (log)  
 
0.009 
(0.253) 
0.386 
(0.438) 
Number of Judge’s and 
Conciliation Officer’s ( Per 
10000 population)  
 
0.559 
(93.60) 
-12.258* 
(74.83) 
Worker’s Tenure (in log 
days)  
 
-0.3975 
(0.407) 
-0.110 
(0.687) 
Constants 13.782*** 
(5.029) 
19.285*** 
(8.318) 
R-sqr 0.10 0.30 
Number of Observations 150 287 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. a participation dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the dispute is settled in the conciliation 
process (for column A)  and it again takes a value of 1 if the dispute is resolved in the labour courts ( for 
column B). All specifications include the CGIT and time specific fixed effects.  
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Table 3.4 reports the results obtained from estimating the impact of key independent 
variables on the final amount received by workers. This table also explains the nature of 
association between the determinants of legal claims and final settlement. Column (a) in 
table 3.4 indicates that disputes settled in a conciliation process positively correlate with 
the final payment received by workers. This also implies that settlement rates are positive 
in the conciliation process. The coefficient on participation dummy is positive and 
significant at 1 percent. Another interesting point is that workers’ initial claims are also 
positively related to final payments. This positive relationship also indicates that all 
disputes settled in conciliation receive more or less the same settlement offer which is 
equivalent with the initial demand. Disputes appealed in the labour tribunal as indicated 
in column (b) of Table 3.4, conclude in a positive award, but however, the coefficient on 
participation dummy for appeal is insignificant. This could be due to procedural delays in 
the court ruling for the final award that sometimes reduces the real value of monetary 
claims that would be obtained in the future. However, this may not be true in cases settled 
in the conciliation process that are more flexible and prompt in concluding the labour 
disputes. Therefore, one can infer that settlement rates are positive and significant with 
conciliation compared to appeal in labour courts.  
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Table 3.4: Effects on Final Payments (Dependent variable- Final Payment in logs)  
 Conciliation (Mandatory) Appeal(Non-Mandatory 
Conciliation) 
 
 
Participation Dummya 
 
(A) (B) 
 
0.228*** 
(0.741) 
0.021 
(0.012) 
Worker’s Initial Claim (log)  
 
0.986*** 
(0.024) 
0.001*** 
(0.004) 
Number of Judge’s and 
Conciliation Officer’s ( Per 
10000 population)  
 
2.180 
(4.209) 
2.292 
(0.699) 
Worker’s Tenure (in log days)  
 
0.006 
(0.038) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
Constants -2.508*** 
(0.470) 
--0.173** 
(0.077) 
R-sqr 0.091 0.099 
Number of Observations 150 287 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. a participation dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the dispute is settled in the conciliation 
process (for column A)  and it again takes a value of 1 if the dispute is resolved in the labour courts ( for 
column B). All specifications include the CGIT and time specific fixed effects. 
 
Table 3.5 estimates the effects of determinants of legal disputes on the difference in final 
legal claims received in conciliation and concluded in appeal with labour courts. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the conciliation process provides flexibility in 
procedure and always stimulates healthy dialogue between disputing parties with 
assistance from the Conciliation Officer. Due to the exchange of information in an 
amicable environment, parties in dispute can easily verify the merit of a legal claim and 
assess its legal standing. Therefore, differences in claims and counter-claims could be 
reduced through promoting negotiations, otherwise it would not be possible in labour 
courts. Column (a) in table 3.5 shows that the participation dummy is negatively 
associated with differences in the settlement amount received by workers. The coefficient 
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on participation dummy is significant. However, the participation dummy is positively 
larger in magnitude in column (b) of same table. This result implies that participation in 
conciliation significantly reduces differences in worker’s initial claim and final settlement 
offer. This is due to the flexible approach of the conciliation process to dispute resolution 
that allows an exchange of information between parties and enables them to assess the 
merit of a legal claim. 
Table 3.5: Effects on  Difference in Final Payments (Dependent variable- Difference 
in Final Payment in logs)  
 Conciliation 
(Mandatory) 
Appeal(Non-Mandatory 
Conciliation) 
 
 
Participation Dummya 
 
(A) (B) 
 
-0.218*** 
(0.812) 
0.451 
(1.531) 
Worker’s Initial Claim (log)  
 
0.993*** 
(0.024) 
0.990*** 
(0.008) 
Number of Judges and 
Conciliation Officers ( Per 
10000 population)  
 
2.156 
(4.243) 
3.033 
(3.560) 
Worker’s Tenure (in log 
days)  
 
-0.005 
(0.039) 
 
-0.055 
(0.332) 
Constants -2.337*** 
(0.469) 
-2.208*** 
(0.414) 
R-sqr 0.092 0.087 
Number of Observations 150 287 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. a participation dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the dispute is settled in the conciliation 
process (for column A)  and it again takes a value of 1 if the dispute is resolved in the labour courts ( for 
column B). All specifications include the CGIT and time specific fixed effects.  
 
In the light of the ADR theory predictions, results obtained from Tables 3.3 to 3.5 by 
pooling the dataset from two CGITs and over a time period between 2008-11, the study 
conjectures that disputes concluded in a conciliation process tend to reduce total 
disposition time, promote settlement and reduce differences in the final payments 
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received by workers. Therefore, the role of the conciliation process in resolving labour 
conflicts is indeed an efficient way to resolve labour disputes compared to adjudication 
in a labour court.  
 
Now, the study assesses the effects of the amendment to the Industrial Dispute Act of 
1947 that granted direct access to the labour court irrespective of conciliation 
proceedings. As mentioned in the introduction, there are claims that both support and 
argue against the amendments in the Act. However, there is an absence of significant 
empirical studies that prove that the conciliation method is inefficient in terms of 
resolving disputes. The study does not carry any presumptions about the validity of 
amendments or does not claim that an amendment is efficient or not. But rather it 
conducts an empirical investigation to assess cases settled or concluded in the post-
reform period with those in the pre-reform period.  
From Tables 3.6 to 3.8, the same empirical exercise was repeated with a slight 
modification. The dummy variable for participation is now focused on disputes that are 
concluded or settled in the post-reform period. Results obtained from Table3.6 indicate 
that disputes settled in the post-reform period significantly reduced the total disposition 
time and the effect of the participation dummy is negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable. The same negative relationship can also be observed for disputes 
appealed in labour courts. The coefficient on participation dummy significant for 
conciliation implies that the process of conciliation has statistically significant 
correlation in reducing the disposition time. The results also corroborate with results 
obtained from the pool data in Table 3.3. Therefore, the study infers that the conciliation 
process of dispute resolution is significant and useful in reducing case disposition time.  
Table 3.7 provides the results on the final payment received by workers in the post 
reform period. It is predicted that participation in ADR will promote settlement and the 
final offer received by workers will be positive. However, in the post-reform period, 
disputes settled in conciliation indicate a positive relationship with final payments 
received by workers and a negative relationship with final payments awarded in labour 
court. The coefficients on participation dummy variables for both sub-groups are 
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insignificant, implying that in the post reform period, participation in either process has 
no significant effect on the successful conclusion of labour disputes in conciliation or in 
appeal in the labour court. 
Table3.6: Effects on Dispute Disposition Time (Dependent variable- Disposition Time in 
Sqrt-days)  
 
 Conciliation 
(Mandatory) 
Appeal(Non-Mandatory 
Conciliation) 
 
 
Participation Dummya 
 
(A) (B) 
 
-3.089*** 
(0.375) 
-0.2758 
(0.570) 
Worker’s Initial Claim (log)  
 
-0.107 
(0.236) 
0.416 
(0.438) 
Number of Judges and 
Conciliation Officers ( Per 
10000 population)  
 
-12.613* 
(4.011) 
-15.493* 
(7.246) 
Worker’s Tenure (in log 
days)  
 
-0.096 
(0.382) 
-0.157 
(0.688) 
Constants 17.789*** 
(4.701) 
20.718** 
(8.270) 
R-sqr 0.12 0.27 
Number of Observations 48 99 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. a participation dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the dispute is settled in the conciliation 
process (for column A)  and it again takes a value of 1 if the dispute is resolved in the labour courts ( for 
column B).  
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Table 3.7: Effects on Final Payments (Dependent variable- Final Payment in logs)  
 
 Conciliation 
(Mandatory) 
Appeal(Non-Mandatory 
Conciliation) 
 
 
Participation Dummya 
 
(A) (B) 
 
0.008 
(0.131) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
Worker’s Initial Claim (log)  
 
0.490*** 
(0.008) 
1.001*** 
(0.004) 
Number of Judges and 
Conciliation Officers ( Per 
10000 population)  
 
(0.957) 
(1.738) 
-0.518 
(0.720) 
Worker’s Tenure (in log 
days)  
 
0.029* 
(0.143) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
Constants -0.253 
(0.179) 
-0.179** 
(0.771) 
R-sqr 0.23 0.46 
Number of Observations 48 99 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. a participation dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the dispute is settled in the conciliation 
process (for column A)  and it again takes a value of 1 if the dispute is resolved in the labour courts ( for 
column B).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78 
 
Table 3.8: Effects on Difference in Final Payments (Dependent variable- Difference in Final 
Payment in logs)  
 
 Conciliation 
(Mandatory) 
Appeal(Non-Mandatory 
Conciliation) 
 
 
Participation Dummya 
 
(A) (B) 
 
-0.007 
(0.030) 
0.026 
(0.331) 
Worker’s Initial Claim (log)  
 
1.025*** 
(0.020) 
0.989*** 
(0.025) 
Number of Judge’s and 
Conciliation Officer’s ( Per 
10000 population)  
 
-3.459 
(4.049) 
3.565 
(4.469) 
Worker’s Tenure (in log 
days)  
 
0.054 
(0.033) 
0.006 
(0.040) 
Constants -2.196*** 
(0.418) 
-2.318*** 
(0.481) 
 
R-sqr 0.89 0.91 
Number of Observations 48 99 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. a participation dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the dispute is settled in the conciliation 
process (for column A)  and it again takes a value of 1 if the dispute is resolved in the labour courts ( for 
column B).  
 
Table 3.8 presents the results obtained by estimating the effects of determinants of legal 
claims on the differences in final payments received by workers in the post reform 
period. Column (a) indicates that participation in conciliation reduces the differences 
between workers’ initial claims and the settlement amount concluded in the negotiation 
process. On the other hand, disputes appealed in the labour court show a positive 
association between the workers’ initial claims and the final amount awarded in labour 
courts. The coefficient of estimates exhibits predicted signs of association between the 
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participation variable with the dependent variable, however, strong results cannot be 
interpreted for the sample of cases concluded in the post reform period.  
 
3.6. Conclusion: 
 
For well functioning labour markets, the prevailing industrial relations system must 
provide an efficient dispute resolution mechanism that ensures a speedier disposal of 
labour conflicts and an effective settlement. Over the years, on the one hand, the 
traditional mechanism of adjudication of labour conflicts in labour courts has become 
inefficient and is often blamed for the reduction the welfare of the overall economy. On 
the other hand, there is a growing demand for alternative dispute resolution systems in 
various branches of the legal system. Using a standard law and economics framework of 
ADR theory, this chapter examined the theoretical predictions of ADR programs that aim 
to promote the settlement, a reduction in the differences of final payments and most 
importantly, a reduction in the case disposition time. The empirical analysis of this 
chapter is based on the micro dataset obtained from two Indian labour courts (CGITs) for 
the period 2008-2011. Results obtained from this study indicate that at the aggregate 
level, cases settled in the mandatory conciliation process tend to take less time than those 
cases appealed in the labour courts. Moreover, the study observes that labour disputes 
resolved in the mandatory conciliation process were settled more quickly as compared to 
disputes that participated in a non-mandatory conciliation process. Finally, the study 
argues that a mandatory conciliation process provides an efficient way to reduce the 
differences in the final payments received by workers, as it provides a time-bound 
negotiation space to disputing parties relative to other methods of ADR. Moreover, the 
study also confirms that the overall conciliation process succeeds in improving their 
settlement rates. The overall finding suggests that, the role of the conciliation process in 
the Indian labour dispute resolution system, is pivotal and it is indeed an efficient and 
effective method of resolving labour conflicts compared to adjudication.  
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Chapter Four 
From Mother to Daughter: 
Does Equal Inheritance Property Laws Reform Improve Female 
Labour Supply & Educational Attainments in India?17 
4.1. Introduction:  
The aim of this chapter is provide a robust empirical analysis of time series and cross 
section data from India to study how legal changes pertaining to the inheritance rights of 
women have an important impact on the labour market. They especially affect women’s 
participation in the work force. Even though the principal policy target of legal reform 
was to end discrimination against women within the family by reforming inheritance law, 
the benevolent impact of such legal reforms stretches to other spheres for which they 
were not designed. This chapter is therefore an example and demonstration of the insight, 
that to improve conditions in one sector of the economy –here the labour market- one 
might have to change legal norms in quite another field of the law, here the family law. 
 In many countries across the developing world, women rarely hold secure rights 
to property, which could provide them with physical safety, and psychological security as 
well as incentives for them to participate in paid economic activities, as resulting income 
is not legally protected. The denial of women’s rights to property takes the form of 
systemic gender bias in inheritance laws and laws restricting women’s mobility which is 
nonetheless the principal source a woman can have at her disposal to improve her 
economic security and independence (RDI 2009). It is widely acknowledged that the 
inheritance laws are the principal legal instrument that grants women access to a family’s 
                                                          
17.  Note: This chapter was presented in the Annual Conference of Population Association of 
America, at San Diego, CA on 2nd May, 2015 and in the first International Conference 
on Law and Economics, organised by Gujarat National Law University (India), Indian 
Institute of Management Ahmadabad (India) and Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur 
(India) on 14th March 2015. The chapter was published as a journal article with Asian 
Journal of Law and Economics with the same title, in 6th June 2016. (DOI 10.1515/ajle-
2015-0028)  The published copy of this chapter is submitted to EDLE board. 
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wealth and bequests in the context of developing countries (World Bank 2012). It is also 
an important determinant of an individual’s incentives for wealth creation, social mobility 
and access to labour market opportunities. While the underlying social and cultural 
dynamics are complex, legal reform to improve women’s inheritance rights could 
potentially provide a low-cost way to reduce gender discrimination and improve a range 
of socio-economic outcomes for women (Agarwal 1995). 
At a macro level, several policy efforts have been made to improve women’s economic 
position relative to men, and to advance the policy targeted towards women on equity and 
economic efficiency grounds.  
 According to the World Bank Gender Equality and Development Report (2012), 
“the most promising policies to increase women's voice in households centre on 
reforming the legal framework so that women are not disadvantaged in controlling 
household assets, land laws and aspects of family law that govern marriage, divorce, 
disposal of property and active labour market policies which are directed towards 
improving the women’s labour force participation are particularly important” (pg. 19). 
These concerted efforts have been successful in promoting equality in economic 
opportunity for women in developing countries. However, they have clearly 
underestimated the role of gender bias in inheritance laws that have constrained women’s 
access to economic opportunities and have been affecting their capacities to participate in 
the labour market due to convoluted interactions of customary norms and statutory laws. 
Given this background, two natural questions arise- first, whether improvement in 
inheritance laws in favour of women could change their responses towards labour force 
participation and educational attainments. Secondly, how do the benefits of those changes 
translate into improved education of daughter’s through intra-generational transfers of 
resources within the family? 
 Existing empirical evidence on the effects of reforms in inheritance laws in favour 
of women remains scant. On the one hand, the property rights literature is mostly gender 
neutral. A number of studies across the developing world have shown a correlation 
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between the actual female ownership of assets and better nutrition, health (i.e., mostly 
demographic indicators), and educational outcomes for their children (Smith et.al. 2003; 
Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003). There has also been a decrease in the incidence of 
domestic violence (Agarwal and Panda 2005).It should be understood that the evidence 
provided by these studies is not applicable to all countries. Household economics 
literature has looked at the relationship between family law and women's status almost 
exclusively in the context of developed countries (Chiappori et al. 2002). Moreover, 
many studies that have examined this question provide a quasi- unanimous consensus for 
the potential effect of changes in inheritance laws in favour of women and how those 
effects differ across both the developed and developing countries18.  
 This chapter will examine the effects of changes in inheritance property rights on 
labour force participation and educational attainments for women. To address the 
research question, the Indian context represents a unique setting to analyze the labour 
market effects of women's inheritance and to rekindle the debate on the gender dimension 
of labour markets in the present public policy discourse. Inheritance rights in India such 
as land and family rights are largely governed by the multiple and overlapping legal 
domains (i.e., the personal laws and community norms) with a complex interplay of 
customary and statutory laws. In the past two decades, India’s economy has grown fast; 
the service sector has accounted for a large share of this growth (Shastry 2012). During 
this period, India has also experienced a sizable fertility decline, a rapid expansion of 
female education, and an overall empowerment of women (Agénor et.al. 2014; Pieters 
2010). Despite these achievements, it is ironic that the reported female labour force 
participation is the lowest among other emerging markets, and is gradually declining 
since the period of economic reforms started in the 1990’s (Pieters 2010). Recently, it is 
estimated that bridging the gender gap in the labour market will translate into an 
economic boost of 1.4 percent per year incremental GDP growth and this could add $700 
                                                          
18. See Doss (2013) for a recent review of empirical and theoretical studies on property rights and 
women’s economic development, and for the comparative analysis between developing and 
developed countries. 
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millions to India's GDP in 2025( MGI  2015). About 70 percent of the increase would 
come from raising India's female labour-force participation rate from the current 31 
percent to 41 percent in 2025, bringing 68 million more women into the economy (Sen 
et.al. 2015).Hence, this topic deserves empirical scrutiny. It is important to note that 
several studies have identified factors such as the level of education, social status, 
household level characteristics, and labour market conditions that have had significant 
impact on the decision to participate in the labour market (ibid). These factors have 
succeeded in expanding the economic opportunities for women, but they have not 
undermined the social institutions that preclude the access to those opportunities. Among 
these factors, this chapter will focus on the biased inheritance property laws as an 
institutional factor which constrains women’s decisions to participate in the labour 
market and their educational attainments.  
 India’s inheritance property rights vary according to the religion or the 
geographical region one belongs to. In the year 2005, India witnessed a major 
constitutional amendment to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 (hereafter the HSA), 
giving women a legal claim to inherit their parents ancestral bequest, dwellings and 
agricultural land. This law applies to the ancestral property of the Hindu undivided 
family, and does not apply to other property acquired by the parents. This law governs 
the inheritance rights of four religious communities, namely, Hindu, Buddhists, Jains and 
Sikhs; it does not extend to other religious communities such as Muslims, Christians, 
Parsis and Jews. Prior to the 2005 amendment, five states of India had amended this Act 
to eliminate gender inequality in inheritance in favour of women. The first attempts at 
amending this law came from the state of Kerala in 1976, Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil 
Nadu in 1989, and finally, by the state of Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994 
respectively.  This change has larger implications in the Indian context for raising the 
socio-economic status of women, and particularly, in improving their bargaining 
positions relative to men within, and outside the household. Any norms, customs or legal 
rules that prevent women from enjoying their rights to own and control a property 
severely affect their economic status. They also reduce incentives to participate in the 
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market activities. This is a serious concern for Indian women who were left with no such 
titles of property rights. It inhibits their capacity to engage in the market process. To 
eliminate this unequal structure of inheritance, five states out of the 28 states and 7 union 
territories, have subsequently amended the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. The 
subsequent state-wise amendments granted daughters of a dying Hindu interstate, 
independent inheritance rights. Using this plausible exogenous variation created by a 
legislative change in India’s inheritance laws in favour of women; this paper examines 
the economic effects of equal inheritance property rights of women on the labour supply, 
and education levels by comparing the observed outcome between the reformed and non-
reformed states. In addition, it also examines the potential effects of reform on the 
educational attainment of second generation female household members. 
 The HSA greatly improved women’s ability to inherit property, thereby 
increasing their lifetime source of unearned income and their bargaining power within 
and outside the household. A household model of labour supply posits that an increase in 
unearned income decreases labour supply (Cahuc, Carcillo and Zylberberg 2014). 
According to this model, the income effect dominates the distribution rules within the 
household, holding other things constant (Chiappori et.al. 2002). This proposition is 
based on the theoretical model of cooperative bargaining in intra-household distribution 
which assumes that bargaining between the members of a household takes place on an 
equal footing and solutions to the model assume the attainments of Pareto optimality in 
household decisions (Becker 1981). However, this model has largely been challenged in 
recent studies (Hoel 2013; Robinson 2012; Duflo and Udry 2004; Agarwal 2002; and 
Kanbur et.al. 1994) which shows that the outcomes between husbands and wives are not 
necessarily efficient.  
 As against this cooperative model, the theoretical model based on non-
cooperative bargaining relaxes many of these aforesaid assumptions, allows different 
preferences between individuals and recognizes asymmetry between the household 
members (Kanbur and Hadad1994 ; McElroy and Horney 1981).  In this model, the 
implied mechanism treats a change in the legal environment that allows women’s access 
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to productive resources as a positive shock to distribution factors which impact upon 
intra-household bargaining (Heath and Tan, 2014). This positive shock allows women 
access to productive resources, maximizes her utility and control over her choices, so that 
her bargaining power goes up within a household. Under this model, an equal inheritance 
law as in our case, the amendment in the Act has, greatly increases women’s ability to 
inherit property, which subsequently increases their unearned income in the current 
period or some unknown point in the future. This increase in women’s unearned income 
also increases their autonomy, i.e., their control over income and improved bargaining 
position within the family19.  Based on this theoretical premise, the research conjectures 
that in response to this improved position, the parents of a woman may have direct 
incentives to invest more in their daughter’s education. This is likely to be affected by the 
reform, owing to the complementarities between education and female inheritance rights 
in relation to household property management, which directly affect their future 
household income. Secondly, a standard income effect predicts that an increase in 
unearned income decreases female labour supply, as she tends to substitute her total time 
spent on work with a greater consumption of leisure.  This study allows the non-
cooperative model to accommodate this effect to argue that women’s unearned income 
also increases her autonomy, which in turn raises her effective wage and thus may 
increase her labour supply. Finally, increase in the bargaining power within a household 
also suggests that outcomes depend on who in the family receives certain income or owns 
the assets generating income. Hence, it is possible to conjecture that as mothers have a 
greater bargaining weight, intra-household decisions concerning human capital 
investments will reflect, to a larger extent, the preferences of women. It is well-
documented that these preferences tend to be tilted towards the well-being of children, 
especially female children (Jensen 2012).  
                                                          
19. The autonomy effect of changes in legal environment that improves the bargaining power of 
household members within a household is extensively discussed in Heath and Tan (2014) and the 
country specific case studies for selected South Asian countries on land rights and women’s 
empowerment have been discussed in RDI (2009).  
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 To evaluate these effects, the study’s identification relies on a Difference-In- 
Difference estimation strategy (D-I-D) to estimate the impact of reform in inheritance 
laws. The causal inferences are drawn from the empirical analysis by comparing mean 
educational attainment and female labour force participation between the younger and 
older women. Treatment of younger cohorts is assigned in reformed states, and their 
observed outcomes compared with older cohorts. The main underlying assumption is that 
in the absence of reform, the observed outcome for women across cohorts would not have 
been different in reformed and non-reformed states. Similar identification strategies have 
been used by Rosenblum (2015), Deininger, Goyal and Nagaraj (2013), Anderson and 
Genicot (2014), Roy (2011) and Lemieux and Card (2001). 
 Unit level data is used from two rounds of the Employment and Unemployment 
Survey of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) conducted in 1999-2000 
(55th round) and 2004-2005(64th round). The research study’s empirical analysis is 
restricted to these two rounds and does not incorporate subsequent rounds of the NSSO 
conducted after the year 2005.  
The main finding reported that women in states where reforms were implemented 
experienced positive effects on their labour force participation rate and educational 
attainments. This positive effect is also observed in their daughter’s educational 
attainment. The results are much stronger for younger cohorts compared to older cohorts 
who were less likely to be affected by the reforms. The results obtained from this study 
corroborate our proposed hypothesis that improvement in inheritance property laws in 
favour of women, does indeed increase their labour force participation and educational 
attainments through enhancing their autonomy in the household decision making process. 
This improved position yields greater bargaining power and allows women to steer 
resource allocations in the preferred direction. The present analysis rules out the 
possibility of an increase in women’s wellbeing in the absence of any systematic changes 
in the existing legal environment.  
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 The study adds to the growing literature on the economic effects of property 
rights, and more broadly on the effects of institutional change on family economics. This 
study also complements other studies on India that have explored the economic effects of 
providing inheritance rights to women. From the policy perspective, this study appears to 
make a strong case for the need to strengthen legal institutions for protecting women’s 
rights and enhancing their bargaining power. 
The chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 provides the background of previous 
studies. Section 4.3 describes the data and identification strategy for the study. Section 
4.4 provides some preliminary evidences. Section 4.5 presents the main results on female 
education, employment and daughter’s education. Section 4.6 provides robustness 
checks. The final section 4.7 offers a conclusion. 
4.2. Previous studies:  
 It is widely recognized that any restriction on women’s economic and property 
rights is likely to affect their bargaining power and also lead to significant productivity 
losses (Goldstein and Udry 2008). Lack of access to property rights that create incentives 
for investment either in physical capital or human capital tends to affect the economic 
outcomes and entrepreneurial activity across many developing countries (Panuzzi et.al. 
2009).  In addition, inheritance property rights which often constitute the main avenue for 
accessing property titles remains heavily biased against women (World Bank 2001). As a 
result, until now, the denials of property rights have severely increased women’s 
hardships and increased their vulnerabilities (ibid).Earlier studies that have looked at the 
role of women’s rights and economic development can be divided into two strands. In the 
first strand, large sections of literature have highlighted the importance of a direct transfer 
of resources to women and have studied their economic effects. When women inherit an 
equal distribution or share from their parental will in forms of intergenerational transfer, 
it enhances the individual capacity and stimulates the long term individual development 
(Deininger et.al. 2013;Becker and Tomes 1979). In the absence of this equal transfer, the 
relative impact of this gender disparity in economic outcomes could thwart the policy 
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efforts to realize the development goals of countries (World Bank 2012 and De Nardi 
2004). Similarly, direct control over productive resources has shown a reduction in 
fertility rate (Eswaran 2002; Goldin and Katz 2002), an increase in workforce 
participation rate (Duflo 2008), an increase in investment in child care costs (Connelly 
1992;Thomas 1990), and a reduction in domestic violence (Agarwal and Panda 2005) and 
in child mortality rate (Dyson and Moore 1983; Eswaran 2002). Through accumulating 
gains from the rising education level, and growth of white-collar services, more women 
could become part of the labour force and increase their earning capacity(Golding 1990; 
Mammen and Paxon 2000) and reducing social stigma against women’s work (Klasen 
and Pieters 2013).  
The second strand in the literature draws much attention to institutional changes that 
aim to strengthen the legal position of women in society, protect the entrusted rights 
given to women, and increase their bargaining power within existing social relations 
relative to men. For instance, legal changes in family law in Bangladesh led to an 
increase in the value of dowry and prenuptial agreements, when constitutional changes 
erected legal barriers to polygamy, and they decreased after additional divorce costs were 
imposed on men (Ambrus, Field and Torero 2009). In the US, the passage of unilateral 
divorce law changed the terms on which women could exit an existing relationship. 
Giving women an exit option led to a one-third reduction in domestic violence 
(Stevanson and Wolfers 2007), increased labour force participation of married and 
unmarried women (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007) and reduced investment in marriage 
specific capital (Chaiappori et.al 2002). This strand of the literature is largely based on 
the intra-household bargaining model which shows that the re-distribution of power 
within the household, in the light of changes in the legal environment, tends to have a 
favorable impact on women’s development. This change according to the aforementioned 
studies, is equivalent to significant productive resource transfers to women. 
In the context of India, studies assessing the impact of the HSA of 1956, show that 
amendments in inheritance legislation tend to generate enormous positive effect on 
increasing female asset endowments. Moreover, it is likely to bring about positive socio-
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economic outcomes in favour of women. Panda and Agarwal (2005) examine the legal 
changes in HSA, and its consequent impact on a reduction in marital violence in the 
southern states of India. Roy (2010) shows that improvement in inheritance laws 
increases the mean female educational attainment by 1.1 to 1.3 years of schooling. In a 
similar vein, Rosenblum (2015) reports a causal impact on a reduction in child mortality 
and average fertility rates in reforming states as compared to non-reforming ones. Amidst 
the staggering incidence of violence against women, a study by Amaral(2013) concludes 
that improved inheritance rights decreased violence against women. The incidence of 
both family and non-family violence that affect women’s autonomy, saw a decline in the 
face of reforms. Using a unique dataset on three generations, a study by Deininger et.al. 
(2010) examined the impact of amendments of HSA on physical and human capital 
investments. This study isolates the causal effect by exploring the variation in the timing 
of father’s death, with household bequests of land to sons and daughters, in selective 
states of India. They report that the amendment significantly increased a daughter’s 
probability of inheriting family wealth. Yet, substantial bias persists in allocating 
property rights to younger females, since the younger cohort enjoy a higher number of 
years of mean education than their older generations- an alternative channel of wealth 
transfer. 
With a background of some understanding, it emerges that no study has investigated 
the impact of an improvement of HSA in favour women on labour force participation and 
educational outcomes (for both a mother and daughter) by taking into account the 
autonomy channel which reflects the increase in bargaining position within the 
household.  
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4. 3. Data and Identification Strategy: 
4.3.1. Data: 
In order to test whether the HSA reform had effects on female labour supply and 
educational attainments, we use data from two rounds of Employment and 
Unemployment Survey of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) conducted 
in 1999-2000 (55th round) and 2004-2005(64th round). The NSSO surveys, which are 
representative at the state-district level and have an overall response rate of 94 percent, 
contain detailed information on household characteristic, individual information, activity 
status, debt information etc. This cross-sectional survey is the official source of nationally 
representative employment, and earning data used by the Government of India. From 
these surveys, the study focuses on the following variables: gender, education, age, 
family members, female labour force participation (principle status), wage income, non-
wage income, household land holding, social category, religious category and marital 
status. As mentioned earlier, the Hindu Succession Act (1956) did not apply to Jammu 
and Kashmir (Agarwal 1994). Hence,it was dropped from the analysis. Smaller union 
territories like Lakshadweep, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry (formerly 
known as Pondicherry) were also dropped from the analysis . For the purposes of the 
analysis, the focus was on Hindu women (this includes- Buddhist, Sikh and Jain women) 
who were wives of the heads of the households, and were at least 28 years of age at the 
time of survey. This ensured that women in the sample had completed their education and 
were also likely to be affected by the reform in reformed states. Non- Hindu women were 
excluded from the sample and the analysis to estimate the impact of inheritance property 
laws on educational attainments and female labour supply. The state of Kerala was also 
excluded from the analysis20. Four reformed states namely, Maharashtra, Karnataka, 
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh were compared with the rest of India (comprising 30 
Indian states). 
                                                          
20. The state of Kerala abolished joint the family property system altogether in 1976 in favour of an 
arrangement where irrespective of gender, all family members could hold their shares separately 
(Agarwal 1994). Inclusion of Kerala, might give us a biased estimate; since, the state has followed 
a different development path than the rest of the states in India (Sen 1990).   
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To estimate the impact of inter-generation transfer of reform benefits from mother to 
daughter, the same dataset was used with a restricted sample of Hindu women from 
reform states who had at least one daughter at the time of survey. The focus was on the 
age cohort of 6 years or less, at the time of reform i.e., 1994 to measure the intended 
effects of investment decisions on their daughter’s education. Both waves of dataset were 
combined in order to have sufficient power to disentangle changes in educational 
attainments and the female labour supply behaviour of Hindu women, as well as to cover 
the periods before and after the reforms. Household level surveys were conducted by the 
government officials in the month of June 1999 for the 55th round and June 2003 for the 
64th round. A sufficient lag between the reform year, and the time of survey, allowed the 
study to take into account the potential gap between the amendment and the 
implementation of the HSA, 1956. The dataset was collapsed by state and year of birth to 
obtain a state-cohort panel, and present cohort-level analysis (see next section for the 
description of age-cohort). 
4.3.2. Identification Strategy: 
 This chapter follows the identification strategy of Rosenblum (2013); Deininger, 
Goyal and Nagaraj (2013); Anderson and Genicot (2014) and Roy (2010). Difference-in-
Difference estimator (D-I-D) was employed using the state level reform as an exogenous 
variation. To measure the impact of the reform on educational achievements (measured in 
years of schooling), and female labour supply (measured in months of previous 
employment), the sample size was restricted to Hindu women who were at least 28 years 
old or more at the time of survey, in the four reformed states. Using this sample size, four 
possible age-cohort groups were constructed, who were exposed to the reform: cohort 1 
included women aged between 28-35 years, cohort 2 included women aged between 33-
40 years, and cohort 3 and 4 included women aged between 41-45 and 46-50 years 
respectively. Sample classification based on the age-cohorts ensured that exposure to the 
reform was jointly determined by a woman’s year of birth and state of birth. Moreover, 
the age cohort classification enabled exploration of the benefit of reform; the reform was 
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likely to affect women’s decision of schooling when they were at a school going age, and 
in the later years, on their decision to participate in the labour market. 
 As mentioned earlier, the identification strategy exploits the effects of reform on 
“treated” age cohorts A “treated” group was defined as cohorts of women, who were of 
school going age when the reform was passed in their states. Secondly, it also included 
women who had daughters at the time of survey i.e., they were at least 28 years old, and 
had at least one daughter in her family. Hence, in the treated group, cohorts of women 
who were 10 years or younger at the time of reform were included. This was done 
because these women were young enough for the reform to affect their education choices; 
they also had at least one daughter at the time of the survey to indicate a transfer of 
benefits of reform from the mother to the daughter. The control group, on the other hand, 
consisted of all women who were out of school by the time of the reform i.e., they were 
21 years or older, and had at least one daughter both in reformed and non-reformed 
states. The reform ought to have had low or insignificant effects on their educational 
achievement and labour supply. Thus, the observed outcome variables of treated groups 
in reformed states was compared with control groups in the reformed and non-reformed 
states. 
 Following Card (1994) and Roy (2010) in Table 4.1, the crux of using D-I-D 
framework for drawing causal inferences from the proposed identification strategy is 
presented. The identifying assumption in a D-I-D analysis is that controlling for 
observables, trends in women’s educational attainments, and labour force participation, 
would have been the same between the control and the treatment groups, if the 
inheritance law reforms had not taken place. Table 4.1 addresses the validity of this 
assumption by comparing average observed outcome variables of reformed states to non-
reformed states. In table 4.1, the average differences in indicators of educational 
attainments (measured in the average years of schooling), and labour supply (measured in 
the average month of previous employment), between the reformed and non-reformed 
states, and across age-cohort groups is reported. Panel A reports the full sample size of 
women across all age groups who were fully exposed to the reform experienced on an 
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average of 2.2 years of education. This was slightly higher compared to women not 
exposed to the reform; and had on an average 1.9 years of education. The observed 
difference is approximately 0.24 average years of education between the reformed and 
non-reformed states. However, the same benefits from the HSA reform, in reforming 
states, could be observed for the indicator on average months of work as compared to 
non-reformed states. Panel B and C are the main age-cohort groups, who were less than 
10 years old at the time of the reform. Both groups are considered as ‘treated cohorts’ in 
this empirical investigation. The observed outcome of two groups with the cohort 3 and 4 
(Panel D and E) was compared. This comparison is considered as a control experiment 
between two sets of cohorts: one cohort (the younger one), who were fully exposed to the 
reform, and other consists of those who despite residing in reformed states could not 
benefit from it. In the reformed states, the younger cohorts enjoy on an average 2.41 
years of more schooling compared to the older cohort in reformed states. This 
comparison presents a falsification test for women who were born in the1960s and 1970s- 
the members of this cohort (Panel D and E) would have left school by the time the reform 
was passed in their state, and hence they would not have experienced any effect. 
Table 4.1: Mean Years of Education and Mean Months of Work: Birth cohort wise  
 Reformed 
States 
Non- Reformed 
States 
Difference 
 
Panel A: Aggregate (Full Sample) 
 
Mean  Years of 
Education 
2.226 
(0.008) 
1.984 
(0.004) 
-0.242 
(0.008) 
 
Mean Months of 
Work 
4.135 
(0.007) 
3.862 
(0.013) 
-0.273 
(0.016) 
 
Panel B: Cohort 1 (Age 5 or less at time of reform) 
 
Mean  Years of 
Education 
6.593 
(0.025) 
1.993 
(0.003) 
-4.599 
(0.035) 
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Mean Months of 
Work 
10.849 
(0.029) 
3.988 
(0.006) 
-6.861 
(0.061) 
 
Panel C: Cohort 2 (Age 6 to 10 at time of reform) 
 
Mean  Years of 
Education 
6.250 
(0.032) 
2.018 
(0.003) 
-4.232 
(0.046) 
 
Mean Months of 
Work 
9.962 
(0.035) 
3.995 
(0.006) 
-5.966 
(0.059) 
 
Panel D: Cohort 3 ( Age 11 to 20 at time of reform) 
 
Mean  Years of 
Education 
5.234 
(0.021) 
2.011 
(0.003) 
-3.223 
(0.036) 
 
Mean Months of 
Work 
9.688 
(0.048) 
4.030 
(0.006) 
-5.658 
(0.078) 
 
Panel D: Cohort 4 ( Age 21 years or more at time of reform) 
 
Mean  Years of 
Education 
5.701 
(0.019) 
2.505 
(0.003) 
-3.196 
(0.490) 
 
Mean Months of 
Work 
9.371 
(0.022) 
4.281 
(0.124) 
-5.090 
(0.063) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at state level and all S.E. are significant at 1 
percent.  
The difference is quite large between the reformed and non-reformed states for the same 
group of cohorts. On the contrary, despite enjoying the premium over educational 
attainment, the younger cohorts fall short of 0.32years on an average in the employment 
duration as compared to the older cohort. From this simple analysis, it is inferred that the 
intended effect of reform in reforming states on treated cohorts is significant and 
substantially larger compared to those cohorts in non-reformed states who were not 
exposed to the HSA. 
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4.3.3. Econometric Framework: 
 The primary identifying strategy elaborated above is now extended to exploit the 
variation from all reforming states, by using the following form of liner quadruple 
regression framework: 
Ys,c = Įs +ȕc +t + į1Ds,c1+ į2Ds,c2+ į3Ds,c3+ į4Ds,c4+ İs,c  ………..        (1) 
The dependent variable (Ys,c)denotes two variables- the mean years of education and the 
mean months of previous employment of a woman in state (s) belonging to cohort (c). 
We measure the mean years of education as the average years of schooling (from 0 years 
(illiterate) to 21 years (a Master’s Degree and above)). In the NSSO survey in block 5, 
there was a question about the actual duration of previous employment. In the present 
study, this variable is used to measure the response of female labour supply in actual 
months (0-12 months).  Let the reform be passed in year (c* ) in state (s). Then (Ds,c1)is a 
dummy indicating whether the Hindu woman belonging to the cohort who was aged 5 or 
less at the time of the reform in the given state. Similarly (Ds,c2)is a dummy indicating 
whether they were between 6 to 10 years old, (Ds,c3)is a dummy indicating whether they 
were between 11 to 15 years old, and (Ds,c4) is a dummy indicating whether they were 
between 16 to 20 years old respectively. The group consisting of cohorts of women, who 
were 21 years or older at the time of reform, constituted the category omitted from the 
analysis. (Įs)is a state fixed effect, (ȕc)is a birth cohort fixed effect, (t)is birth year time 
trend and (İs,)is the error term. To address the serial correlation concerns and to allow for 
heteroscedasticity the standard errors are clustered at the level of district (Bertrand et.al. 
2004).  This equation estimates the average impact on schooling, and on employability 
(in the later years) in the labour market after the reforms for the treatment cohorts relative 
to the control cohorts. It is important to consider the estimated effect of the reforms as the 
average intent-to-treat effect of implementing equal inheritance rights, since there may be 
a lag between implementation and behavioural change because it takes time for 
behavioural adaptation and knowledge diffusion across populations.  
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 The main coefficients of interest are į1and į2 which capture the effect of being 
exposed to improved inheritance rights on the younger cohorts. As mentioned in the 
previous section, improvement in the inheritance law in favour of women strengthens 
women’s bargaining position in the household due to an increase in autonomy. This 
improvement, subsequently, reduces her fear of being disinherited from the property title. 
Thus, this improvement generates incentives for investment in human capital 
accumulation, and most probably increases her returns from the market activities. The 
oldest cohort (16-20 years old) is specially included as a falsification test. The members 
of this cohort would have left school by the time reform took place in their state. Hence, 
they may not have experienced large effects as compared to younger cohorts on their 
outcome variables.  
 So far, the study’s main specification estimates the effects on first generation 
females who were exposed to the reform. But how does this exposure transmit into 
daughters’ well-being? A potential concern with this specification is that, fathers who 
know that their daughters will inherit a greater amount of physical capital at their death 
may reduce the amount of education they provide to their daughters. This is quite 
relevant because human capital, in the form of education is a key tool for transferring 
wealth across generations. To account for this possibility, there is an analysis of the 
intergenerational transfer of human capital from mothers to daughters. There is a focus on 
the elementary education of girls who were less than 6 years old in 1994 so that their 
decisions would have been affected by the HSA 1956. This is in comparison to those who 
were 13 years or older in 1994. The latter implies that daughters who are 13 years or 
older would have completed their elementary education by then, and their schooling 
decision would not be affected by the Act.  
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The equation to be estimated then becomes: 
Ys,c = Įs +ȕc +į1Fs,c+ į2Fs,c *Vj+ İs,c     ………………..     (2) 
Where (Ys,c)measures the mean years of education of daughters, born in state (s) 
belonging to cohort (c), (Fs,c)is an indicator variable for married women, (Vj) is the 
indicator variable for a daughter who was less than 6 years old in 1994 and 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are defined above.  
 Before proceeding to the results, it is necessary to point out the problem of the 
possibility of omitted variables bias in our results as highlighted by Roy (2010). It is 
possible that reforms were passed in states that have a particularly pro-female bias; they 
might have passed additional legislation to assist women. There do not appear to be 
specific reasons for the location and timing of the reforms. For instance, there was not a 
particular party in power in all these states, at the time of amendment in the law. There 
are many civil society organizations actively working towards women’s empowerment, 
but they are not particularly located in the reformed states. Another concern that arises 
with regard to potential bias is the possibility of systemic variation in the migration 
behaviour due to marriage or other factors, like migration to cities. However, according 
to the Census of India 2011 and 2001, overall inter-state migration in India is 5.9 and 4.8 
percent of the total population21 respectively. Therefore, the possibility that the migration 
factor between the reformed and non-reformed states is likely to affect the results, is 
ruled out. The quadruple D-I-D analysis reduces such omitted variable bias; to account 
for any omitted pro-female variable bias in the estimates, it would have to differentially 
affect Hindu-women after the inheritance rights were passed in the reformed states.  
 
 
 
                                                          
21.  Statistical Abstract of the Census of India, 2011 and 2001.  
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4.4. Preliminary Evidence:  
 Table 4.2 provides summary statistics of observed variables. If the treatment 
component from the sample is disregarded, then it can be observed that all women in the 
sample population enjoy on an average 2.22 years of educational attainment, and an 
average 4.13 months of employment duration. This summary figure is quite low 
compared to other emerging economies like China, Brazil, and many OECD countries 
(OECD 2014)22. The sample population is divided between the reformed states and non-
reformed states. It can be seen that in the reformed states on an average, women 
experienced 2.2 years of educational attainments, and an average 4.13 months of 
employment. The sample is restricted to women belonging to the Hindu religion. The 
average years of education and the average months of employment variable turned out to 
be sufficiently larger in the reformed states than the non-reformed states. On an average, 
the Hindu women in the reformed states experienced 5.04 months of employment and 
2.81 years of educational attainments.  
Next, the treatment is assigned to Hindu women in the reformed states based on their age-
cohort classification. From Cohorts 1 to 4, the average months of educational attainment 
show a decreasing trend. This implies that the estimated effect of reform is larger for the 
younger cohorts compared to the older one. For instance, Cohorts 1 and 2 indicate that 
the average years of schooling is 6.4 and 6.2 years respectively, whereas the same 
variable is 5 years of schooling for the older one (cohort 4). Figure 4.1 supports the 
validity of the observation by showing a trend of educational attainment of treated 
cohorts between the reformed and non-reformed states. The estimated line for the treated 
cohorts is higher in reformed states than in the non-reformed states after the 1980’s. 
However, the difference appears to converge between the 1970s and the 1980s. 
 
                                                          
22. In China, the average years of schooling for women workers is 6.5 years of education and the 
female labour force participation is 52 percent (World Development Report 2013). Similarly in 
Brazil the average years if schooling for women workers is 8.2 years of education and the female 
labour force participation is 59 percent (World Development Report 2013).  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Full Sample 
Mean  Years of Education 363846 2.037 3.238 0 21 
Mean Months of Work 363846 4.072 5.502 0 12 
Reformed States 
Mean  Years of Education 166843 2.226 3.374 0 21 
Mean Months of Work 166843 3.863 5.375 0 12 
Hindu Religion 
Mean  Years of Education 81087 2.815 3.507 0 21 
Mean Months of Work 81087 5.036 5.708 0 12 
Cohort 1 Aged 5 or less at time of reform 
Mean  Years of Education 28480 6.593 2.334 0 10 
Mean Months of Work 28480 9.962 3.273 1 12 
Cohort 2 Aged 6 to 10 at time of reform 
Mean  Years of Education 34862 6.250 2.254 0 10 
Mean Months of Work 34862 9.208 3.392 1 12 
Cohort 3 Aged 11 to 15 at time of reform 
Mean  Years of Education 33425 6.115 2.267 0 10 
Mean Months of Work 33425 8.590 3.328 1 12 
Cohort 4 Aged 16 to 20 at the time of reform 
Mean  Years of Education 32168 5.853 2.222 0 10 
Mean Months of Work 32168 7.235 3.263 1 12 
 
Household Level Control Variables (Non-Reform States) 
Household Size 197003 3.149 2.300 0 9 
Household Land Holding 197003 2.800 2.282 0 10 
Male Education 197003 2.722 3.853 0 21 
Male Income 197003 4.185 4.900 0 18 
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Other Family Income 197003 6.251 0.637 1 17 
Household Level Control Variables (Reform States) 
Household Size 166843 2.778 2.129 0 9 
Household Land Holding 166843 2.203 2.278 0 9 
Male Education 166843 2.942 3.875 0 21 
Male Income 166843 3.460 3.576 0 18. 
Other Family Income 166843 6.342 0.630 2 14 
Source: Author’s own calculations from NSSO unit level data. 
Once the four states amended the HSA in favour of women, it is seen that the educational 
attainments between the reformed and non-reformed states begin to diverge. In the 1980s, 
the massive campaign for female empowerment and the overall state policy response 
towards a gender concern minimized the difference between the educational attainments 
in both categories of Indian states. Along with this spirited campaign for women’s 
empowerment, amendment to the HSA in four states would have complemented the 
state’s policy effort towards women’s development.  
Figure 4.1: Educational attainments: Treated Cohort 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on NSSO data. 
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 The effects of treatment on improving employment prospects for women, who 
were exposed to the reform, do show some marginal improvements (see Figure 4.2). The 
average duration of employment for the treated cohort in reformed states is slightly 
higher than cohorts in non-reformed states, although the difference between the reformed 
and non-reformed states is not as large as it is being indicated for educational 
attainments. In this case, it is possible that women who benefited from the HSA reform 
through advancing their educational status may have enjoyed better labour market 
prospects than those women who did not have high educational status. 
Figure4.2: Employment Duration: Treated Cohort 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on NSSO data. 
 This trend also indicates that social norms and customs could be discouraging 
factors that prevent women from working outside their homes since it is a matter of 
family prestige and social status. As they witness increasing returns from their education 
and lack of stigma to white collar jobs, the workforce participation for women could be 
pulled back(Klassen and Pieters 2013; Eswaran et.al. 2011). 
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4.5. Results: 
4.5.1. Effect on Female Educational Attainments: 
 
 This section estimates the effects of equal inheritance law reform on female 
education attainments. The aggregate estimated result of equation (1) is reported in Table 
4.3.  While aggregating the estimated coefficients the focus was on women from the 
Hindu religious group in the reformed states who were aged 28 years at the time of the 
survey. In column (1), without controlling for any effects or trends, the estimated 
coefficients for all Hindu women sub-sample are positive and significant. It shows that on 
an average, Hindu women who have benefited from the reform have experienced an 
average 4.6 years of schooling at the time of the reform as compared to women from 
other religious groups in reformed states. However, once the state fixed effects, cohort 
fixed effects, and birth year trend (in column 4) were controlled, the predicted results turn 
out to be positive and statistically significant. The initial assessments are consistent with 
the proposed proposition that the equal inheritance property law reform has significant 
effect on the decision to invest in women’s education.   
Table 4.3: Effect on Mean Years of Education (Full Sample) 
 Mean Years 
of 
Education 
(1) 
Mean Years 
of Education 
(2) 
Mean Years of 
Education 
 
(3) 
Mean Years of 
Education 
 
(4) 
Hindu Women ( Dummy 
Variable) 
4.663*** 
(0.209) 
4.872*** 
(0.230) 
5.142*** 
(0.250) 
5.155*** 
(0.248) 
 
Constants 1.930*** 
(0.060) 
1.027*** 
(0.413) 
1.205*** 
(0.420) 
1.946*** 
(0.446) 
 
State FE NO YES YES YES 
Birth Year Trend NO NO NO YES 
Adjusted R-sqr 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Observations 363846 363846 363846 363846 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at state level 
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Proceeding further, the overall educational attainments across religion and birth cohort in 
reform states show positive effects on women’s educational attainments.  
Table 4.4: Effect on Mean Years of Education (Hindu Sample) 
 Mean Years of 
Education  
(1) 
Hindu 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(2) 
Hindu 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(3) 
Hindu 
Mean Years 
of 
Education 
(4) 
Hindu 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(5) 
Non-Hindu 
Age 5 or less at 
the time of 
reform 
 
5.586*** 
(0.346) 
6.017*** 
(0.353) 
6.131*** 
(0.361) 
6.127*** 
(0.361) 
 
-1.398*** 
(0.127) 
 
Age 6 to 10 at 
the time of 
reform 
5.235*** 
(0.325) 
5.666*** 
(0.336) 
5.855*** 
(0.344) 
5.853*** 
(0.344) 
 
-1.319*** 
(0.128) 
 
Age 11 to 15 at 
the time of 
reform 
5.140*** 
(0.304) 
5.571*** 
(0.310) 
5.754*** 
(0.318) 
5.752*** 
(0.318) 
 
-1.328*** 
(0.123) 
 
Age 16 to 20 at 
the time of 
reform 
4.902*** 
(0.328) 
5.333*** 
(0.343) 
5.561*** 
(0.349) 
5.559*** 
(0.348) 
 
-1.277*** 
(0.128) 
 
Constants 1.272*** 
(0.065) 
0.533*** 
(2.01) 
0.636*** 
(0.302) 
1.778*** 
(0.078) 
 
0.717*** 
(0.080) 
 
State FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Year 
Trend 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Adjusted R-sqr 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 
Observations 81087 81087 81087 81087 197003 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at state level 
Even after controlling, the average years of schooling is 5.1 for cohort 1, and 4.6 years 
for cohort 4. Interestingly, the effects get smaller as one considers the potential effects on 
older cohorts. This is also consistent with the expectation that the older cohorts would 
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have been out of school at the time of reform. Thus, the parents’ decision to invest in 
their daughter may not have been motivated by the benefits of reform for older cohorts. 
Then, one could ask why the older cohorts seem to benefit from the reforms, when the 
intended treatment was not meant to affect them. A potential explanation could be offered 
to explain this effect. Failure in the primary and secondary grades is a common 
phenomenon in the Indian education system. Students who failed in class continue with 
their grades at an older age. Accounting for this fact makes it possible that even older 
cohorts would have benefited from this reform (Dufloet.al. 2008). Therefore, it can be 
argued that the parents of a woman may have direct incentives to invest more in their 
daughter’s education, and that they are likely to be affected by the reform, owing to the 
complementarities between education and female inheritance rights in relation to 
household property management, which directly affects their future household income. 
Table 4.4 presents the effects of HSA reform on Hindu women. In column (1), without 
controlling for any effects, the average effects on educational attainments are positive. 
Women from Cohort 1 enjoyed on an average 6 years of education, and cohort 2 women 
enjoyed on an average 5.3 years of education in the reformed states. Once the effects 
were controlled, the estimated size of the effect again appeared to be positive for the 
treated cohorts, who have enjoyed 6.1 and 5.8 years of education attainment, in the 
reform states respectively (column 4). It may be noted that all cohort groups among 
Hindu women seem to have benefited from the reform; however, the estimated 
magnitude of the coefficients gets smaller as we move down to the older cohorts.  A 
young cohort 1 of women, aged less than 5 years at the time of reform, experienced 
approximately 0.6 years more of education than the older cohort 4, who were more than 
16 years of age at the time of the reform. The quantitative differences seem to indicate 
that the effect too low to suggest any positive difference between the educational 
attainment of the younger and older cohorts. However, these 0.6 years of difference could 
be a decisive factor in the job market, the marriage market, or even for social status. For 
instance, having a daughter who had completed primary education, makes a family more 
proud than when they have qualifications below the primary level. Similarly, having a 
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daughter who had completed higher education is more prestigious for her family, and for 
her prospective in-laws23 and she is considered as an asset in the family who would 
contribute towards the family resources till she gets married.  
Apart from using the state, trend and cohort fixed effects, as an additional robustness 
check, there is an estimate of the effects of reform on non-Hindu women in the reform 
states. The reforms were aimed at improving the economic status of Hindu women and 
eliminating the persistent bequest inequality in the Hindu Joint family system. However, 
it wasn’t intended to affect the economic status of other women. In the revised estimate 
presented in Table 4.4, we treat the same cohorts among the non-Hindu sample in the 
reformed states. Column 5 indicates that the true effect of reform is negative across all 
cohorts. Despite controlling for fixed effects, the magnitude of coefficients is 
approximately a reduction of 1.3 years in average years of schooling. This effect could be 
because after the Hindu population, the second largest sample population is that of 
Muslim women, who have an average 2.4 years of schooling. Muslim women in India are 
historically marginalized both in the social and household spheres due their minority 
status. There seems to be a lack of policy  for uplifting the overall status of Muslim 
women (Government of India 2005). Therefore, an overall decline in education could be 
due to ignorance of targeted public and social policy, which were aimed to improve the 
wellbeing of Muslim women.  
 
4.5.2. Effect on Female Employment: 
 
In this section, the effects of reform on female employment from equation (1) are re-
estimated. In table 4.5, we present the aggregated results of all women belonging to the 
Hindu religion in the reformed states.  Column (1) in Table 4.5, presents the results 
without controlling for cohorts, trend and state fixed effects. On an average, all women 
                                                          
23. A section of literature on human capital theory has  been devoted to study the role of school 
education  in improving marriage market prospects  to analyse how female labour supply responds 
to changes in marriage market conditions. A detailed discussion on this topic can be found 
(Bertrand et.al 2014;  Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss 2008;  Blau, Kahn and Waldfogel 2000). 
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belonging to Hindu religion enjoyed 6 months of employment relative to women from 
other religious groups in the reformed states. However, once controlled for cohorts, birth 
year trend and state fixed effects, the effects continued to be positive and significant for 
women belonging to the Hindu religion as compared to non-Hindu women in the 
reformed states.  This positive effect on employment outcome is largely driven by 
expected positive returns from engaging in paid labour market activities.  This 
development can be ascribed to an increase in women’s unearned income through the 
HSA reform that led to an increase in autonomy. As per the proposed hypothesis, an 
increase in women’s autonomy raises her effective wage and thus may increase her 
labour supply as she holds bargaining power to allocate resources and steer that 
allocation in her preferred direction which yields maximum returns to her choices. Table 
4.6 reports the effects of reform on Hindu women. In column (1), the estimated effect of 
equal inheritance reform is positive, and is slightly higher compared to table (4.5). Cohort 
1 females enjoy, on an average, 7.4 months of employment exposure, and cohort 2 enjoys 
7.03 months of average employment exposure. Compared to younger cohorts, the 
positive effect is also extended to the older Hindu female cohorts.  
Table 4.5: Effect on Mean Months of Employment (Full Sample) 
 Mean 
Months of 
Employment 
(1)  
Mean 
Months of 
Employment 
(2) 
Mean Months 
of 
Employment 
(3) 
Mean Months 
of 
Employment 
(4) 
Hindu Women ( 
Dummy Variable) 
6.070*** 
(0.173) 
6.930*** 
(0.190) 
7.607*** 
(0.241) 
7.595*** 
(0.241) 
 
State FE NO YES YES YES 
Birth Year Trend NO NO NO YES 
Adjusted R-sqr 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Observations 363846 363846 363846 363846 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at state level. 
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Upon using fixed effects, the magnitude of coefficients gets larger for all Hindu women 
cohorts. Cohorts 1 and 2 enjoy on an average 8.5 and 8.3 months of employment 
exposure respectively, and the mean difference of employment duration for control and 
treated group is 0.10 months. 
Table 4.6: Effect on Mean Months of Employment (Hindu Sample) 
 Mean Months 
of 
Employment 
(1) 
Hindu 
Mean 
Months of 
Employmen
t 
(2) 
Hindu 
Mean 
Months of 
Employment 
(3) 
Hindu 
Mean 
Months of 
Employmen
t 
(4) 
Hindu 
Mean 
Months of 
Employmen
t 
(5) 
Non Hindu 
 
Age 5 or less at 
the time of 
reform 
7.411*** 
(0.113) 
8.269*** 
(0.067) 
8.575*** 
(0.120) 
8.574*** 
(0.120) 
 
2.929*** 
(0.056) 
 
Age 6 to 10 at 
the time of 
reform 
7.095*** 
(0.130) 
7.953*** 
(0.101) 
8.287*** 
(0.147) 
8.287*** 
(0.147) 
 
2.897*** 
(0.061) 
 
Age 11 to 15 at 
the time of 
reform 
7.275*** 
(0.131) 
8.133*** 
(0.898) 
8.373*** 
(0.147) 
8.373*** 
(0.147) 
 
3.008*** 
(0.069) 
 
Age 16 to 20 at 
the time of 
reform 
7.232*** 
(0.082) 
8.181*** 
(0.091) 
8.405*** 
(0.847) 
8.405*** 
(0.151) 
 
3.02*** 
(0.0712) 
 
Constants 2.615*** 
(0.082) 
0.744*** 
(2.20) 
0.847*** 
(0.750) 
0.393*** 
(0.082) 
 
2.726*** 
(0.057) 
 
State FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Year 
Trend 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Adjusted R-
sqr 
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.01 
Observations 81087 81087 81087 81087 197003 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at state level. 
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In addition to fixed effects, the study used a non-Hindu subsample for an additional 
robustness check. Column 5 shows that the reform, aimed to improve Hindu women’s 
economic status, is positively associated with the employment outcome of non- Hindu 
women. Although the magnitude of the coefficient is very small and far lower than those 
coefficients in Hindu women’s, this effect suggests that the reform could have improved 
the bargaining position of Hindu women relative to women from other social groups. 
Therefore, Hindu women have been in a better position to access the opportunities 
offered by the labour market, whereas such accessibility was not extended to those 
women who were not exposed to the reform process. As a result, the labour market 
opportunities which have been open for all women workers could have been captured by 
the Hindu women relative to non-Hindus due to their comparative advantage of improved 
bargaining power in the household. It is interesting to note that the general trend reflects a 
U- shape experience in the labour market. For instance, for the younger cohort 1, the 
employment duration is high. As one moves down, the estimated effects get smaller for 
two cohorts (2 &3), and it again increases for the older one. This is consistent with the 
“U-Shape” trend, where it can be argued that at a younger age, women are more 
productive, and are not constrained due to issues of their reproductive health or any 
family commitments for child birth. As they grow older, due to responsibilities of 
familial responsibilities, they withdraw their active participation from the market. Again, 
they return to their activity once their children grow older.   
4.5.3 Effects on Daughter Education Attainment: 
The previous two sections presented the empirical evidence of the effects of equal 
inheritance property laws on Hindu women’s educational attainment and employment 
outcome.  In this section, we will present the evidence on the educational attainment of 
daughters, whose mothers were exposed to the reform in reforming states. Results from 
the estimating equation (2) for daughters, who were at the age of 6 or less, at the time of 
reform in 1994, are presented in Table 4.7.  
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Table 4.7: Effect on Daughter’s Education 
 Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(1) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean Years 
of Education 
(2) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean Years 
of Education 
(3) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean Years 
of Education 
(4) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean Years 
of Education 
(5) 
(Non Hindu 
Sample) 
Less than age 
6 at the time 
of reform 
4.328*** 
(0.141) 
 
4.187*** 
(0.143) 
5.381*** 
(0.111) 
5.381*** 
(0.111) 
1.342*** 
(0.091) 
 
Constants  1.226*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.363*** 
(1.31) 
0.559*** 
(0.02) 
0.817 
(0.09) 
0.716*** 
(0.89) 
State FE NO 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE NO 
 
NO YES YES YES 
Birth Year 
Trend 
 
NO NO NO YES YES 
Adjusted R-
sqr 
0.03 
 
0.05 0.06 0.06 0.03 
Observations 8210 8210 8210 8203 11568 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at state level 
Column 1 shows that, without controlling for any effects, the daughters of Hindu women 
who were exposed to reform experience on an average 4.3 years of education as 
compared to the older female child cohort (i.e. cohort of girl children who were 13 years 
of old )in the reformed states. However, once we controlled for state, birth cohort and 
birth year fixed effects, the educational attainment of girls increases with an average 5.4 
years of primary and upper primary schooling. In addition to fixed effects, there is a non-
Hindu sub-sample for the additional robustness check. This additional empirical exercise 
is useful to know whether the intended effects of reform were actually transferred to 
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daughters in the Hindu sample. Using the same  age cohorts of girls from the non-Hindu 
sub-sample in column 5, it was found that after controlling for fixed effects, a younger 
cohort ( aged between 6 to 10 years)  experiences 1.3 fewer years of education, compared 
to the older cohorts of the non-Hindu sample in the reformed states. Therefore, it can be 
argued that with increased autonomy in the family, women who were exposed to the 
reform prefer to invest in their daughter’s education. This observation is very well 
documented in many other developing countries. India has one of the poorest male / 
female ratios in the world. According to the Census of 2011, there were 940 females for 
1000 males. Family and social relations in Indian society are largely shaped by 
patriarchal norms. Up to now, a male child is preferred over a girl child due to 
conservative social norms, cultural values and orthodox beliefs assigned to male roles in 
the family.  Owing to these cultural barriers, women’s autonomy or independence in 
almost all Hindu families is more or less curtailed.  Such restriction is expanded to their 
reproductive health whereby a husband and his family members decide whether to have a 
child or not, and how many children they could have.  In all decisions, the family assigns 
a preference to a male child without even considering the woman’s say in the decision to 
have a baby (Rosenblum 2015). As per the theoretical framework, the amendment in 
inheritance laws gives more autonomy to women through providing some source of 
income. This autonomy, in turn allows women to have a say in their reproductive health 
matters. While allocating the family resources, a female child receives little or no share 
compared to male children. To eliminate such sexual discrimination, it is assumed that a 
mother would prefer to invest in her daughter’s education.  
4.6. Robustness Checks: 
In this section, three robustness checks for the empirical results obtained in the previous 
section are provided. The first robustness check involves controlling for household level 
covariates for educational attainments, and labour supply. The second exploits, after 
controlling for household level covariates, the religious differences among women. And 
finally, a placebo test was applied to see whether the coefficient estimates are mistakenly 
picking up trends in educational attainments, and employment that were independent of 
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reform. In this test, we restrict the sample to Hindu women born in the 1970’s, when 
education attainment and employment should be unaffected by the later changes in 
inheritance laws. This test treats 1965 as the year from when the inheritance laws were 
implemented.  
Table 4.8 presents the robustness of results on the effects on HSA on educational 
attainments. In Columns 1 to 4, the use of household level covariates, and other fixed 
effects shows that re-estimated results are almost similar to those obtained in table 4. 
However, the magnitude of coefficients for treated young cohorts is marginally higher as 
compared to the full sample. A young Hindu female who belonged to cohort 1 and cohort 
2 experienced on an average, 4.8 and 4.5 more years of schooling in reformed states, than 
those young cohorts who were in non-reformed states. Column 5 in the same table reports 
the results for non-Hindu women. The estimated robust effect is positive but quite small. 
This estimation, to some extent, would rule out the possibility of prevalence of common 
trends in female education across religions. In column 6, a placebo test was used to see 
whether the predicted results are the true effect of reform, or whether it was driven by a 
common trend in the educational attainment of women. Using hypothetical birth cohorts, 
the study infers that estimated effects are true effects of reform, and are not driven by the 
general trend. The estimated coefficients are insignificant and positive.  
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Table 4.8: Robustness Checks- Female Education 
 Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(1) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(2) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(3) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(4) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(5) 
(Non 
Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(6) 
(Hindu 
Sample 
Placebo 
Test) 
Age 5 or less 
at the time of 
reform 
4.541*** 
(0.396) 
4.633*** 
(0.628) 
4.747*** 
(0.637) 
4.755*** 
(0.632) 
2.575*** 
(0.275) 
0.873 
(0.830) 
 
Age 6 to 10 at 
the time of 
reform 
4.192*** 
(0.365) 
4.296*** 
(0.550) 
4.513*** 
(4.310) 
4.522*** 
(0.557) 
2.442*** 
(0.352) 
0.755 
(0.861) 
 
Age 11 to 15 at 
the time of 
reform 
4.083*** 
(0.354) 
4.111*** 
(0.581) 
4.310*** 
(0.606) 
4.318*** 
(0.601) 
2.443*** 
(0.427) 
0.451 
(0.743) 
 
Age 16 to 20 at 
the time of 
reform 
3.839*** 
(0.376) 
3.826*** 
(0.623) 
4.190*** 
(0.612) 
4.198*** 
(0.608) 
2.470*** 
(0.317) 
- 
 
 
Household 
Size 
0.028 
(0.134) 
0.114 
(0.147) 
0.108 
(0.152) 
0.109 
(0.151) 
0.080 
(0.156) 
0.111 
(0.151) 
 
Landholding 0.144 
(0.177) 
0.877** 
(0.329) 
0.879** 
(0.329) 
0.877** 
(0.328) 
0.946** 
(0.346) 
0.895** 
(0.332) 
 
Male-
Education 
-0.010** 
(0.048) 
-0.458*** 
(0.095) 
-0.620*** 
(0.099) 
-0.624*** 
(0.099) 
-0.633*** 
(0.102) 
0.523*** 
(0.499) 
 
Male-Income -0.259*** 
(0.069) 
0.137 
(0.117) 
0.346*** 
(0.120) 
0.351*** 
(0.121) 
0.324** 
(0.128) 
0.359*** 
(0.122) 
 
Constants  2.074*** 
(0.634) 
4.000*** 
(0.430) 
6.432*** 
(0.418) 
4.936*** 
(0.505) 
5.132*** 
(0.541) 
1.328*** 
(0.031) 
 
State FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Birth Year 
Trend 
NO NO NO YES YES YES 
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Adjusted R-
sqr 
0.19 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.25 
Observations 62188 62188 62188 62188 62188 62188 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at state level 
 
Table 4.9 Robustness Check-Female Employment 
 Mean 
Months of 
Employmen
t 
(1) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Months of 
Employme
nt 
(2) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Months of 
Employme
nt 
(3) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Months of 
Employme
nt 
(4) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Months of 
Employme
nt 
(5) 
(Non 
Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Months of 
Employme
nt 
(6) 
(Hindu 
Sample 
Placebo 
Test) 
 
Age 5 or less 
at the time of 
reform 
6.345*** 
(0.280) 
6.611*** 
(0.632) 
6.787*** 
(0.661) 
6.801*** 
(0.659) 
-3.794*** 
(0.297) 
2.060 
(0.170) 
 
 
Age 6 to 10 
at the time of 
reform 
6.044*** 
(0.262) 
6.318*** 
(0.494) 
6.562*** 
(0.536) 
6.578*** 
(0.532) 
-3.679*** 
(0.430) 
2.215 
(0.166) 
 
 
Age 11 to 15 
at the time of 
reform 
6.188*** 
(0.284) 
6.345*** 
(0.650) 
6.529*** 
(0.712) 
6.544*** 
(0.707) 
-3.734*** 
(0.553) 
2.73 
(0.167) 
 
Age 16 to 20 
at the time of 
reform 
6.21*** 
(0.303) 
6.303*** 
(0.678) 
6.628*** 
(0.683) 
6.644*** 
(0.679) 
-3.899*** 
(0.396) 
- 
 
 
Household 
Size 
-0.080 
(0.203) 
-0.132 
(0.227) 
-0.132 
(0.232) 
-0.134 
(0.232) 
-0.088 
(0.240) 
-0.136 
(0.232) 
 
Landholding 0.373 
(0.293) 
1.473** 
(0.537) 
1.472** 
(0.540) 
1.468** 
(0.539) 
1.569** 
(0.563) 
1.494** 
(0.544) 
 
Male-
Education 
-0.120 
(0.078) 
-0.627*** 
(0.144) 
-0.764*** 
(0.157) 
-0.772*** 
(0.158) 
-0.781*** 
(0.168) 
-0.785*** 
(0.159) 
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Male-Income -0.463*** 
(0.124) 
0.099 
(0.186) 
0.276 
(0.203) 
0.286 
(0.205) 
0.242 
(0.222) 
0.296 
(0.207) 
 
Constants  3.062*** 
(0.965) 
5.410*** 
(0.663) 
7.181*** 
(0.651) 
4.362*** 
(0.959) 
4.697*** 
(0.901) 
3.993*** 
(1.00) 
State FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Birth Year 
Trend 
NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-
sqr 
0.19 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.31 
Observations 68032 68032 68032 68032 68032 68032 
Table 4.9 reported the robust estimated effect on female employment. Controlling for 
household level covariates, and other fixed effects, the effects of reform are positive for 
younger as well as older cohorts, among the Hindu female sample. The estimated 
coefficients show a U- shaped pattern for the employment duration. Initially, it is higher 
for younger women of cohort 1. It then shows a slight declining trend, and it again rises 
for the older cohorts. Among non-Hindu women, the effect is negative. Column 5 shows 
that the younger cohorts of non-Hindu females tend to work on an average 2.5 and 2.4 
months less, compared to the same cohorts in the non-reform states. Using the placebo 
test in column 6 the study reported that the effect is not driven by the common trend in 
employment.  Now, the study presents the robust evidence of reform on daughter’s’ 
education in table 10. Theoretical predictions suggest that women who were exposed to 
the reform, were most likely transferring the benefits of the reform to their daughters by 
investing in their education. The main estimation results in Table 4.10, show that reforms 
favour the younger daughters of Hindu women. On an average, they tend to experience 
approximately 0.8 years more schooling than other girl children in non-reform states. 
However, after controlling for household covariates and other fixed effects, the intensity 
of the coefficient reduces to 2.7 years. When the same effect for daughters of non-Hindu 
was compared, the estimated coefficient showed a positive sign and insignificant 
estimate. For the placebo test, the female sample was restricted to those born around the 
1970s. Their daughter’s education was taken as a hypothetical cohort. This is required to 
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see whether a recent trend in daughter’s education is largely driven by the reform 
process, or is a continued general trend among Hindu women’s daughters. Column 6 
indicates that education of daughters whose mothers were born during the 1970s, showed 
a positive sign. However, this effect is much smaller than the main estimation, and is thus 
insignificant.  From this section, it is evident that the effects of equal inheritance property 
law reform on female education and employment, as well as for their daughter’s 
educational attainment, are robust to empirical specification. From Tables 8 to 10, all 
household level covariates show the expected signs; they are almost equivalent for Hindu 
and non-Hindu religious groups. 
Table 4.10 Robustness Check-Daughter Education 
 Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(1) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(2) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(3) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(4) 
(Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Educatio
n 
(5) 
(Non 
Hindu 
Sample) 
Mean 
Years of 
Education 
(6) 
(Hindu 
Sample 
Placebo 
Test) 
Age 6 to 10 
at the time 
of reform 
 
1.688*** 
(0.582) 
1.526*** 
(0.521) 
2.753*** 
(0.687) 
2.752*** 
(0.687) 
2.091*** 
(0.219) 
0.880 
(0.362) 
Landholdin
g 
0.090 
(0.139) 
0.417* 
(0.219) 
0.411* 
(0.221) 
0.412* 
(0.221) 
0.417* 
(0.222) 
0.422* 
(0.223) 
 
Household 
Size 
0.042 
(0.104) 
-0.020 
(0.150) 
-0.027 
(0.105) 
-0.027 
(0.105) 
-0.029 
(0.105) 
-0.028 
(0.105) 
 
Male-
Education 
-0.221*** 
(0.026) 
-0.266*** 
(0.40) 
-0.236*** 
(0.034) 
-0.237*** 
(0.040) 
-0.233*** 
(0.040) 
-0.235*** 
(0.040) 
 
Male-
Income 
-0.115*** 
(0.23) 
-0.098*** 
(0.33) 
-0.134*** 
(0.035) 
-0.133*** 
(0.35) 
-0.141*** 
(0.036) 
-0.138*** 
(0.036) 
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Female 
Education 
0.667*** 
(0.034) 
0.840*** 
(0.034) 
0.836*** 
(0.034) 
0.835*** 
(0.034) 
0.841*** 
(0.034) 
0.965*** 
(0.024) 
 
Constants  1.964*** 
(0.559) 
-0.202 
(0.565) 
-0.110 
(0.601) 
-0.247 
(0.633) 
-0.259 
(0.635) 
-0.267 
(0.636) 
 
State FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Birth Year 
Trend 
NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-
sqr 
0.26 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.24 
Observation
s 
4991 4991 4991 4990 4990 3598 
Notes *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at state level 
 
4.7. Conclusion:  
Women’s economic status and their bargaining powers are determined by the property 
rights they effectively hold. Any institutional barriers that restrict women’s access to 
property rights would be detrimental to the whole economy. In this chapter it was 
examined whether female inheritance legislation has important implications for women’s 
well being. It establishes the relation between inheritance rights of women and the 
gendered outcome measured in terms of female labour force participation, educational 
attainments and their daughter’s educational status. The results contribute to the growing 
literature on the role of property rights in gender development and notably, in the area of 
household economics which studies the importance of policies targeted towards women. 
Using the staggered implementation of legal amendments in the Hindu Succession Act, 
this chapter analysed the economic effects of improvements in inheritance laws in favour 
of women on labour force participation and educational attainments and studied how the 
benefits of those changes translate into improved education of the daughter through intra-
generational transfers of resources within the family?  The theoretical premise was based 
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on the non-Cooperative Bargaining Model which treats changes in inheritance laws as a 
positive shock to distribution factors which impact upon the intra-household bargaining. 
We believe that this positive shock allows women’s access to productive resources, 
maximizes her utility and control over her choices, so her bargaining power goes up 
within a household. Improvement in bargaining position also improves her autonomy in 
the household. We assume that the autonomy of an individual has some intrinsic 
economic value which helps shape the rational behaviour, generate incentives and assist 
in building individual capacities.  In this context, changes in inheritance laws in favour of 
women, greatly increase women’s ability to inherit property, which subsequently 
increases their unearned income in the current period or some unknown point in the 
future. As a result, the size of the initial endowment changes for women within the 
household.  The study showed that the equal inheritance property law reform has 
significant effect on the decision to invest in women’s education. This positive effect is 
also observed in their daughter’s educational attainment. The results are much stronger 
for younger cohorts as compared to older cohorts who are less likely to be affected by the 
reforms. Moreover, this improvement also increased her labour force participation through 
enhancing her autonomy in the household decision making process. These results are 
consistent with an elusive relationship between institutional change, bargaining power 
and women’s development. Thus, the HSA reform triggered an increase in female labour 
force participation and educational attainment through not only expanding the economic 
opportunities but also by improving its accessibility.  
From the policy perspective, this study offers a strong case for strengthening legal 
institutions in order to protect women’s rights, and for enhancing their bargaining power. 
In 2005, the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 extended to all women in 
all Indian states governed by the Hindu personal law and entitled them to inheritance 
rights on a par with sons regardless of their marital status. It is hoped that future research 
will consider this case to study the impact of reform on second generation beneficiaries 
and such analysis should be extended to study the impact of property rights reforms 
among other religions as well. At present, the focus is on the autonomy channel that has 
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played an important role in transmitting the benefits of reforms. However, another direct 
channel which may influence the results,  is dowry (a bride price). But due to lack of 
credible data on the dowry, the study has focused on the autonomy channel.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
5.1. Background:  
 The dissertation started with the assessment of the arguments for and against 
labour market regulation. It began with highlighting the role of labour laws and 
institutions in ensuring or impeding the functioning of labour markets. It briefly 
discussed the problem of rigidity in labour laws, and the related views of various scholars 
working in an interdisciplinary environment. Then it was briefly followed by a discussion 
on the theoretical foundations for assessing the economic effects of labour laws and 
labour markets institutions. Labour laws and their institutions are perceived as an 
exogenous interference with the operation of labour market forces. A widespread idea is 
that the perfect labour market acts as an implicit regulator of decisions allowing each 
agent to respond to incentives. Any regulatory interference with this market mechanism 
may lead to inefficient outcomes for the labour market and could perhaps disrupt the 
entire economy and may cause a deadweight loss for society.  
On the other hand, another group of scholars supports the legal intervention in labour 
markets that help ensure equitable distribution of income for all workers and correct 
market failure due to asymmetric information, signalling problems and unequal 
bargaining power. Eventually, the former view became a driving force to design the 
labour market flexibility strategy - a strategy that has dominated the reform agenda in 
many developing countries, and has been a driving force to reduce the regulatory 
constraints in the labour markets.  
 So far, several studies have examined the potential impact of these institutions of 
regulatory law on the labour markets. Much attention has been paid to study the labour 
market of developed countries and quite a few studies are related to developing countries. 
However, less attention is paid to the dynamics of local and national conditions, the legal 
environment, and the prevailing social institutions.  
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This dissertation departs from the previous studies and takes a fresh look at the impact of 
labour and non-labour market institutions using the interdisciplinary scholarships of law 
and economics, development economics and labour economics. It attempts to advance the 
current understanding on how the labour market and non-labour market institutions 
function and influence the functioning of labour markets in India. Even though the study 
is thus about one developing country some modest suggestions have been offered to 
generalise the conclusion drawn from the Indian labour market to other developing 
countries, which are markedly different from the developed countries but might have 
some labour market features in common with a country like India.  
The dissertation assessed the impact of such labour market institutions that have 
witnessed significant changes in the legal regime in India. These changes were either an 
attempt to remove institutional inertia from the labour market or they had totally different 
policy targets but affected the functioning of the labour market. In the second category 
falls the change of inheritance law for women, which aimed at promoting equal rights for 
women but, as has been shown, had also an enormous effect on women’s labour market 
participation.  
Disregarding the fact that the author is an Indian citizen, was raised in India and has the 
most comprehensive and intuitive understanding of the country as compared with all 
other developing countries, India, as a representative country from the pool of developing 
economies, has been selected to conduct empirical analysis for the following reasons: . 
Firstly, following the reform of the 1990s, the Indian economy has achieved remarkable 
progress; the average annual growth rate of the Indian the economy hovered around 6.3 
to 6.5 percent point for the period 2000 to 2014. Secondly, the same period is also 
marked as the period of demographic dividend that India is banking on to provide the 
country‘s 63.4 percentage active working age population (15-64 years) to the global 
economy. At a national level, this growth trajectory was largely criticised for yielding 
jobless economic growth by several prominent scholars and the rigid labour market 
institutions and inflexible business environment were mooted as the principle factors 
impeding the labour market performance. A priori, the arguments based on the 
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widespread belief of the negative impact of labour regulations has guided the policy 
discourse on labour issues in India. Thirdly India is a federal country, in which many 
rules of labour law are state law, which allows for the statistical evaluation across states. 
This study can be regarded as an attempt to critically examine the impact of legal reforms 
that are based on policy beliefs about the functioning of the Indian labour market.  
 
5.2. Impact of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and Law Enforcement on 
the Hiring of Temporary Contract Workers in the Organised Manufacturing 
Sector:  
 In India, the heated debate on the effects of EPL on labour market outcomes is 
focused on total employment growth, productivity and the growth of firms. Several 
prominent studies concentrated on the substantive labour law leaving aside the role of 
enforcement. They also disregard the changing nature of employment arrangements that 
is the rise of contractual workers replacing regular workers. Employment protection Laws 
even if well enforced protect as a matter of fact only the regular but not the contract 
workers. The share of such temporary contract workers has increased from 10 percent 
points to 27 percent point; the share of regular workers has decreased from 68 percent 
point to 54 percent point for the period 1995–2010 respectively. On the one hand, this 
growth has closely been associated with an attempt to increase the labour market 
flexibility-an employment adjustment technique for the management of labour demand 
flexibly. On the other hand, this positive development has its own drawback. A growth in 
their share is coupled with poor working conditions, low productivity and a lack of social 
cohesion between contract workers and regular workers. Therefore, labour laws as 
promised to protect workers through ensuring employment protection to all regular 
workers, are actually hurting many of them, because as a consequence of this change they 
might become unprotected contract workers. In India, the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) 
governs employer-worker relations and covers various aspects such as the resolution of 
labour disputes, hiring and firing workers, closure of establishments, retrenchment, 
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strikes and lockouts. This act covers regular workers who are directly employed in the 
formal sector, through long-term contracts, and who are well represented by the trade 
unions. However, temporary contract workers are exempted from the application of 
severance payment, mandatory notices or retrenchment authorisation from the state. Such 
exceptions from legal compliance incentivise employers to hire an increasing number of 
contract workers due the flexibility it offers in the formal labour market.  
In this context, this dissertation hypothesises, that the stricter EPL and effective law 
enforcement protects the rights and economic situation of regular workers. But that it 
incentivizes firms to circumvent those laws by hiring more temporary contract workers, 
who remain unprotected and are exempted from legal compliance. This study conjectures 
that firms located in strict EPL states, and faced with high enforcement intensity, are 
likely to experience a higher incidence of temporary contract workers as compared to 
those firms located in less strict EPL states, facing low enforcement intensity. It is not 
only the substantive labour laws that produce such effects but also how well the law is 
actually enforced which nter alia determine the magnitude of the effects on the observed 
outcome.  
Using the official data set on the Indian economy, this chapter examined - whether firms 
located in a stricter EPL regime across 29 states of the Indian Union hire differentially 
more temporary contract workers in response to variable “enforcement intensity”. The 
results corroborate our predictions. An overall strict EPL that protects the rights of 
regular workers and ensures their strong enforcement causes firms to hire more 
temporary contract workers relative to regular workers. Moreover, firms in inflexible 
labour regimes and those in flexible labour regimes hire differentially more temporary 
contract workers in response to the variable “enforcement intensity”. The research also 
showed that the severity of effects varies with the nature of the industries; the results 
indicate that labour intensive industries located in inflexible states, witness a higher 
incidence of contract workers than those located in flexible states. Therefore, the study 
conjectures that firms hire differentially more temporary contract workers in response to 
variable enforcement intensity to circumvent firing and overall mandated compliance 
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costs and it further gives them more flexibility in adjusting the workforce.  
In a nutshell, this chapter argues that labour laws, in combination with the effectiveness 
of their enforcement, influence the share of temporary contract workers or informal 
workers relative to regular workers. Firms adjust their flexible workforce depending on 
the state of labour regulation and its effective enforcement. This finding might have some 
importance for other developing countries as well.  
5.3. Impact of Mandatory Conciliation and Non Mandatory Conciliation 
Mechanism: 
 In chapter three, consideration was given to the relevance of conciliation methods 
in the resolution of labour disputes. We were especially interested in empirically 
assessing the impact of mandatory and non-mandatory conciliation processes on the 
negotiated settlement and the dispute resolution time. The design of the Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism is another labour market institution with direct implications for 
the labour market outcomes.  EPL provides employers with the flexibility to adjust their 
workforce and hire more or less unprotected contract workers. The dispute resolution 
mechanism provides workers with a unique opportunity to use their bargaining strengths 
and to claim those benefits to which the law entitles them . Grievances and conflicts are 
an inevitable part of the employment relationship. Establishing effective dispute 
prevention and resolution processes is a key to promoting sound industrial relations and 
to facilitate a smoothly functioning labour market. Having a sound dispute resolution 
mechanism is critical for productive employment relations.  In the absence of this 
mechanism, the labour market is likely to experience the strains of labour strikes and 
industry lockouts that would lead to an increase in the number of workday stoppages and 
to a decrease in the production of goods and services respectively. Notable studies have 
documented the growing incidence of workers unrest in many developing countries 
including India. As a result, the disappointment with the existing systems of dispute 
resolution for workers has attracted much attention.   
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This chapter began by explaining the role of dispute resolution in promoting healthy 
labour markets and illustrated how different countries have evolved their system to a 
multi-tier dispute resolution for various types of workers. Within the broader range of 
dispute resolution mechanisms, several models have been developed and applied to settle 
labour disputes such as conciliation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication. Among 
those models, the discipline of law and economics has paid much attention to the 
arbitration method of dispute mechanism as one form of ADR. In such studies, 
theoretical models of ADR have progressed relative to empirical studies to support this 
claim. However, little attention is paid to empirically assess the effectiveness of the 
different conciliation methods of dispute resolution. Using the recent changes in section 
2(a) of the IDA in 2010, this chapter assessed the impact of mandatory and non-
mandatory conciliation processes on the negotiated settlement and dispute resolution 
time. Combined with the related theoretical and empirical literature drawn from various 
branches of law and economics, this chapter posited its proposition on the standard theory 
of ADR. Based on empirical results, this dissertation argues that labour conflict cases 
settled in mandatory conciliation processes tend to take less average time than cases with 
a non-mandatory reconciliation procedure.  Also labour disputes settled in the 
conciliation process take less time than labour disputes appealed in the labour courts. 
Similarly, the settlement rates were found to be significant in the mandatory conciliation 
process. This process allows a neutral person to assist the aggrieved parties to share 
information and provide an amicable environment as compared to disputes that led to a 
non-mandatory conciliation process. Finally, this dissertation finds that a mandatory 
conciliation process reduces differences in the final payments received by workers, as it 
provides a time-bound negotiation space to disputing parties relative to other methods of 
ADR  
In sum, this dissertation argues that arbitration as one form of ADR provides an effective 
method to settle the dispute; similarly, the conciliation mechanism stands out as another 
effective way to redress labour conflicts in a satisfactory manner. Many legal scholars are 
sceptical about the capability of the conciliation to redress the labour conflicts since it is 
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based on the voluntary efforts, personal persuasion and wiliness of aggrieved parties. But 
if the legal system allows mandatory conciliation for all labour disputes that begin on the 
factory floor, then it may perhaps reduce the workload of labour courts and possibly 
render positive benefits to the disputing parties. The empirical results from this study 
confirm this view for the Indian case. 
More generally from the point of view of the developing countries, having an effective 
dispute resolution mechanism is necessary to sustain harmonious industrial relations and 
reduce the cost of the country‘s legal system. This could allow the judiciary to spend their 
time and resources on cases that require more attention. This thesis advocates that if such 
mechanisms are strengthened across all developing countries, a significant amount of 
resources could be saved.  
5.4. Impact of Equal Inheritance Women’s Rights: 
In the fourth chapter, the thesis is engaged with the question of how changes in 
inheritance laws in favour of women with the aim to end their traditionally unequal 
treatment, actually affected women’s participation in the labour market. Hence, the 
analysis of how changing the legal patterns of family law can influence labour markets.  
New inheritance laws gave equal rights for women on a par with men. The non-labour 
market institutions mediate their indirect impact through changing the bargaining position 
within the family. It is well understood that the family as a socio-economic unit in a 
given society greatly influences the division of labour and resource allocation within and 
outside the family. It also determines consumption and saving patterns and acts as a 
decisive factor for labour market participation as well as an incentive for human capital 
investment among females. Therefore, it is fruitful to ask whether an improvement in 
inheritance rights for women improves their labour force participation and their education 
attainments? The study thus highlights that considerable changes and improvements in 
one market (the labour market) might have their origin in legal changes regulating 
another sphere of society (inheritance law). The chapter began with highlighting the role 
of rights in the empowerment of women, and discussed how those rights are influential in 
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achieving the gendered outcome. The chapter then emphasised that inheritance laws are 
the principal legal instruments that grant women access to a family‘s wealth and bequest 
in the context of developing countries. It is also an important determinant of individual‘s 
incentives for wealth creation, social mobility and access to labour market opportunities. 
While the underlying social and cultural dynamics are complex, legal reforms to improve 
women‘s inheritance rights provide a low-cost way to reduce gender discrimination and 
improve a range of socio-economic outcomes for women.  
India witnessed a constitutional amendment to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 in 
2005. It gave daughters equal inheritance rights with sons. However, five states in India 
had earlier amended the same Act in favour of daughters. Using this natural setting, the 
chapter exploited a Difference-In- Difference (D-I-D) estimation strategy to estimate the 
impact of reform on female education, labour force participation and their daughter‘s 
educational attainment. Based on the empirical results, the thesis argues that 
improvement in inheritance rights in favour of women significantly increases their  
access to productive resources and increases women‘s unearned income This increase in 
women‘s unearned income also increases their autonomy, i.e. their control over income 
and improves their bargaining position within the family. The study found that women 
who were exposed to the reform experienced more  average schooling years, and average 
months of employment. It is interesting to note that this positive effect is also observed 
for their daughter‘s educational attainments. In much of the policy discourse in 
developing countries, serious attention has been paid to institutions that imply direct 
impact on the labour markets. This thesis has paid equal attention to non-labour market 
institutions that could mediate their effects through changing the allocation rules in the 
family. Recently, it was estimated that bridging the gender gap in the labour market will 
translate into an economic boost of 1.4 percent per year incremental GDP growth and this 
could add $700 Millions to India's GDP in 2025. About 70 percent of the increase would 
come from raising India's female labour- force participation rate from the current 31 
percent to 41 percent in 2025, bringing 68 million more women into the economy. Thus, 
this dissertation argues that like the labour markets institutions that directly affect the 
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performance of labour markets, the same importance could be given to non-labour market 
institutions such as inheritance rights that may improve the outcome for women workers. 
Further, this dissertation also advocates that such changes be accompanied by changes in 
labour laws across developing countries allowing more mobility to women workers.  
5.5. Avenues for future research: 
In this thesis, an attempt has been made to study the impact of both labour market and 
non-labour institutions on various outcomes of labour markets in India. Multiple ways are 
opened for future research if the ideas presented in this study are considered for evidence 
based policy analysis. First, the analysis presented in this thesis has so far looked into the 
dynamics of regulatory variables as coded by some of the prominent scholars that have 
applied using macro data drawn on the Indian economy. It is advisable for future scholars 
to undertake the coding process of labour regulation simultaneously with the enforcement 
variable so that the true effect of a particular law can be disentangled in order to study 
them further. Secondly, various institutions that regulate or perhaps, facilitate the 
economic development in India were created during the colonial time.  Labour market 
institutions such as some of those discussed in this study still allow the colonial mentality 
to be followed while enforcing labour regulations. It is further advisable for future 
scholars to identify such spots or trends to draw the attention of policy makers so that 
while amending the law they might consider it in the legislative process. Third, so far we 
have focused on the organised (formal) labour markets to conduct the empirical analysis. 
This is also due to a paucity of data that allows inter- linkages between formal and 
informal labour markets. Throughout this thesis, it has been assumed that labour 
regulations only affect the formal labour markets, but there is various anecdotal evidence 
which shows us the impact of rigid labour regulations on informal labour markets. Hence, 
it is advisable for future scholars to make use of the latest dataset on the Indian Human 
Development Survey 2014-15 to conduct the empirical analysis on labour market in 
India. Fifth, the Indian economy is going through a rapid transition, allowing the 
structural transformation of the age old legal institutions. Since the new government 
came to power, a process of structural change in the old labour laws has been stirred up to 
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transform the economy.  It is advisable for all future scholars of the Indian labour market 
to take into account the current reform measures which are undertaken by the government 
while conducting the empirical analysis of labour regulations. Finally, and most 
importantly, the labour regulation debate classifying the states in India as pro-labour or 
capital is highly problematic as state governments’ comprehensive labour policy outlook 
does not lend to water-tight compartmentalization as is done. This is a grave limitation of 
over-reliance on quantitative studies which fail to capture the realities. Here, the study 
advises all scholars to complement the legal analysis with empirical analysis of labour 
markets to see how their joint interaction affects the observed outcomes of the labour 
markets of India.  
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Appendix: 1 
States EPL ENFORCE 
Andaman and Nicobar (UT) 0 0.13 
Andhra Pradesh -2 0.22 
Assam 1 0.09 
Bihar 1 0.20 
Chandigarh (UT) 1 0.16 
Chattisgarh 1 0.21 
Dadara Nagar Haveli (UT) 0 0.09 
Daman and Diu (UT) 0 0.11 
Delhi (UT) 1 0.21 
Goa 1 0.24 
Gujarat -1 0.29 
Haryana 1 0.42 
Himachal Pradesh 1 0.21 
Jammu &Kashmir 0 0.13 
Jharkhand 1 0.28 
Karnataka -1 0.13 
Kerala 1 0.15 
Madhya Pradesh 1 0.24 
Maharashtra 2 0.32 
Manipur 0 0.08 
Meghalaya 0 0.06 
Nagaland 0 0.05 
Orissa 1 0.19 
Pondicherry (UT) 0 0.06 
Punjab 1 0.22 
Rajasthan -1 0.27 
Tamil Nadu -2 0.30 
Tripura 0 0.15 
Uttar Pradesh -1 0.37 
Uttaranchal 0 0.21 
West Bengal 4 0.44 
Source: Author’s own calculation (see section 4 of Chapter 2 for the data description)  
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SUMMARY 
This doctoral dissertation examines and investigates the impact of labour market and non- 
labour market institutions on the Indian labour market. In general, some of its most 
important findings are of interest for other developing countries as well. It engages with 
the critical debate on the potential adverse effects of protective labour laws. Many 
scholars have looked sceptically on those effects as a bottleneck to labour market 
flexibility and economic development. To address the raised concerns, this dissertation 
empirically investigates three research questions that are interlinked with each other.  
The first two research questions deals with the assessment of labour market institutions 
that have direct implication on the Indian labour market. The third research question 
deals with the assessment of non-labour market institutions that has indirect implication 
on the labour market mediated through changing bargaining position of a woman within a 
family. However, this academic engagement can best be viewed as an empirical exercise 
exhorting how specific the India‘s labour laws and personal laws such as inheritance 
property rights, interact with the labour market. Moreover it also allows us to analyse 
how these interactions are receptive to advance our scholarship on understanding the 
relationship between labour market and labour market institutions that have witnessed 
significant changes since the beginning of economic reform of 1991 in India.  
The first research question examines the impact of strict employment protection laws and 
enforcement intensity on the growing incidence of temporary contract workers in India. 
This chapter argues that if strict employment protection laws that protect the rights of 
regular workers and the enforcement of those legal rights are perfectly complied with, 
then it is possible for Indian firms to circumvent those laws. Firms indeed do so by 
reducing the demand for regular workers and increasing the demand for temporary 
contract workers since the latter category of workers are exempted from legal 
compliances. The chapter conjectures that firms located in strict employment protection 
states and faced with a high enforcement intensity are likely to experience higher 
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incidence of temporary contract workers compared to firms located in less strict 
employment protection states and facing low enforcement intensity. Moreover, firms in 
inflexible labour regimes and those in flexible labour regimes hire differentially more 
temporary contract workers in response to variable enforcement intensities. The degree of 
these effects varies across industries; the results indicate that the labour intensive 
industries located in states with inflexible labour law witness higher incidence of contract 
workers than those located in states with more flexible labour law. Nonetheless, it does 
matters especially how strictly those well intended laws are actually enforced. This inter 
alia determines the magnitude of effects on observed outcome.  
The second research question investigates the impact of mandatory and non-mandatory 
conciliation mechanisms on the negotiated settlement and dispute resolution time in 
India. This chapter aims to find out -whether such possibilities could improve the 
industrial relation climate and reduce strikes and lockouts. Using the recent amendments 
in section 2(a) of Industrial Dispute Act of 1947 in 2010, this allows the disputing 
parties’ direct access to the labour courts, without taking any resource to conciliation 
proceedings or the negotiated outcome in the conciliation conference. Combined with the 
related theoretical and empirical literature drawn from various branches of law and 
economics, this chapter posits its proposition on the standard theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution. Based on empirical results, this chapter argues that, the labour 
conflict cases settled in mandatory conciliation process tend to take less average time 
than cases appealed in the labour court (a non-mandatory scenario); whereas, at an 
aggregate level, labour disputes settled in the conciliation process take less time than 
labour disputes appealed in the labour courts. Similarly, the settlement rates were found 
to be significant in the mandatory conciliation process as it allows a neutral person to 
assist the aggrieved parties to share information and provide an amicable environment 
compared to disputes that participated in a non-mandatory conciliation process. Finally, a 
mandatory conciliation process provides an effective way to reduce differences in the 
final payments received by workers, as it provides a time-bound negotiation space to 
disputing parties relative to other methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution.  
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The third research question analyzes- whether the equal inheritance property laws reform 
improves female labour force participation and educational attainments in India. This 
chapter argues that improvement in inheritance rights in favour of women significantly 
increases women‘s access to productive resources and increases women‘s ability to 
inherit property, which subsequently, increases their unearned income in the current 
period or some unknown point in the future. This increase in women‘s unearned income 
also increases their autonomy, i.e. their control over income and improved bargaining 
position within the family. In 2005, India witnessed a constitutional amendment to the 
Hindu Succession Act of 1956. It gave daughters equal inheritance rights as sons. 
However, five states in India had earlier amended the same Act in favour of daughters. 
Using this exogenous variation created by legislation on inheritance property rights; this 
chapter exploits a Difference in Difference estimation strategy to estimate the impact of 
reform on female education, labour force participation and their daughter‘s educational 
attainment. This chapter argues that women who were exposed to the reform have greater 
average years of schooling and average months of labour force participation than those 
women who were not exposed to the reform. It is interesting to note that this positive 
effect is also observed in daughters’ educational attainments whose mothers were exposed 
to the reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

SAMENVATTING
 
In dit proefschrift wordt het effect van arbeidsmarkt- en niet-arbeidsmarktgerelateerde
instellingen op de Indiase arbeidsmarkt onderzocht. Over het geheel genomen zijn een 
aantal van de belangrijkste bevindingen ook relevant voor andere ontwikkelingslanden. 
Het proefschrift sluit aan op het kritische debat over de potentiele negatieve effecten 
van beschermende arbeidswetgeving. Veel wetenschappers zijn sceptisch over deze 
effecten en beschouwen deze als een bottleneck voor een flexibele arbeidsmarkt en 
economische ontwikkeling. Het proefschrift gaat in op de gerezen bezorgdheid aan de 
hand van empirisch onderzoek naar drie onderling gerelateerde onderzoeksvragen.
De eerste twee onderzoeksvragen hebben betrekking op de beoordeling van 
arbeidsmarktgerelateerde instituties die rechtstreeks van invloed zijn op de Indiase 
arbeidsmarkt. De derde onderzoeksvraag betreft de beoordeling van niet-
arbeidsmarktgerelateerde instituties die indirect van invloed zijn op de arbeidsmarkt als 
gevolg van de veranderende onderhandelingspositie van de vrouw in het gezin. Deze 
academische betrokkenheid kan echter het beste worden beschouwd als empirische 
oefening waarbij wordt onderzocht hoe specifiek de wisselwerking is tussen het Indiase 
arbeidsrecht en privaatrecht, waaronder het erfrecht, enerzijds en de arbeidsmarkt 
anderzijds. Daarnaast wordt geanalyseerd hoe deze wisselwerking het 
wetenschappelijk begrip ten goede kan komen van de relatie tussen de arbeidsmarkt en 
arbeidsmarktgerelateerde instituties, die sinds de economische hervormingen van 1991 
in India ingrijpende veranderingen hebben doorgemaakt.
De eerste onderzoeksvraag beoordeelt het effect van strenge beschermende 
arbeidswetgeving en de intensiteit van de handhaving op de toename van het aantal 
tijdelijke arbeidskrachten in India. In dit hoofdstuk wordt gesteld dat indien de strenge 
arbeidswetgeving die dient ter bescherming van de rechten van vaste werknemers 
volledig wordt nageleefd en gehandhaafd, Indiase bedrijven die wetten zullen 
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omzeilen. Bedrijven doen dat door de vraag naar vaste werknemers te verlagen en de 
vraag naar tijdelijke arbeidskrachten te verhogen, aangezien deze laatsten niet onder 
deze wetgeving vallen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt gespeculeerd dat bij bedrijven in staten 
met een strenge beschermende arbeidswetgeving die worden geconfronteerd met een 
hoge intensiteit van de handhaving waarschijnlijk sprake is van een hoger aantal 
tijdelijke arbeidskrachten dan in bedrijven in staten met een minder strenge 
beschermende arbeidswetgeving en een lagere handhavingsintensiteit. Bovendien 
nemen bedrijven in staten met een inflexibele arbeidswetgeving en bedrijven in staten 
met een flexibele arbeidswetgeving relatief meer tijdelijke arbeidskrachten aan als 
reactie op een variabele handhavingsintensiteit. De ernst van de effecten varieert per 
sector; de resultaten duiden erop dat in de arbeidsintensieve sectoren in staten met een 
inflexibele arbeidswetgeving sprake is van meer tijdelijke arbeidskrachten dan in staten 
met meer flexibele arbeidswetten. Het is echter met name van belang hoe strikt die 
goedbedoelde wetgeving effectief wordt gehandhaafd. Dit bepaalt onder andere de 
omvang van het effect op de waargenomen uitkomst.
De tweede onderzoeksvraag kijkt naar het effect van verplichte en niet-verplichte 
bemiddelingsmechanismen op de tijd die in India nodig is om via onderhandelingen 
overeenstemming te bereiken en geschillen te beslechten. In dit hoofdstuk wordt 
getracht vast te stellen of dergelijke mogelijkheden zouden kunnen leiden tot betere 
arbeidsverhoudingen en een daling van het aantal stakingen en bedrijfsbezettingen. Op 
basis van de in 2010 doorgevoerde wijzigingen in artikel 2(a) van de 
arbeidsgeschillenwet van 1947 hebben de twistende partijen rechtstreeks toegang tot 
de arbeidsrechtbanken, zonder te hoeven terugvallen op bemiddelingsprocedures of de 
onderhandelingsresultaten van de bemiddelingsconferentie. In combinatie met de 
relevante theoretische en empirische literatuur afkomstig van diverse rechtsgebieden 
en takken van de economie, wordt in dit hoofdstuk een stelling geponeerd over de 
standaardtheorie van de alternatieve geschillenbeslechting. 
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Aan de hand van de empirische resultaten wordt in dit hoofdstuk gesteld dat de 
arbeidsconflicten die worden beslecht in een verplichte bemiddelingsprocedure 
gemiddeld minder tijd in beslag nemen dan zaken die door de arbeidsrechtbanken 
worden behandeld (een niet-verplicht scenario); over het geheel genomen nemen 
arbeidsgeschillen die worden beslecht in de bemiddelingsprocedure minder tijd in 
beslag dan arbeidsgeschillen die door de arbeidsrechtbanken worden behandeld. 
Evenzo bleek het percentage beslechte geschillen in de verplichte 
bemiddelingsprocedure significant te zijn als gevolg van het feit dat een onpartijdige 
persoon de benadeelde partijen kan helpen informatie te delen en er sprake is van een 
meer vriendschappelijke omgeving dan bij geschillen die werden onderworpen aan een 
niet-verplichte bemiddelingsprocedure. Ten slotte biedt een verplichte 
bemiddelingsprocedure een effectieve manier om verschillen met betrekking tot de 
uiteindelijke betalingen die werknemers ontvangen terug te dringen, doordat de 
twistende partijen anders dan bij andere methoden inzake alternatieve 
geschillenbeslechting een tijdgebonden onderhandelingsruimte wordt geboden.
De derde onderzoeksvraag analyseert of de hervorming op het gebied van gelijk 
erfrecht leidt tot een grotere arbeidsparticipatie en betere schoolprestaties van vrouwen 
in India. In dit hoofdstuk wordt gesteld dat de verbetering van het erfrecht ten gunste 
van vrouwen de toegang van vrouwen tot productiemiddelen en de mogelijkheid voor 
vrouwen om eigendom te erven aanzienlijk vergroot, wat vervolgens leidt tot een 
stijging van hun inkomen uit vermogen op dat moment of op enig onbekend tijdstip in 
de toekomst. Deze toename van het inkomen uit vermogen van vrouwen komt ook hun
autonomie ten goede: ze hebben meer zeggenschap over hun inkomen en een betere 
onderhandelingspositie binnen het gezin. In 2005 vond in India een wijziging plaats 
van de Hindoestaanse wet inzake erfopvolging van 1956. Hierdoor kregen dochters 
dezelfde erfrechten als zonen. Vijf staten in India hadden dezelfde wet al eerder ten 
gunste van dochters gewijzigd. 
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Uitgaande van deze exogene variatie die het gevolg is van de wetgeving inzake erfrecht 
wordt in dit hoofdstuk een strategie voor een verschil-in-verschil-meting gehanteerd 
om een inschatting te kunnen maken van het effect van hervormingen op onderwijs 
voor vrouwen, hun arbeidsparticipatie en de schoolprestaties van hun dochters. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt gesteld dat vrouwen die met de hervorming te maken kregen 
gemiddeld meer scholingsjaren en meer maanden arbeidsparticipatie hadden dan 
vrouwen die niet met de hervorming te maken kregen. Het is interessant om op te 
merken dat dit gunstige effect ook wordt waargenomen bij de schoolprestaties van
dochters van moeders die met de hervorming te maken kregen.
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